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ABSTRACT 
The majority of empirical studies that investigate the relationship of corruption and FDI tend 
to find that there is a strong relationship between corruption and FDI, although the findings 
are mixed in this regard; some have found the opposite while others have resulted in 
inconclusive results. This paper uses an institutional approach to corruption and seeks to 
advance the concept of “corruption distance” as it relates to FDI in context of Africa, it 
therefore investigated the manner in which the perceived level of corruption in the African 
continent affects the level of FDI counties in Africa are able to attract.  
The paper analyses corruption and FDI where the home countries are developing economies in 
Africa in order to obtain a greater insight regarding relationships in African investment using a 
panel data set of 45 African countries from 2003 to 2013. The research findings support the view 
that corruption distance has a negative effect on FDI in Africa. Given the levels of corruption in 
Africa, even expectations that more corrupt countries would be more likely to invest in less 
corrupt countries where confirmed. Our evidence confirms that the flow of FDI in Africa is 
mostly influenced by countries who on average are less corrupt that African countries. The paper 
finds that that there is a negative relationship between corruption and FDI where the home 
country is less corrupt than the host African country and concludes that the potential for FDI 
towards Africa to be great if the institutional quality underpinning the investment climate in 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
In 2016, the Fiscal Affairs and Legal Department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
attributed the consequence of bribery related activities to a tune of up to $2 trillion (IMF, 
2016). The IMF further reports that the “overall economic and social costs of corruption are 
likely to be even larger” and has identified key channels of growth in which corruption has a 
negative effect. These refer to key state functions such as fiscal policy, policy formulated by 
the country reserve banks as well as other institutional mechanisms that are required to 
promote trust and certainty in the manner in which governments and countries interact with 
its citizens in the allocation of resources (ibid).  
Jain (2001) describes the definition of corruption, which will be used in this thesis, in the 
following way: 
“Corruption, defined more comprehensively, involves inappropriate use of political power 
and reflects a failure of the political institutions within a society. Corruption seems to result 
from an imbalance between the processes of acquisition of positions of political power in a 
society, the rights associated with those positions of power, and the rights of citizens to 
control the use of that power. Power leads to temptation for misuse of that power. When such 
misuse is not disciplined by the institutions that represent the rights of the citizens, corruption 
can follow” (p. 3). 
It is from this definition that the concept of corruption and its impact on FDI will be analysed, 
discussed and interpreted. Additionally, the World Bank reports on the negative effects that 
are observed as a result of corruption pertaining to the following cost implications, where 
corruption: 
 Increases the cost and risk of operating, and the uncertainty created in a locality;
 Results in sub-optimal economic outcomes that could have been obtained through the
use of fewer resources;
 Is detrimental to future investment made locally and abroad;
2 
 Results in effort being directed to rent seeking instead of value creation activities, and
changes the way in which firms optimise their resources; and
 Creates an environment where companies start to operate in the black market resulting
in losses of tax revenue for the state. (World Bank, 1998)
These drawbacks of corruption, and related effects on  economic growth and development 
have been supported by contemporary thoughts of Mauro, who in his respective studies, 
presents evidence indicating that corruption negatively affects the economic growth of 
countries (Mauro, 1995,1997). 
The prevalence of corruption seems to also have a correlation with the institutions of 
countries (Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005), (Svensson, 2005). Institutional strength and 
capacity to influence policy direction and discourse has been one of the central pillars 
determining corruption and the extent to which it influences perception of the society (Jain, 
2001), mainly because it is the effective functioning of these institutions that bring credibility 
to the mechanisms available to combat the scourge of corruption. The funding of countries 
through the World Bank and bilateral country arrangements has historically as well as 
currently sought to strengthen institutional capacity of countries to enable growth and 
developmental objectives to thrive (Dollar & Levin, 2005). These scholars were of the 
opinion that development aid has the most impact in countries that have sound institutions 
(Dollar & Levin, 2005).  
Post 1993 era renewed emphasis on global development to focus on corruption signaled by 
the formation of Transparency International in 1993 (Transparency International, 2017). 
After the financial crises of 2008, slow growth and rising debt in many countries resulted in 
increased competition amongst countries for the attraction of investment that creates internal 
employment and unlike trade, does not have the added risk of funding future budget deficits 
in order to spur growth, finance increasing government spending, and reduce unemployment 
(UNCTAD, 2015). The last decade has also seen development and promulgation of socially 
responsible standards that focus on Multi-National Enterprises and investment and the 
international rules supporting these (UNCTAD, 2015). 
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Figure 1: World Corruption Prevalence 
Source: Transparency International (www.transparency.org/cpi2015) 
Figure 1 above is a visual indication of the prevalence of perceived corruption in the world as 
described by the index developed by Transparency International, also referred to as the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (2015). The measurement of the level of corruption is 
rated from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (clean). As the map illustrates, there is a prevalence of 
countries in the world that are perceived as leaning towards a highly corrupt level, with a few 
countries predominantly in Western Europe and North America leaning towards very clean. 
The map seems to suggest that the majority of the world economies are plagued with 
challenges of corruption. 
Figure 2: World CPI per Region 
Source: (Transparency International, 2015) 
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The chart above illustrates the perception of corruption in Africa using the CPI index 
compared to the rest of the world. Out of the 52 African countries included, 46 (88%) show a 
serious corruption disposition (below a score of 50). The Europe and Central Asia region 
(ECA), which excludes the European Union, shows the highest percentage of countries (95%) 
with serious corruption problems, the best performing region being Western Europe 
(WE/EU) at 13%. An overall observation shows that 68% of countries in the world have a 
serious corruption problem. 
With the fall of communism and increased effort towards globalization, the 1990’s witnessed 
an increased role of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, & 
Sayek, 2004: 1). The trend has continued since as can be seen in the chart below: 
Figure 3: Global FDI inflows by group of economies, 1995-2015 (billions $) 
Source: (UNCTAD, 2016) 
By 2015, FDI flows to developing economies comprised 43% of the global FDI flows. The 
preceding year, this figure was 55%. The global growth in foreign controlled investments 
show 
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Figure 4: Share of global FDI inflows by group of economies 2015 (billions $/cent) 
Source: (UNCTAD, 2016) 
 a greater level of rate progression than most other foreign investment flows (Blonigen, 
2005). It is these trends according to Blonigen, that have resulted in amplified interest in the 
academic fraternity and have spurred the growing investigations into the drivers of FDI 
activity (2005). When observing developing country FDI flows, specifically African FDI 
flows, the growing trend in FDI is also detected.  
Figure 5: Africa FDI inflows by group of economies, 1995-2015 (billions $/cent) 
Source: (UNCTAD, 2016) 
North Africa by far has been the main beneficiary of cumulative FDI since 1995 (31% of 
African FDI), followed by West Africa and Southern Africa. The regions of Central Africa 
and East Africa have been the worst performing regions in the African continent during this 
period (World Investment Report, 2016). FDI, as seen in the Fig 1.5 above, has been resilient 
2015 FDI 
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during the Asian financial crises that transpired during 1997 and persisted in the following 
year. This is true also for the more recent 2008 crisis. The resilience of FDI is also observed 
in the Mexican crises of 1994-1995 and the Latin American crises of the 1980’s, this 
evidence, which as suggested by Assaf et al (2001), has led to Developing Countries favoring 
this form of capital flow. 
Corruption and its effects on FDI or growth has been studied by a number of scholars (Wei 
2000; Mauro 1995, 1997; Ahmad et al  2012). The majority of studies in this area have 
consistently found economic growth and corruption to be negatively correlated and have 
supported similar conclusions regarding corruption and FDI.  
1.2 Research Problem 
Much of the research investigating corruption and FDI uses cross sectional data that involves 
various host countries in different stages of development, localities, political stability and a 
few source countries which usually tend to be from developed economies. The 
socioeconomic effects of corruption, coupled by the prevalence of this phenomenon in 
Africa, imply a requirement for the continued development in the understanding of corruption 
as a determinant of FDI. 
To the researcher’s knowledge, an investigation that probes the relationship of corruption to 
FDI in bilateral investments where the host countries are developing economies in Africa and 
the consideration of how the relative corruption amiability of these countries may affect FDI 
decisions, has not been performed. In essence, the question of corruption distance, defined as 
the differences in corruption levels between host and home countries (Habib & Zurawicki, 
2002) has not been performed. Corruption distance as a variable in this study has not been 
investigated regarding relationships in Intra-African investment. Given the resilience 
observed by the flow of FDI for various economic regions, and the preference for developing 
countries to favour FDI, it is consequently important to understand whether the growth in 
FDI, in intra African commerce, is negatively affected by corruption considering the 
literature that suggest that entities and institutions that originate from corrupt countries (that 
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experience high levels of corruption) are not unduly influenced by corruption emanating in 
host countries when making decisions on providing FDI (Godinez & Liu, 2015). 
1.3 Research question 
The study will explore the following research questions: 
 Does the perception of corruption in Africa affect the capability of African countries
to attract foreign direct investment from investor countries?
 Is the effect of corruption distance on FDI significant in Africa?
1.4 Objective of the study 
The study seeks to investigate whether corruption distance negatively affects foreign direct 
investment when investment involves an African country as source of FDI and another 
African country as the host as well as to explore whether corruption distance plays a role in 
determining the flow of FDI in Africa. The objective could thus be decomposed as follows: 
1. Confirming the effect of corruption on FDI inflows in Africa
2. Confirming whether corruption distance has an effect on FDI where the home
countries are more corrupt than the host country.
3. Confirming whether corruption distance has an effect on FDI where corruption in the
home countries is less than found in the host country.
1.5 The significance of the study 
The research questions posed, are significant from a theoretical and policy perspective. From 
a theoretical perspective the research would add to the current literature exploring the 
relationship between corruption and FDI as well as expands the understanding of the 
variables important in the determination of FDI in Africa. From a policy perspective, an 
understanding of the determinants of FDI in Africa, will assist governments and policy 
makers to consider the aspects that drive FDI in Africa and develop appropriate economic 
policy interventions to stimulate investment on the continent.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2 Introduction 
What makes firms invest abroad through acquiring long term interests in foreign markets? 
What are the reasons that determine the location for investment and are these reasons the 
same for MNE’s (Multi-National Enterprises) that operate in Africa? How does corruption 
play a role in the decisions made by MNE’s regarding investment in foreign countries? The 
first section of this chapter will explore corruption as a concept. The different definitions 
regarding corruption will be explained and the theoretical classifications defined. The concept 
of FDI will thereafter be defined, followed by a short overview of the investment theories that 
laid the theoretical foundations from which FDI theory emerged. 
The second part of the chapter will discuss the theories and theoretical approaches relating to 
the drivers or determinants of FDI, and the underlying components that have been advanced 
to explain the concept. Focus will then be placed in the analysis of some of the theories that 
have explored the determinants of FDI from an institutional point of view. The chapter will 
proceed by discussing the different views regarding the role of corruption in deterring and, as 
well as in promoting FDI. The introduction of the concept of corruption as a form of 
institutional deficiency as well as the key research concept of corruption distance will be 
presented to conclude the theoretical literature under consideration. 
2.1 Corruption 
Corruption has been a subject of concern all over the world for a considerably long time. One 
of the earliest references of corruption come from sources as early as the 4th century B.C. 
where Kautiliya (1915) the Prime Minister of the India as he then was deposes that,  
“Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey (or the poison) that finds itself at the tip 
of the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up, at least, a bit 
of the king’s revenue. Just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be found out 
either as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed in the 
government work cannot be found out (while) taking money (for themselves)” (p. 
96).  
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Other orthodox scholars who surveyed the political ideas such as Plato, Thucydides and 
Machiavelli, have described corruption and its effect on societies and the “distributions of 
wealth and power relationships between leaders and followers” as explained by Johnston 
(2001: 12). The author describes that in this period, the issue of corruption had been seen 
from the lens of politics, as “a social process, with corruption referring at least as much to the 
ends and justifications of political power as to the ways it was used and pursued”. Corruption 
also became to be explained in terms of the social and ethical description in much later years, 
with authors such as Frantz Fanon exploring factors such as the “national consciousness” of 
newly independent regimes and how inevitably they fall in the trap of corrupt practices 
(Fanon, 1961: 98). 
2.2 Definitions of corruption 
The modern definitions of corruption are based on “explicitly public roles endowed with 
limited impersonal powers”. as According to Johnston corruption can be divided into the 
behavior classification definitions and the neo classical definitions (Johnston, 2001): 
2.2.1 Behavior classification definitions 
These forms of definitions of corruption, explain the phenomenon as “an abuse of public 
power” for the “private benefit” of an individual and/or group. Definitions in this space of 
classification usually struggle with the articulation of the meaning of concepts such as 
“private”, “benefit”, “public” as well as what, within the context of the exercise of power, 
constitutes “abuse” (Johnston, 2001). Debate around the definitions of such concepts and the 
manner in which these concepts have been explained range between those that espouse an 
objective view, as can be found in law, to those that advocate social standards for definition. 
Such studies according to Johnston, often recognize that cultural opinions and other ethical 
standards vary across regions (Johnston, 2001) . 
2.2.2 Neoclassical definitions 
Neoclassical definitions of corruption try to define corruption as not only a result of a 
behavior or action that can be deemed as corrupt but rather an issue with the processes of 
politics and the manner in which political power is gained, retained and exercised (Rogow 
and Lasswell 1963). 
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2.3 Corruption in literature 
The literature on corruption does not settle the debate regarding the definition of corruption. 
Further complicating the issues of the definitions of corruption is the fact that it is 
problematic to measure. Given that corruption occurs, the activities of corruption are 
normally hidden from view resulting in a conundrum regarding how to measure the extent of 
the actual occurrence of corruption. Secondly, the type and frequency of corruption can vary 
widely in different regions making comparative assessments difficult. 
According to Ahmad et al (2012) corruption has up until the 1980’s, been confined to the 
fields of sociology, history, public administration and criminal law, with an increasing focus 
in the field of economics in in the years leading to 2012. In October 2006, the Nobel 
economist, Joseph Stiglitz attributes much of the effort and credit in recent times to put 
corruption on the agenda of the World Bank “against opponents who regarded corruption as a 
political issue, not an economic one, and thus outside the Bank’s mandate” (2016, p. 1) as a 
result of research he conducted to show the systemic relationships that corruption share with 
economic growth. He further states that: 
“The World Bank’s primary responsibility is to fight poverty, which means that when 
it confronts a poor country plagued with corruption, its challenge is to figure out how 
to ensure that its own money is not tainted and gets to projects and people that need it 
(p. 2).” 
These definitions of corruption, together with the popularisation of corruption as an 
economical as well as a political issue highlights the following important points that are 
summarised by this research regarding how the understanding of corruption is to be 
developed in this thesis:  
i. It incorporates social and ethical standards that vary amongst regions
ii. It involves a process of politics (the manner in which political power is gained,
retained and exercised)
iii. It is a political as well as an economic issue
iv. It involves an abuse of power
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Jain (2001) brings these elements together with an appreciation of political institutions in this 
comprehensive definition of corruption: 
“Corruption, defined more comprehensively, involves inappropriate use of political 
power and reflects a failure of the political institutions within a society. Corruption 
seems to result from an imbalance between the processes of acquisition of positions of 
political power in a society, the rights associated with those positions of power, and 
the rights of citizens to control the use of that power. Power leads to temptation for 
misuse of that power. When such misuse is not disciplined by the institutions that 
represent the rights of the citizens, corruption can follow” (p. 3). 
When corruption does follow, a vast body of literature on corruption argues that corruption 
increases the operational cost of business, creates uncertainty and deters growth (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, & Thaicharoen, 2003; Andrei 
Shleifer, 1993; Hall & Jones, 1999; Mauro, 1995). These strands of literature can be said to 
be classified under the sanding-the-wheels hypothesis which argue that corruption hinders 
economic activity. Other strands of studies of corruption espouses that corruption “greases 
the wheels of commerce” or is detrimental to economic activity (greasing the wheels 
hypothesis) and may even allocate investment and time more efficiently (Tanzi, 1998). This 
argument has been described by Bardhan (2013) as an extension of (Leff, 1964) who argues 
the following: 
“….if the government has erred in its decision, the course made possible by corruption 
may well be the better one (p.11). 
2.4 Definition of FDI 
The IMF (IMF, 2007) identifies five (5) different classifications of financial transactions used 
in International accounts: “Direct Investment; Portfolio Investment; Financial Derivatives 
(other than reserves) and Employee Stock Options; Other Investment; and Reserve Assets”(p. 
99). 
These classifications are characterised based on economic motivations and the behaviour they 
exhibit, e.g., Portfolio Investments differ from Direct investment in that the latter “is related 
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to control or a significant degree of influence, and tends to be associated with a longer term 
relationship”    (International Monetary Fund, 2009, p. 99). 
The definition of FDI promulgated by the OECD (2008) is as follows: 
“Direct investment is defined as “a category of cross-border investment made by a 
resident entity in one economy (the direct investor) with the objective of establishing a 
lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an 
economy other than that of the direct investor……. The main motivation of the direct 
investor is to exert some degree of influence over the management of its direct 
investment enterprise(s) whether or not this entails exercising a controlling interest. 
However, in many, if not most cases, the relationship is strong enough that the direct 
investor will control the direct investment enterprise. The motivation to significantly 
influence or control an enterprise is the underlying factor that differentiates direct 
investment from cross-border portfolio investments” (p. 17). 
2.4.1 Concepts in defining FDI 
From these definitions, the concepts of residence and degree of influence form the core of 
the definition of FDI. In this context, the United Nations identifies the “resident” in an 
economy as different from either citizenship or nationality (United Nations, 2009). Residents 
include “governments, incorporated companies, unincorporated businesses, societies, 
partnerships, individuals, households, non-profit organizations and unions” that have an 
economic interest and have engaged in economic activity at a significant scale for more than 
one year or intends to do so as suggested by the IMF (International Monetary Fund, 2009) in 
this definition: 
“The residence of each institutional unit is the economic territory with which it has the 
strongest connection, expressed as its centre of predominant economic interest. Each 
institutional unit is a resident of one and only one economic territory determined by its 
centre of predominant economic interest…………An institutional unit is resident in 
an economic territory when there exists, within the economic territory, some location, 
dwelling, place of production, or other premises on which or from which the unit 
engages and intends to continue engaging, either indefinitely or over a finite but long 
period of time, in economic activities and transactions on a significant scale. The 
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location need not be fixed so long as it remains within the economic territory. Actual 
or intended location for one year or more is used as an operational definition” (p.70). 
Control or Degree of influence is the degree control over management decisions that is 
obtained via funds, supply of additional contributions such as technology, management, 
intellectual property, marketing and other assets. The IMF (2009) describes Control or 
Influence in the following way: 
“Control or influence may be achieved directly by owning equity that gives voting 
power in the enterprise, or indirectly by having voting power in another enterprise that 
has voting power in the enterprise” (p.101). 
2.5 Theoretical overview of Trade and Investment 
There is no agreed model in the literature of FDI that explains the determinants of FDI. The 
most common questions regarding understanding FDI activity are around what informs the  
decisions of an entity to set up in a different country for production rather than export or 
engage in licencing arrangement in the chosen destination (Blonigen, 2005). In his 
assessment of the causes of FDI, Blonigen categorises FDI decisions into two main groups 
which have an internal and external orientation. 
 Internal firm characteristic factors that affect MNE decisions are explained by Blonigen in 
terms of the internal intangible assets in a firm that can be replicated elsewhere without 
diminishing their use in the firm. The author further explains that the decision regarding 
additional production in the local environment versus moving production to another country 
is explained in terms of the market failure of these intangible assets (Blonigen, 2005). 
The external characteristics the author describes are those of Exchange Rate Effects, Taxes, 
Institutions, Trade Protection and Trade Effects. These external macro-economic factors 
according to Blonigen affect MNE foreign investment decisions. The consideration for these 
external characteristics are summarised below: 
1. Exchange rate effects - An exchange rate change may have an impact on the value of
an asset that an MNE invests in with different consequences. A depreciation of a
foreign currency can result in an opportunity to buy an asset at a cheap price,
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motivating the MNE to either invest at the reduced price or to hold off investment in 
if the anticipation is that the currency will continue depreciating and value will be lost 
in the long term. Conversely, an appreciation in the foreign currency could lead to the 
appreciation of the asset in the long term and the MNE may make a decision to invest 
promptly before the price of the asset appreciates further. 
v. 
2. Taxes – Higher foreign taxes in a foreign country relative to the investor’s home
country or to an alternative investment destination may be a consideration an MNE
makes before making a long term investment decision. Moreover, the methods in
which double taxation is treated in the home and host country especially when
earnings are repatriated back into home country may affect decisions to invest in a
particular jurisdiction.
vi. 
3. Institutions – The quality of institutions in a foreign country can impact the ability to
protect MNE assets invested abroad and could be critical in an MNE’s FDI decision.
Furthermore, if the quality of institutions required for well-functioning markets in a
foreign country may be an important consideration before investment.
vii.
4. Trade Protection – The degree to which trade protection prevents an MNE to trade
products in a foreign locality may result in a decision to produce the product in the
foreign location instead or find a country where this would not be a requirement.
viii.
5. Trade Effects – Trade considerations such as a matured market in the MNE’s country
could compel the MNE to look for new markets.
ix. 
Theoretical literature dealing with FDI developed parallel to the theory of trade, and in fact, 
according to Blonigen, it is helpful to understand the development of the investment theory 
that deals with FDI by understanding the theory of trade which dealt with similar topics ( 
Blonigen, 2005). The author further explains that until as recently as the 1990’s, “trade theory 
and trade empirics rarely crossed paths” and the majority of trade theory was dominated by 
the “general equilibrium theory” of Heckscher and Ohlin. Faeth (2009) similarly traces the 
first models that try to explain FDI through models developed by Heckscher and Ohlin 
(Heckscher-Ohlin model), and MacDougal (1960) and Kemp (1964). 
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The Heckscher-Ohlin Theory of Factor Endowments builds on the theories of comparative 
advantage and absolute advantage. Decades earlier, Adam Smith had postulated (in his theory 
of absolute advantage) that in a situation of free trade, countries should specialise in the 
production of products that they can produce more efficiently than others, that can then be 
traded with countries that produce other products more efficiently (Smith, 1776).This theory 
relied on the premise that a nation is in a better position at producing greater outputs when 
given equal resources of certain products than another. In 1817, David Ricardo refined this 
theory further by introducing the idea of comparative (as opposed to absolute) advantage:  
“... the principle of comparative advantage: a nation, like a person, gains from the 
trade by exporting the goods or services in which it has its greatest comparative 
advantage in productivity and importing those in which it has the least comparative 
advantage." (Ricardo, 1817).  
This period between 1776 and 1826 which propounded differences in factor empowerments, 
is recognised as the basis for the standard theory of trade (Sen, 2010). At this time, the 
reasons for the differences where not explained until the appearance of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
Theory of Factor Endowments. 
The theoretical assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theory as described by Schott (2003) are 
as follows: ”1. Productive factors (e.g. capital, labour) are perfectly mobile from sector to 
sector within a country, but immobile internationally; 2. Countries are small, open and 
possess perfectly competitive markets; and 3. Countries share identical, constant returns to 
scale technology” (p. 4). 
The theory advances earlier trade theories by offering explanations for the differences in the 
factor endowments that result in comparative advantage. It further explains differences in 
production costs as differences in the supply of production factors. Thus according to Ohlin, 
products that require abundant resources and those that require scarce resources, are exported 
for those that require resources in the opposite direction (Ohlin, 1933). The theory therefore 
explains the existence of international trade as a consequence of uneven geographical 
distribution of productive resources that is exploited by countries as a result of a comparative 
advantage created because of this difference.  
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Under this theory, the premise is that for example, if a country is endowed in a natural 
resource such as bananas, in comparison to a country that does not have this resource, or has 
an insufficient amount of this resource, the country endowed with bananas will as a 
consequence trade bananas for another commodity that it requires. The assumption here is 
that an abundance of a factor of production results in a reduced price for the factor of 
production and thus provides comparative advantage in trade (Ohlin, 1933). 
In reality however, the production of commodities such as bananas will utilise all the factors 
of production such as labour, capital and land, where a country that is not endowed with 
bananas may have more land or cheaper capital. With this in mind, the useful insight 
regarding the Heckscher–Ohlin theory is the understanding that traded commodities are a 
bundle of factors (labour, capital and land) in which the scarcity of these commodities may 
differ between two trading countries. The trade between countries is therefore an indirect 
factor arbitrage, transferring the means of production from abundant to resource scarce 
destinations (Leamer & et al, 1995).  
2.6 Investment theories 
2.6.1 Theories of FDI based on perfect competition 
2.6.1.1 MacDougall-Kemp hypothesis 
The MacDougall-Kemp hypothesis extends the Heckscher-Ohlin Theory in its focus on the 
price of capital. It is the only investment theory that is not primarily based on  market 
imperfections and the imperfect capital market  (Chigbu, Austin, Ubah, & Chigbu, 2015) 
According to the hypothesis as described by Chigbu et al: 
“…….assuming a two-country model - one being the investing country and the other 
being the host country, and the price of capital , being equal to its marginal productivity, 
capital moves freely from a capital abundant country to a capital scarce country and in 
this way the marginal productivity of capital tends to equalize between the two 
countries. This leads to improvement in efficiency in the use of resources that leads 
ultimately to an increase in welfare” (p.2). 
The theory suggests that even though the abundant country may lose capital as a result of the 
movement of funds to the investment destination, the national income will not fall as long as 
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the return received from this investment will on balance be greater  (Chigbu, Austin, Ubah, & 
Chigbu, 2015). 
The MacDougall-Kemp theory focuses on higher returns on investment as a determinant of 
making an investment decision and specifically arbitrage opportunities derived from capital 
as cited by Assunção and  Forte (2011). The efficiency that can be derived from decisions 
around the use of capital as a result of difference in interest rates (price of capital) is the core 
focus. The theory does not attempt to explore issues of the reason for FDI (or specifically 
address or define FDI) and treats capital movement in its broadest form (there is no 
differentiation between portfolio flows and direct investment). Furthermore, because the 
theory assumes perfect markets, transaction costs such as those that can arise as a result of an 
inefficient regulatory environment, distance (transport costs), weak institutions, corruption 
and other external factors are not considered (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014). The theory 
therefore fails to address differences in regions (locations) as a factor in the movement of 
capital and as a consequence does not satisfactorily address the reasons why capital would 
prefer one location over another and which aspects are important in that regard as even in the 
case of capital described by the theory. Intuitively, capital can still move from a less endowed 
nation to a more endowed.  
Lastly, the  MacDougall-Kemp theory and the trade theory that precede it, do not consider the 
role of the MNE (Multinational Enterprise) in the movement of capital and therefore fails to 
extend the comparative advantage theory it advances beyond commodities or factors of 
production. Because the decision to invest (and therefore move capital) lies with the MNE, 
the firm specific (or internal) as well as external conditions that affect that decision are not 
explored beyond differences in interest rates (capital arbitrage).  
2.6.2 Theories of FDI based on imperfect markets 
2.6.2.1 Monopolistic advantage theories 
The first modern theory of FDI, according to Ardiyanto (2007), is the Monopolistic 
advantage theory, which can be attributed to Stephen Hymer and focused on firm specific 
advantages as the determinants of FDI. Hymer as cited by Ardiyanto argued that firms that 
invest abroad, do so because they have an internal propriety monopolistic advantage over the 
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local competitors such as superior technology, economies of scale or other superior 
knowledge (Ardianto, 2007). Firm specific advantages can occur at a local level, where the 
local firm has advantages that are derived from knowing the local territory better and can 
leverage knowledge of local market conditions, the legal and institutional framework and 
territory culture, all of which would imply higher costs for a foreign firm to acquire 
(Ardianto, 2007)Therefore, FDI seeks to take advantage of market imperfections by 
monopolising the advantages of firms seeking to invest abroad in an environment of 
competing local advantages (Ardianto, 2007). 
The ownership benefits, or specific firm advantages that Hymer promulgated, extended to 
benefits assumed as a consequence of control of firms. Hymer in this regard defined the 
difference between direct investments and portfolio investments in terms of control in which 
he described control or degree of influence as ownership of twenty five percent equity. He 
describes the reasons that a firm would want control in a foreign enterprise as follows: 
1. In order to appropriate fully the returns to certain abilities they possess. They chose
this method (FDI) other than the alternative method of licencing because
imperfections in the market prevent the fullest realisation of profits unless the firm
exercises some degree of control.
2. Firms control enterprises in foreign countries in order to eliminate competition
between them when the enterprise sell in the same market or sell to each other under
conditions of an imperfect market.
Hymer concedes that international operations can also occur in the manner above as a result 
of factors other than those related to control. That for instance, competition can be eradicated 
by collusive behaviour (1976).  
Kindleberger like Hymer argues in line with the imperfect market theory (Ardiyanto, 2007). 
He postulates that FDI occurs as a result of imperfect markets, and if markets had been 
perfect, “local firms would have an advantage over foreign firms” (Kindleberger, 1969), and 
FDI would not occur. He described the conditions for FDI to occur as follows: 
1. When market participants find a way to collude or are able to differentiate their
product or knowledge, resulting in market imperfections.
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2. Ability to leverage intellectual property and bespoke technology or obtain a
preferential position in the market, resulting in imperfections.
3. Cost competitive advantages obtained as a result of economies of scale that cause
firms to expand through global operations.
4. Economic policy and regulatory decisions governments may take that can create
monopolies and distortions in the market.
The more significant these “market imperfections are, the greater the likelihood” that a 
monopoly advantage will exist that will result in an FDI decision (Ardiyanto, 2007).  
Product differentiation 
Caves extended Hymer’s monopolistic advantage theory regarding ownership benefits by 
suggesting that the ability for firms to differentiate their products may be a key ownership 
advantage that results in foreign participation. He finds that there is a connection between a 
firm’s unique assets and the level of foreign investment and that firms that invest overseas are 
typically those that invest heavily in marketing and research and development (Caves, 1996). 
The monopolistic theory spearheaded by Hymer is important to the research in several ways: 
1. The introduction of the concept of control as a central feature in the definition of FDI.
2. A focus on product differentiation.
3. The introduction of imperfect markets (and departure from perfect markets).
4. Focus on the appropriation of ownership benefits in an environment of competing
local advantages.
 Firstly, prior to Hymer, FDI and portfolio flows had never been studied separately and the 
theory regarding capital flows relied exclusively on portfolio flows (Dunning & Rugman, 
1985). The consequence therefore is that Hymer provides the basis for FDI analysis through 
his definition of direct investment (through the definition of foreign control) which is still 
used today and will form the understanding in this thesis. By attempting to describe why the 
MNE would want control: a modality of investment that is distinct from portfolio flows, the 
first attempts to explain the determinants for FDI are made that are relevant to this thesis. If 
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one is to consider firstly, that control in the context of Hymer implies a degree of ownership 
and ability to influence or direct the factors of production, and secondly that the ownership 
and protection of this property is enforced through the institutions of a country, the 
relationship between properly functioning institutions (e.g. that enable property rights and 
protection) and FDI as well as the relevance of an analysis of FDI from an institutional view 
can be induced. It perhaps can be deducted that the institutional quality, as well as 
institutional type, of a country may have a bearing regarding where MNE’s choose to control 
foreign productive activities (invest in foreign production), as Hymer pointed out. 
“Different nations have different governments, different laws, different languages and 
different economies……..National firms have a general advantage of better 
information about their country: its economy, its language its law, its politics. To a 
foreigner, the cost of acquiring this information is considerable…” (p.27). 
The choice of location when considering an FDI decision envisages the extent to which the 
local advantages of foreign firms can be minimised as this would contribute to maximising 
the appropriation of ownership benefits that are described by Hymer as one of the reasons for 
acquiring control in foreign production. 
2.6.2.2 Internalisation Theory 
Buckley and Casson (1976) explain how technology transfer and international trade can be 
explained by the concept of internalisation of imperfect product markets. Two types of 
internalisation where identified by Buckley and Casson: 
1. Operational internalisation - Involving intermediate products flowing through
successive stages of production and the distribution channel.
2. Knowledge internalisation – The internalisation of the flow of knowledge emanating
from R&D.
x. 
Focus on the theory has been mainly on Knowledge Internalisation as admitted by Buckley 
and Casson (1976). A standard example of Knowledge Internalisation made by Buckley and 
Casson and also cited by Blonigen, is that related to asymmetric information. A licensee in 
this case may not offer the required value in negotiations as a result of the licensor not 
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providing sensitive information required to make an appropriate offer. The licensor will not 
offer the information before a contract is signed as this would be tantamount to sharing 
information that can be exploited. This results in a situation where the most optimum 
decision is to internalise the transaction by “establishing its own production affiliate in that 
market” (Blonigen, 2005). 
The theory of internalisation therefore focuses on the efficiency and the reduction of 
transaction costs as a driver for FDI. This element is pertinent to this study as it recognises 
that institutional weaknesses such as those that have the effects of raising tariff prices as a 
response to an inadequate business environment and consequently, the ability of countries to 
raise sufficient tax revenue,  can result in the bypassing of tariffs through the internalisation 
of operations in a foreign country (Blonigen, 2005). Internalisation to improve efficiency as a 
response to institutional weakness is therefore possible  (Blonigen, 2005). 
2.6.3 Eclectic paradigm (OLI advantages theory) 
The development of the literature explaining FDI in terms of imperfections in the market was 
led primarily by Dunning (1992; 2000) with his OLI paradigm, also called the Eclectic 
Paradigm, and supported by  Cleeve (2008). In his theory, which is regarded as the most 
“robust and comprehensive” theory on FDI, he suggests that: 
“…a firm would engage in FDI if three conditions were fulfilled: 
(i) It should have ownership advantages vis-à-vis other firms (O);
(ii) It is beneficial to internalize these advantages rather than to use the
market to transfer them to foreign firms (I);
(iii) There are some location advantages in using a firm’s ownership
advantages in a foreign locale (L)” (p.275).
The OLI paradigm asserts that the degree, location and makeup of the activities of business of 
a firm that operates or intends to operate internationally, is driven by the interaction of three 
key variables which according to the proponent author, also comprise the components of 
three sub-paradigms: Ownership, Location and Internalisation (OLI). The Ownership (O) and 
Internalisation (I) in Dunning’s OLI paradigm are derived from the idea of taking advantage 
of a firm’s inherent and acquired internal attributes and capabilities while reducing 
transaction costs (Blonigen, 2005). Dunning views the Ownership (O) advantages as those 
monopolistic advantages that are firm specific such as patents, trademarks (and other 
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intellectual property), market and trade advantages that are leveraged as competitive 
advantage over local firms (Ardiyanto, 2007).  
The “L” is described by Dunning as “the locational attractions of alternative countries or 
regions, for undertaking the value adding activities of MNEs” (Dunning, 2000). The 
advantages that can be exploited through the resource specificity and capabilities abroad can 
be used to counter the disadvantages of operating abroad such as economic costs that arise as 
a result of geographical distance and unfamiliarity of the foreign firm (Eden & Miller, 2004; 
Godinez & Liu, 2015). When deciding on the attractiveness of a foreign destination, MNE’s 
should therefore take into consideration the host country’s institutional characteristics that 
include the quality of the institutions and the prevalence of corruption (Chen, Yao, & Kotha, 
2009; Godinez & Liu, 2015) as Svensson points out, the prevalence of corruption often 
occurs as a result of the inefficiency of institutions (2005). 
The UNCTAD identifies four economic determinants of FDI: 1) Market attractiveness, 2) 
Availability of low-cost labour and skills, 3) Presence of natural resources, and 4) Enabling 
infrastructure (United Nations, 2012). The literature on the determinants of FDI similarly 
examines a large number of variables related to the above economic determinants. Moosa 
conducts a study regarding the explanatory variables of foreign direct investment in 
theoretical discussion (2002), Dunning makes examples in literature of the four main types of 
economic determinants of FDI, similar to those promulgated by the United Nations: 1) 
Market Seeking, 2) Resource Seeking, 3) Efficiency Seeking and 4) Strategic Asset Seeking 
(2000). Recent studies of the determinants of FDI include Blongien (2005) and Moosa and 
Cardak (2006). 
These studies have looked at different combinations of the determinant variables with varying 
and mixed results regarding the level of importance of the variables as well as the direction of 
the effect as noted by Moosa and Cardak (2006). 
The OLI paradigm is an important addition to the theory of FDI and this thesis as it firstly 
acknowledges the ownership and internalisation features of FDI already described, but most 
importantly, specifically recognises the location choices or the where of FDI. Transactional 
costs related to distance of the host country, for example, can deter an MNE from engaging in 
FDI but can also act as competitive advantage for those countries more familiar with the 
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regional environment. Institutional weaknesses therefore that emanate from corruption could 
be seen as regional competitive advantages and may not deter MNE’s form countries with 
similar environments. 
2.7 Institutions, FDI and Corruption Distance 
2.7.1 Corruption and Institutions 
Kaufmann et al (2003) describe the presence of corruption as result of the lack of respect 
displayed by the corrupter and the corrupted to the rules that govern their interactions thus 
indicating “a failure in governance”. The authors further explain governance as “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised”, which are identified 
as: 
1. The activities and institutions that inform how governments obtain and relinquish
power, as well as how they are held accountable;
2. The capability and ability for government and its agents to develop and execute
effective policy, and
3. The adherence by society and the government to the preservation of the institutions
that govern them through the observance of the laws that gives rise to their existence
and function.
The first description of governance mirrors aspects of the definition of corruption provided 
by Jain (2001) which stated and highlights the manner in which corruption and institutions are 
related: 
“Corruption seems to result from an imbalance between the processes of acquisition of 
positions of political power in a society, the rights associated with those positions of 
power, and the rights of citizens to control the use of that power” (p. 3). 
Granted that governance is explained by “the traditions and institutions by which authority in 
a country is exercised”, the questions that perhaps follow are: 
1. What are institutions?
2. What is meant by political power (authority)?
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3. How is authority obtained and exercised?
4. For whose benefit is this authority exercised?
In regards to the first question, what are institutions? North describes institutions in an 
informal and formal manner. Informally, he terms institutions as “the rules of the game in a 
society”. Formally, he describes institutions as “humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction (North, 1990). They structure incentives in exchange whether political, 
economic or social”. The description also seems to satisfy the question regarding for whose 
benefit, in its reference to “society” and “human interaction”. The classification of these 
incentives by North also seems to further articulate the type of benefits (social, economic and 
political). 
As society is bound to have conflicts of interest among various groups, and how the different 
preferences are managed often depends on the political power or strength. Paul Alagidede 
explains that consumers and producers in a country make the most decisions that affect the 
nature of the economy. He further states that although the economy is primarily moulded by 
producers and consumers, government activities play a significant and powerful effect on the 
way producers and consumers interact (Alagidede, 2012). These interactions according to 
Jain (2001) are economic transactions. The factors that play a major role in economic 
outcomes according to Acemoglu et al (2005) are the economic institutions in a society. 
 As such, because political power determines economic institutions that lead to different 
choices about the distribution of resources and economic performance the fundamental 
explanation, according to North and Thomas, of comparative growth in economies, is 
differences in institutions (1973).  
Acemoglu et al (2005), summarise these ideas schematically as follows: 
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 →→𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
According to Acemoglu et al, economic institutions are determined as interests of society as a 
result of their economic outcomes or benefits. Because different economic institutions 
determine varying economic performance as well as different distribution of resources, there 
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will be a conflict of interest in society regarding the choice of institutions which is decided by 
the political power of the competing groups. The following is described by the second part of 
the Acemoglu et al (2005) framework: 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 →→ 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
According to Benassy-Quere et al and cited by Assunção et al (2011), since the late 1990’s, 
much research attentiveness engaged institutional quality as the main determinant of 
developmental differences between countries, were “low levels of corruption where 
associated with greater prosperity” (p.6). The studies used several different proxies for 
institutional quality: 
Those that used a corruption index  found corruption to be statistically and significantly 
negative in attracting FDI (Asiedu, 2006; Cleeve, 2008; Mohamed & Sidiropoulos, 2010). 
Asiedu (2006) for example use a corruption index obtained from the ICRG (International 
Country Risk Guide) which includes varying dimensions of corruption such as demands for 
bribes, secret party funding, excessive patronage and nepotism. The author combines this 
index with the rule of law index also obtained from the ICRG as the key institutional 
variables in her analysis into the importance of institutions in directing FDI to a region (Sub-
Saharan Africa). Similarly, Mohamed and Sidiropoulos use the ICRG corruption index but 
unlike Asiedu, combines it with the “Investment Profile, which includes assessment in 
contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment delays, to measure 
institutional quality” (2010, p.90). Cleeve in contrast uses the CPI (Corruption Perception 
Index) obtained from Transparency International (Cleeve, 2008). 
If one is to firstly consider the argument initially made, that because FDI implies control, and 
that the ability to exercise control in order to fully appropriate the ownership benefits of 
MNE’s, requires the protection of property rights and consequently the rule of law. Secondly 
if this was to be combined  with the understanding provided by North that comparative 
growth in economies can be explained by differences in institutions and  Kaufmann et al 
(2003) assessment that corruption is the undermining of institutions, the measurements 
employed by Asiedu (2006), Cleeve (2008) and Mohammed et al (2010) provide an adequate 
proxy for institutional quality sufficient for the purposes of this thesis which examines 
whether differences in institutional quality (corruption) affects FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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2.7.2 Distance 
The theory of FDI centered primarily on market inefficiencies and how foreign direct 
investment is a consequence of the exploitation of these market inefficiencies. In this view, 
FDI is a consequence of this exploitation. Using Acemoglu’s framework, FDI is explained 
through factors related to economic performance and the distribution of resources. Cross-
national distance as a factor affecting the internationalization of a firm was touched upon by 
early scholars such as Hymer who noted that the “liability of foreignness” increase with 
distance between the home and host countries (1976). Berry et al (2010) cite Dunnings view 
that countries “may be distant from each other not only in a geographical sense, but also 
because economic, social cultural, or political differences make it harder for firms to operate 
across them” (p.1). Complementary to this view, is the institutional view of FDI, which views 
differences in the development of countries as a result of differences in institutions as 
promulgated by North (1991).  
The issue of distance therefore is important in the analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa FDI in that 
firstly it emphasizes the role of the nature of institutions (including institutional quality) in 
the assessment of FDI as well as recognizes the importance of the competitive advantage of 
geographical locality as emphasized by Dunning (2000). Secondly, if one is to accept the 
contribution by Dunning in his OLI paradigm: the degree of FDI is as a result of the 
interaction of ownership (O), location (L) and internalization (I), and more specifically that 
the ownership advantages are more efficiently appropriated through internalization, the 
remaining and consequential inquiry would be where these advantages can be best exploited 
given the “liability of foreignness”. The relevance to the research therefore is that, given the 
assumption that the ownership (O) and internalization (I) factors have been considered by the 
MNE, and the consideration propounds an FDI decision, do differences in the ability of 
MNE’s to exploit locational advantages have a significant effect on the choice of location (L) 
?. To be more specific, do SSA countries leverage the assumed (as a consequence of their 
proximity to each other) local (or regional) advantages in a manner that can explain regional 
FDI flows in SSA?  
2.7.3 Corruption distance 
If one is to consider the position of Kaufmann  (2003), that the lack or failure of institutions 
results in corruption, and that because of conflicts of interests in society, institutions would 
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differ in different social settings, the result would deductively imply differences in corruption 
as a result of differences in institutions. 
There have been challenges facing the models in empirical literature explaining FDI and the 
numerous variables that affect it, and the lack of consensus regarding the effects of corruption 
on FDI has led some to search for alternative explanations such as “psychic distance” 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). In this view, the selection of a similar market reduces 
uncertainty, promoting FDI (Qian & Sandoval-Hernandez, 2016).  
Other strands in the empirical literature predicted trade flows between countries under gravity 
model of trade, which according to Blongien (2005) “specifies the trade flows between 
countries as primarily a function of the GDP of each country and the distance between the 
two countries”  (p.393). The theoretical grounding of these models was contributed by 
academics such as Anderson et al (2003) and through the gravity models which explain trade 
flows, the specification according to Blonigien similarly fit FDI flows reasonably well and is 
extended to FDI as a result (2005). 
This argument of “distance” to explain factors affecting FDI allocation decisions was 
extended with the postulation of the idea of the corruption distance between two countries by 
Habib and Zurawicki (2002). 
Uhlenbruck et al later point out that corruption has different dimensions in different countries 
and the perception to which it is observed differs with differing locations both in terms of 
scope and the level of uncertainty it generates (2006). As already observed (see fig 1.1), the 
prevalence of corruption varies greatly with locality from a regional perspective, but also in 
addition to this, FDI activity occurs between different regions as well as within the same or 
similar regions. In view of this, the effects of corruption as identified by the World Bank, 
IMF and various academic literature can be conditional on the identity of the source country 
and the country and/or region investment is intended for (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). Finally, in 
addition to the above, Godinez (2015) cites Driffield’s suggestion that countries with limited 
exposure to corruption have a greater expectation to be adverse to investing in corruption 
prone investment destinations (2013). Such differences in corruption levels between host and 
home countries have been seen to influence FDI (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). 
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This implies that MNE’s that have institutional proximity should be able to overlook certain 
institutional inadequacies in foreign countries especially if corruption in these countries 
(which implies institutional inadequacy) is more prevalent in the country of origin. The 
converse is that MNE’s that originate from less corrupt countries would not have this 
competitive advantage even if there exists an assumed institutional proximity. This is 
important to this thesis as it suggests that although institutional proximity may exist, the 
ability of an MNE to leverage the proximity may be related to the degree in which the home 
country MNE views this proximity as a competitive advantage or an added transactional 
burden.   
2.7.4 Corruption growth and FDI 
In 2016, the president of the World Bank Jim Yong Kim states the following regarding 
corruption: 
“All over the world, citizens are rising in protest against governments that are 
perceived as corrupt. Corruption poses an enormous obstacle to economic and social 
development and the global goal of ending extreme poverty by 
2030……….Corruption is, quite simply, stealing from the poor. It undermines growth 
and prosperity….” (p.1). 
Furthermore, corruption has been cited by the IMF (2016) as having “significant negative 
effects on the key channels that affect growth” (p.5).  
Theoretically, there is no conclusive agreement regarding the effects of corruption on growth 
(Wei, 2000). The empirical literature can be categorized into three groups: the micro, semi-
micro and Macro studies (Asiedu & Freeman, 2009). The categories are formed on the basis 
of the origin of the source data used to describe corruption and investment. The authors 
explain micro studies as those that utilize firm level data for corruption as well as investment 
from sources within the country represented by Batra et al (2003) who include developing 
and developed countries and Gavaria (2002) whose study is restricted to Latin America. Batra 
finds that there is a negative correlation between corruption and investment while Gavaria 
finds no significant relationship.  
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The unique nature of corruption in different regions and how it varies across regions has been 
discussed within the literature (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Habib and Zurawicki further explain 
that these “relative differences between corruption levels in home and host countries” (2002, 
p.298) may influence FDI. We therefore further contribute to the gaps in the African
literature as Godinez and Liu had done for the Latin American countries (2015) and follow 
their example in extending corruption by including the “distance metaphor”, propagated by 
(Shenkar, 2001); psychic distance (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) cultural distance (Shenkar, 
2001); and more recently, institutional distance (Schwens, Eiche, & Kabst, 2011); (Eden & 
Miller, 2004). 
Semi-micro studies are described as those that use firm level data for investment and country 
wide data for corruption such as Wei (2002) who use cross-sectional data and Asiedu and 
Freeman (2009), who focus on Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and transitional 
economies. Asiedu and Freeman find that the effect of corruption on investment, varies 
according to regions. In Transition Economies, there is a significant relationship whereas 
there is no significant relationship in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Macro studies are described as those that use country level data for both corruption and 
investment such as those of Mauro (1995) and Wei (2000). The overwhelming findings for 
these types of studies support the idea that corruption is detrimental to growth or investment. 
The different studies each have their weaknesses and advantages. Micro studies rely on data 
at a firm level from the same source, resulting in endogenous problems within the study. 
Secondly because the data on corruption is derived internally (from within the country), it 
does not explain the decisions taken into consideration before a firm decides to invest abroad. 
The Semi-Micro studies utilise country level corruption indices and firm level data on 
investment. These studies have problems associated with their use of country level corruption 
and the inherent assumptions that all firms experience the same level of corruption. 
Although the majority of studies in this area have been in regards to Macro studies, where 
country level data is obtained for both investment and corruption, this research has not come 
across studies that examine economic regions within the African context. Literature that 
included Africa tended to speak broadly about the developing countries as a category or Sub-
Saharan Africa as a Region (Loungani & Razin, 2001), (Asiedu & Freeman, 2009), (Gyimah-
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Brempong, 2002). Secondly, as in these studies, little attention has been given to the role of 
corruption distance as an additional factor in the analysis of corruption and investment 
although some exist specific to Latin America (Godinez & Liu, 2015). This study aims to 
contribute to the gaps in the literature regarding African countries, specifically in the area of 
Macro studies while taking consideration of corruption distance which was not found in these 
studies. In so doing, a greater understanding of corruption and as a consequence institutional 
maturity, will provide further insight into the external determinants of FDI and the “L” in the 
OLI paradigm. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Research design 
The design of the research seeked to explain relationships between the key independent 
variables and the dependent variables. According to Saunders and Lewis (2012), an 
explanatory research is one that seeks to provide new insights or explanations regarding a 
phenomenon “through the discovery of causal relationships between key variables” (2012, p. 
140). This approach was guided by a positivist philosophical disposition which the said 
authors describe as one in which emphasis was placed on the observable and measurable data 
or variables which “the positivist researcher pursues a cycle of attempts at establishing  cause 
and effect until future events may be accurately predicted” (p. 105). 
It is important at this stage to distinguish between causality and correlation as the positivist 
approach attempts to establish cause and effect. While correlation refers to an observed 
relationship in the behaviour of independent and dependent variables, causality takes the 
observed relationship further by inferring an explanation to what causes the change in the 
dependent variable. Weiers (2011) states three conditions that must be satisfied in order to 
establish causality: 
1. There must be a statistically significant correlation between the independent and
dependent variables.
2. The occurrence of an independent variable must act upon of the dependent variable
first.
3. Extraneous variables that may explain the correlation between the independent and
dependent variable must be identified and excluded.
The study approached time horizon by using a longitudinal study where according to 
Saunders and Lewis is one which studies “a particular topic over an extended time period”.  
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3.2 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis which are the objects to which this study is based was countries in 
Africa. 
3.3 Research population and sample 
The research population, which are the countries under observation and measurement, was 
first constructed by considering the available country data sets provided by the World Bank 
and secondly other data sets that may provide useful data not measured by the World Bank 
for the periods 2003 to 2013.  
3.4 Data collection 
The study uses secondary data and desktop review obtained from various institutional 
websites. Detailed methodologies and approaches that provide further explanations of the 
rational of methods used can all be obtained from these sources. The research limits itself 
purely with the rational for the use of the various measures. In the context of this research, it 
was useful to employ secondary data usage for its convenience (time), cost advantages and 
the leveraging of external expertise and resources. In this line, it would also be logically 
expected that the nature of the data (country information) would most likely be better 
obtained through the institutions involved. 
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The table below summarises the data used in the research and the sources were this data was 
obtained: 
Table 1 : Summary of data collected 
Measure used 
(variable) 



































Inflation World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.
CPI.TOTL.ZG 
2003-2013 



















3.5 Data analysis 
As has already been stated, the study uses longitudinal (or panel) data. According to Michael 
D. Intriligator, panel data are a type of “pooled cross-sectional time-series data in which the
same cross section is sampled over time” (Intriligator, 1978). For the purpose of this research, 
the time will cover the period 2003-2013. The panel data was constructed using 44 countries 
on the African continent over the period stated. The rational for using panel data over cross-
sectional or time-series data are informed by some of the advantages cited by Cheng Hsiao 
(2014): 
1. More accurate inference of model parameters.
2. Avoids selection bias.
3. Controls for the effects of omitted variables.
4. The accuracy advantage that pooled data leverages over individual outcome
predictions.
The limitation to obtain data regarding the educational index beyond 2013 was the major 
factor in the selection of the sample years used to be limited to 2013. A further reason was 
the unavailability of internet usage data, especially in Africa, prior to the year 2000 and the 
unavailability of the data used for the bureaucracy index prior to 2003. A sample of data from 
2003 to 2013 was used as a consequence.  
3.6 Variables of analysis 
3.6.1 Corruption measures 
Recently, there have been a variety of different corruption measures that have been used in 
the study of corruption. Some have come from the efforts of Risk management Firms, some 
such as those provided by the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy and the Institute for 
Management Development are provided on a propriety basis while some can even be sourced 
from advocacy groups such as the World Economic Forum (Johnston, 2001).  
The measures of corruption used in the current literature can be divided into three different 
types as described by Asiedu and Freeman (2009). The authors label these measures in terms 
of three classifications which they call the internal, external and hybrid. The internal 
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measurements refer to those measurements where perception of corruption is obtained from 
firms that operate within a country. The external measurements are those that are obtained 
from risk analysts that reside outside the country while the hybrid measurements combine 
data from different sources and the most widely used as described earlier, is the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI). 
For the purpose of this research, corruption was measured using the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI). This in recognition that corruption is in itself difficult to measure as it often 
occurs in secret and that it is the perception of corruption that informs investment decisions. 
The CPI ranks the level of corruption in countries from around the world on a scale of 0-10 
(prior to 2012) with 10 being a corrupt clean country environment. We then used the CPI 
index to articulate the corruption distance that is found between the investing and host 
country. Post 2011 (2012 and 2013), the CPI is measured on a scale of 0-100. Values for 
these two years have been adjusted for comparability (the mean value was used). 
3.6.2 Control variables 
The control variables in the study comprise of the other determinants of FDI which are 
suggested in the literature. The study classifies the control variables using the UNCTAD’s 
classification of FDI determinants as well as country risk variables are described in the table 
below: 
Table 2: Control variables 





















 Commercial energy use per
capita
 R&D expenditure  as a




Efficiency-seeking  The availability of  Infrastructure index  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
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Country risk  Inflation
 Political Stability










Source:(Godinez & Liu, 2015) and own amendment 
3.6.2.1 Market-seeking investment variables 
The research uses the UN (2015) human development index (HDI), that considers the country 
GDP per capita, life expectancy, and level of education as utilized by Godinez and Liu 
(2015), and the natural algorithm of the total GDP (World Bank 2015) of the host country  to 
represent market attractiveness of the host country as used by Godinez and Liu (2015) and 
Globerman and Shapiro (2003). These two variables represent the market seeking category of 
the UNCTAD’s classification and be used as the proxy for market attractiveness. GDP 
especially in Africa is very good determinant of FDI. As found by Olatunji et al (2015) a 
large share of FDI in Africa has been in African countries that are well endowed in natural 
resources. This FDI in some cases as have contributed up to 50% of to the GDP of these 
countries (2015).  The GDP index is used widely in the research investigating the 
determinants of FDI such as Qian and Sandoval-Hernandez (2016), Wei (2005) and Godinez 
and Liu (2015). In all these cases, GDP was found to have the most effect on FDI. In further 
support, Hansen et a1 finds that an increase in the mean ratio of FDI by 1% on average 
results in an increase of 2.25% in GDP (2005). 
Reiter et al investigates contested the contested relationship between FDI and development. 
One the one hand he states, it has been argued that FDI brings human capital, financial capital 
and other benefits and others have argued that it has the potential of crowding out local 
competition and not transfer monopolistic advantages to locals. He further suggests that these 
issues often have to do with the FDI policy of the host country and finds that FDI has reduced 
year to year improvement of HDI in cases where there where not adequate FDI restrictions 
and the converse being also true (2010). The above is the rational for including HDI as a 
variable as this will give the research insight regarding the potential policy environment of 
the African countries. 
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3.6.2.2 Country risk variables 
Country risk is represented by the Rule of Law Index, following the example of (Godinez, 
2015) and  Globerman and Shapiro (2003), for representing law enforcements, property rights 
and crime. The inflation proxy used is the consumer price index obtained from the World 
Bank and Political Stability is representing measures of perceptions of the likelihood of 
instability and violence as defined by the World Bank. The monopolistic advantages 
discussed, promulgated by Dunning and cited by Ardyanto (2007), cannot be taken advantage 
of in an environment where there is political instability and risk to assets owned. Although 
Cleeve (2008) and Mhlanga (2010) find inconclusive results regarding the effect of the 
political stability index, Mhlanga in the same study finds a negative result when using a 
different country risk rating. For this reason a composite of indicators that reflect country risk 
was used in the study.  
3.6.2.3 Resource Seeking 
The Resource Seeking FDI investment is represented by the Unemployment Rate of the host 
country as a measure of the attractiveness of the country (UN 2015), the Educational 
Attainment Index measured by the Mean Years of Schooling and Expected Years of 
Schooling by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2015). 
3.6.2.4 Efficiency-Seeking Investments 
To represent the Efficiency-Seeking Investments, we use the Bureaucracy level of the World 
Bank to rank the ease of conducting business in a given country as well as the Infrastructure 
Index based on the level of internet penetration in the country. The availability of the internet 
has been shown to increase productivity in a country McGukin et al (1998). Choi (2003) 
demononstrates in his findings that when internet users in a country increase by a10%, there 
is a corresponding increase of 1.84% in FDI. 
3.7 The Model 
The study utilises the fixed effects model described by the following equation: 
𝐿𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟_𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟_𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑐𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑃𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽9𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
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Where: 
i = the country 
t = time 
β = estimated coefficient 
α = time invariant effects 
Ɛ = error term 
The key dependent variable to be explained in the research was the FDI inflows from 2003 to 
2013. These flows where obtained from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), 
which is a survey of over 10,000 firms in 80 countries. 
Following the example of Godinez and Liu (2015), two types of corruption distance will be 
computed 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟_𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 and 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟_𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟2𝑖𝑡, which will represent the difference 
in the perception of corruption between home country and source country when the home 
country is more corrupt (𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟_𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) and when the home country is less corrupt 
(𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟_𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡). This is to specifically test the different situations regarding corruption 
distance that may affect FDI between African countries.  
3.7.1 Choice of the model 
The study uses longitudinal (or panel) data. The choice of the model is a result of conducting 
tests to ascertain the appropriateness of different types of econometric models. As such, a 
comparison between the fixed-effects model, the pooled OLS model and the random-effects 
model was performed. The types of tests and the results indicating that the fixed-effects 
model is the most appropriate in the case of this research are discussed in the following 
chapter. It is however prudent at this stage to point out that the fixed-effects model chosen 
“cannot estimate the effect of any unobservable variable like entrepreneurial or managerial 
skills, religion, culture or government authorities’ ability to manage a country and attract 
FDI” as mentioned by Lumbila  (2005, p.13). The consequence of this is that effects such as 
those that have resulted as a result of colonial history which may be important in the case of 
Africa are not estimated in the current study. 
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3.8 Method of analysis 
As has already been stated, the data used in the study is obtained from a variety of sources 
(see Table 1). The data was then refined to standardize the naming of countries and thereafter 
consolidated in Excel as a single data set. The necessary calculations were then made 
regarding variables that required computation (corruption distance) in order to arrive at a 
complete data set that was imported into a statistical tool. Corruption distance was calculated 
as the difference between the CPI index of a host country for a given year and the average 
CPI of home countries for the same year. For each African country, the average of home 
country that were more corrupt was subtracted from the CPI of the host country to arrive at 
“CorrD_morecorr”. The average of home countries that where less corrupt was subtracted 
from the CPI of the host country to arrive at “CorrD_lesscorr”.  
Statistical software: GRETL (GNU Regression, Econometrics and Time Series Library). 
The ln of FDI inflows consisted of 27 missing observations. This is as a result of negative 
FDI inflows (which suggest disinvestment) which were excluded from the study. The 
research therefore aims at: 
1. Confirming the effect of corruption on FDI inflows in Africa (H1).
2. Confirming the effect of corruption distance has an on FDI where the home countries
are more corrupt than the host country (H2a).
3. Confirming the effect of corruption distance has on FDI where the home countries are
less corrupt than the host country (H2b).
The research takes three approaches to test these objectives through three hypotheses which 
are H1, H2a and H2b. This is illustrated in the diagram below: 
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Table 3: Research hypotheses 
xii. 
These hypotheses will be tested by confirming if a significant statistical relationship exists 
between the corruption variables of CPI, CorrD_less, and CorrD_more  in relation to FDI 
inflows. Time lag effects were taken into consideration at it was determined that a lag of  𝑡−2 
for the corruption variables produced the more significant p-value for corruption. 
3.9 Limitations and Delimitations of the study 
The key independent variables under investigation, that describe corruption as well as 
corruption distance, are measurements of the perception of corruption. Experience shows that 
there are a variety of the types of corruption that occur as well as the extent to which they 
occur in different societies and economic development. Michael Johnston points out that 
these differences according to theory are as a result of differences in culture, economic, 
political and other factors affecting the historical development of societies, and the difficulty 
in the measurement of corruption has made making comparisons and building comprehensive 
theories difficult (Johnston, 2001). 
3.9.1 CPI Reliability 
The shortcomings of the index are that, as already stated, the measurement is not a direct 
observation of corruption and corruption may manifest itself in various, incompatible, ways 
in different countries and or regions. Secondly, as pointed out by Lambsdorff, the changes in 
the year to year comparisons of a country’s perception index have a variety of reasons over 
and above changing perception such as sample and methodology (1999). This has resulted in 
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a mean estimation of the perception index for the 2012 and 2013 years which may remove 
some reliability in the information for this period. 
Advantages are that the index is composite of several corruption measures (seventeen 
surveys), and as such, can be trusted from a reliability point of view. To test this reliability, 
the correlations of the index from year to year will be tested. A weakness of this method will 
however be that the coefficients can be too strong and different levels of data may be 
available from different countries as cited by Johnston (2001).  
3.9.2 CPI Validity 
The study avoids measuring corruption directly and focus more on the perception of 
corruption, as business decisions are made in consideration of perceived levels of corruption 
and actual corruption often occurs in unobservable instances. The Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index is the most widely used measure of corruption 
and is cited as the most ambitious effort to measure corruption by Johnston (2001). For this 
reason, together with difficulty in directly observing corruption, this measure for corruption 
will be used.  
3.9.3 Theoretical scope 
The research does not investigate the causes of corruption but focuses on the impacts or 
consequences that corruption may or may not have on FDI and the channels corruption may 
impact FDI. As such, the scope of the research was confined to an exploration of the 
determinants of FDI and the extent to which corruption and corruption distance affects these. 
Where theoretical discussion regarding the causes of corruption is mentioned, this may be 
that these causes are found to be the same as the consequences of corruption.  
Furthermore, the research will confine itself to the external factors influencing FDI as time 
constraints and data availability may be a constraint when information regarding individual 
Multinational Enterprises (MNE) motivations are sought (internal firm motivations) as well 
as the fact that the direction of the research is also to contribute to the macro level studies 
regarding FDI.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
4 Data Analysis 
This chapter, will discuss the findings of the research. The study will begin by showing the 
summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables that form the basis of this 
study and proceed to discuss each objective, the hypothesis that underpinned the investigation 
and conclude with a summary of the results. The research objectives aimed to test the 
relationship between corruption and FDI inflows between African countries as well as test 
whether or not corruption distance is a factor that influences African FDI inflows from host 
countries.   
To achieve these results, an initial sample of 46 African countries were included as part of the 
analysis. Eritrea was removed from the population because of missing inflation and education 
data and the Seychelles for absence of data for unemployment. As a result, a total sample of 
44 countries in Africa was used. The following are the summary statistics of the dependent 
variable (ln FDI) and the independent variables under focus as well as the control variables:  
Table 4: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Skewness Ex. kurtosis 
CPI 2.93399 2.7 1.4 7.6 1.12047 1.92492 4.2955 
CorrD_lesscorr 0.726174 0.491127 0.073462 4.08522 0.736355 2.50812 6.87556 
CorrD_morecorr -2.39048 -2.429 -2.88209 -1.07222 0.213983 3.00441 13.3311 
FDI_of_GDP 4.28668 2.89874 -5.97751 41.8096 5.66252 3.04771 12.7096 
GDP 242.5 242.5 1 484 139.863 0 -1.20001
LN_GDP 23.2176 23.0875 20.0039 26.9674 1.38917 0.403962 -0.0984386
Educationindex 0.427172 0.422369 0.136145 0.718097 0.130257 0.137843 -0.679042
HDI 0.490657 0.468 0.1944 0.775 0.117518 0.581373 -0.420136
Inflation 62.6032 6.17 -35.84 24411 1115.12 21.7569 472.519 
Infrastructure 7.18109 3.79906 0.150978 56 9.43268 2.46158 6.76493 
Political_stability 33.2905 33.9623 0.943396 92.823 22.0238 0.348472 -0.706995
Rule_of_Law -0.671596 -0.648974 -1.84183 1.05673 0.601185 0.360998 -0.0957011
Unemployment 10.3095 7.35 0.6 38.6 7.87847 1.24406 0.879243 
Bureuacracy 42.7054 34 5 177 35.9093 1.76762 2.97355 
l_FDI_inflows 19.5586 19.7739 10.3607 23.1724 1.85805 -1.0362 2.63659 
Table 5 below illustrates the results of the coefficient of correlation test of the variables. A 
coefficient of correlation that is close to 1 or -1 from 0 is strong and the one which is closer to 
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zero is regarded as having a weak relationship. The data suggests that at a significance level 
of 5%, only the GDP has a strong linear relationship to FDI.  
Table 5: Correlation coefficients 
Surprisingly, there is a positive correlation between the time it takes to start a business 
(Bureaucracy) and FDI (0.009) albeit a weak one. Godinez and Liu in this case also found a  
weak linear relationship and insignificant result relationship that was positive in this case 
(2015). It was expected that bureaucracy would have a negative correlation with FDI as 
found by prior research such as Kinoshita and Campos (2003). The strength of the linear 
correlation for all other variables was found to be in line with findings of Godinez and Liu 
(2015) except for the Rule of Law, which was strong in their case and very weak in our 
analysis.  
4.1 Objective 1: Does corruption affect FDI inflows in Africa 
4.1.1 Hypothesis H1: Corruption (CPI) and FDI inflows 
The hypothesis H1 aimed to establish whether corruption has effect on FDI inflows into 
Africa. A regression model was developed taking consideration of the variables that may 
affect FDI flows within countries as described in section 3.8 of this thesis. A further testing of 
the model was performed in the econometrics software GRETL. The first step was to 
determine if the model stated was the most appropriate model for the said investigation. 
Correlation coefficients, using the observations 1:05 - 44:11
(missing values were skipped)





































HDI 0.544 0.892 1
Inflation -0.029 0.023 -0.027 1
Infrastructure 0.532 0.494 0.581 0.018 1
Political_stability -0.139 0.427 0.423 -0.042 0.063 1
Rule_of_Law 0.081 0.447 0.48 -0.093 0.308 0.717 1
Unemployment 0.059 0.39 0.374 -0.034 0.13 0.347 0.291 1
Bureuacracy -0.117 0.028 -0.026 0.073 -0.21 0.109 -0.269 0.203 1
CPI_2 0.143 -0.021 -0.06 0.1 0.059 -0.255 -0.12 0.064 -0.076 1
Political_stability_1 -0.207 -0.202 -0.229 -0.005 -0.084 -0.014 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.171 1
CorrD_lesscorr_2 0.138 0.017 -0.006 0.1 0.072 -0.231 -0.109 0.036 -0.076 0.986 -0.207 1
CorrD_morecorr_2 0.286 0.177 0.269 0.044 0.182 -0.12 0.002 -0.164 -0.138 0.574 -0.272 0.645 1
l_FDI_inflows 0.747 0.351 0.483 -0.044 0.374 0.04 0.129 0.145 0.009 0.067 -0.233 0.062 0.208 1
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Table 6: Fixed effects model (Model 1) Corruption and FDI inflows 
A random effects regression output of the model was considered first which delivered results 
of the Breusch-Pagan and Hausman test to interrogate the fitness of the model. The Breusch-
Pagan test tests the conditional heteroscedasticity in order to establish whether the random 
effects model is more suited to the data than the pooled OLS model. The null hypothesis for 
the Breusch-Pagan test is that there is no heteroscedasticity. The possibility of 
heteroscedasticity in the model was reduced by using the ln FDI in the data used. An 
indication of high heteroscedasticity in the model would indicate that the random effects 
model would be preferred above the pooled OLS model as it is considered the best estimator 
in that case. The GRETL output in table 6 shows a low p-value (3.43594e-05) suggesting that 
Model 1: Fixed-effects, using 344 observations
Included 44 cross-sectional units
Time-series length: minimum 6, maximum 9
Dependent variable: l_FDI_inflows
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.230093 1.07651 0.2137 0.8309
CPI_2 −0.0771002 0.0439572 −1.7540 0.0805 *
LN_GDP 0.856665 0.0492239 17.4034 <0.0001 ***
Educationindex −2.64989 0.856056 −3.0955 0.0022 ***
HDI 2.75904 1.18E+00 2.3338 0.0203 **
Inflation −1.46408e-05 3.91831E-05 −0.3737 0.7089
Infrastructure −0.0150336 0.00776246 −1.9367 0.0538 *
Political_stability_1 −0.0110651 0.00258236 −4.2849 <0.0001 ***
Rule_of_Law −0.0357783 0.132624 −0.2698 0.7875
Unemployment 0.00980164 0.00679771 1.4419 0.1504
Bureuacracy 0.00055117 0.00173523 0.3176 0.751
LSDV R-squared 0.702018 Within R-squared 6.36E-01
LSDV F(53, 290) 12.89083 P-value(F) 1.12E-50
Random effects test
Breusch-Pagan test -
Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0
Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(1) = 17.16  with p-value = 3.43594e-05
Hausman test -
Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent
Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(10) = 84.191  with p-value = 7.53561e-14
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we should reject the null hypothesis and as a consequence use the random effects model as 
opposed to the pooled OLS model. 
The second step in the analysis is to consider the appropriateness between the fixed effects 
model and the Random effects alternative. The Hausman test is considered for this decision. 
In this case, a probability value (p-value) that is small would indicate that the random-effects 
estimates are not consistent in the data and that there is evidence for fixed effects in the data. 
Again, the p-value for the Hausman test as determined by the GRETL output is low: p-value 
(7.53561e-14). The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the GLS random effects 
estimates are consistent. The low p-value indicated that we reject the null hypothesis 
indicating that in this case, the fixed-effects model is the most appropriate. The results of the 
fixed-effects model are described in model 1 above. This makes intuitive sense in Africa 
given the diverse differences in language, culture and colonial history. 
As anticipated, the GDP of a country, which is an indicator for market attractiveness has the 
strongest positive linear correlation to FDI (0.747). This suggests that MNE’s may find the 
potential for market growth, the market size as well as the market structure to be the most 
important elements in the decision to invest in foreign markets. The findings are consistent 
with Qian and Sandoval-Hernandez (2016), Mauro (1995). Godinez and Liu (2015) also find 
a strong correlation at a significance level of 1% but in their case they found a slightly 
stronger correlation for the human development index.  
The Educational Index shows a weak linear correlation (0.351) at a 1% significance level, 
which was surprising given that Godinez and Liu (2015) found that the coefficient is not 
significant in Latin America. The reason for these different types of outcomes regarding FDI 
and human capital are explained by Blomstrom and Adri (2003) by noting that while human 
capital attracts FDI through its resource seeking motive, it also has the effect of contributing 
to the human capital in the host country. Hence according to Blomstrom and Adri (2003), just 
as economies that exhibit high levels of education attainment can attract high levels of 
technology intensive MNE’s low educational attainment may also attract MNE’s who 
contribute simpler technologies. 
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The results also indicate that assuming a significance level of 10% there is  significant 
evidence to indicate that corruption has a negative relationship with FDI inflows with p-value 
between 0.05 and 0.1 (0.0805). 
Our hypothesis as illustrated in diagram 1, the null hypothesis put forward (H1) was that 
corruption has a negative effect on FDI in Africa. The alternate hypothesis therefore would 
be that corruption has a positive or no correlation with FDI inflows. 
𝐻10: 𝛽𝐶𝑃𝐼−2 = 0; 𝐻11: 𝛽𝐶𝑃𝐼−2 < 0
The output of our model suggests that this negative effect exists (coefficient −0.0771002) and 
the p-value of 0.0805 suggests that the correlation is significant at a significant level of 10%. 
We therefore reject the null hypothesis in this case and accept the alternative hypothesis.  
4.2 Objective 2: Does corruption distance affect FDI inflows in Africa where the home 
country is more corrupt than the host country 
4.2.1 Hypothesis H2a: Corruption distance (CorrD_more) and FDI inflows 
The hypothesis H2a aimed to establish whether corruption distance has a positive correlation 
with FDI inflows into Africa where the host country was more corrupt than the home country. 
Again, a regression model was developed taking consideration of the variables that may 
affect FDI flows within countries as described in section 3.8 of this thesis. 
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Table 7: Fixed effects model (Model 2) Corruption Distance and FDI inflows 
A further testing of the model was performed in the econometrics software GRETL. The first 
step was to determine if the model stated was the most appropriate model for the said 
investigation. The GRETL model indicates a statistically significant corruption variable. 
Corruption (CorrD_morecorr) in this case refers to cases where the home countries corruption 
level was more than the host country. As in Model 1 (and for the same reasons), Model 2 
favours a fixed-effects model over the OLS and random-effects model. The null hypothesis 
for the Breusch-Pagan test is rejected due to the low p-value (3.72731e-05) suggesting the 
random-effects model is preferred to the pooled OLS model. After considering the results for 
the low p-value (9.27961e-14) indicated that we reject the null hypothesis as there is evidence 
of fixed effects. The model output indicated a strong R-squared of 70%. 
Model 2: Fixed-effects, using 344 observations
Included 44 cross-sectional units
Time-series length: minimum 6, maximum 9
Dependent variable: l_FDI_inflows
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −1.22896 1.38965 −0.8844 0.3772
CorrD_morecorr_2 −0.44549 0.242548 −1.8367 0.0673 *
LN_GDP 0.854421 0.0488417 17.4937 <0.0001 ***
Educationindex −2.94008 0.855711 −3.4358 0.0007 ***
HDI 3.57498 1.21808 2.9349 0.0036 ***
Inflation −1.50958e-05 3.91E-05 −0.3859 0.6999
Infrastructure −0.0175103 0.00786538 −2.2263 0.0268 **
Political_stability_1 −0.0108264 0.00256061 −4.2280 <0.0001 ***
Rule_of_Law −0.0309011 0.131829 −0.2344 0.8148
Unemployment 0.00554145 0.00691317 0.8016 0.4235





LSDV F(53, 290) 12.90944 P-value(F) 9.75E-51
Random effects test
Breusch-Pagan test -
Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0
Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(1) = 17.0054  with p-value = 3.72731e-05
Hausman test -
Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent
Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(10) = 83.732  with p-value = 9.27961e-14
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As illustrated in figure 6, the null hypothesis put forward (H2a) was that corruption distance 
where the home country was more corrupt than the host country would result in a positive 
effect on FDI in Africa. The alternate hypothesis therefore would be that the corruption 
distance as specified has a negative or no correlation with FDI inflows. 
𝐻2𝑎0: 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝐷_𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟−2 = 0; 𝐻2𝑎1: 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝐷_𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟−2 < 0
The output of our model suggests that this negative effect exists (coefficient −0.44549). The 
significant p-value of 0.0673 a significant correlation. Given that the calculation for the 
variable 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝐷_𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟−2 is derived from subtracting the CPI of the host country to the 
more corrupt CPI of the home countries, the variable is a negative and the interpretation of 
the negative effect should be interpreted as a positive effect on FDI. The research therefore 
rejects the null hypothesis and observe that in Africa, where the home country was more 
corrupt than the host country, a positive effect on FDI is observed. 
4.3 Objective 3: Does corruption distance negatively affect FDI inflows in Africa where 
the home country is less corrupt than the host country 
4.3.1 Hypothesis H2b: Corruption distance (CorrD_lesscorr) and FDI inflows 
The hypothesis H2b aimed to establish  whether corruption distance has a negative 
correlation with FDI inflows into Africa where the host country was less corrupt than the 
home country. Similarly, a regression model was developed taking consideration of the 
variables that may affect FDI flows within countries as described in section 3.8 of this thesis. 
To determine if the model stated was the most appropriate model for the said investigation, 
the same tests were performed as in the previous models (model 1 and 2). 
The results show that a random-effects model is preferred over the pooled OLS model as the 
most appropriate. The null hypothesis for the Breusch-Pagan test is rejected due to the low p-
value (4.67666e-05). A second test to investigate the consistency of the GLS estimates was 
performed using the Hausman test. The null hypothesis in this regard is that the GLS 
estimates are consistent. The null hypothesis is rejected due to the low p-value (1.27354e-13) 
and the fixed effects model is chosen as the most appropriate. 
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Table 8: Fixed effects model (Model 3) Corruption Distance and FDI inflows 
In our hypothesis as illustrated in figure 6, the null hypothesis put forward (H2b) was that 
corruption distance where the home country was less corrupt than the host country has no  
effect on FDI in Africa. The alternate hypothesis therefore would be that the corruption 
distance as specified has a positive  correlation with FDI inflows. 
𝐻2𝑏0: 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝐷_𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟−2 = 0; 𝐻2𝑏1: 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝐷_𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟−2 > 0
The output of model 3 suggests that the negative effect exists (coefficient −0.117849) with a 
significant p-value of 0.0768. We therefore accept the null hypothesis and observe that in 
Model 3: Fixed-effects, using 343 observations
Included 44 cross-sectional units
Time-series length: minimum 5, maximum 9
Dependent variable: l_FDI_inflows
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.0299788 1.095 0.0274 0.9782
CorrD_lesscorr_2 −0.117849 0.0663504 −1.7762 0.0768 *
LN_GDP 0.857386 0.0492299 17.416 <0.0001 ***
Educationindex −2.67014 0.855137 −3.1225 0.002 ***
HDI 2.86592 1.17766 2.4336 0.0156 **
Inflation −1.46251e-05 3.92E-05 −0.3732 0.7093
Infrastructure −0.0152677 0.0077753 −1.9636 0.0505 *
Political_stability_1 −0.0110749 0.00259437 −4.2688 <0.0001 ***
Rule_of_Law −0.0396465 0.133267 −0.2975 0.7663
Unemployment 0.00945325 0.00677721 1.3949 0.1641
Bureuacracy 0.000598983 0.00174287 0.3437 0.7313
LSDV R-squared 0.70116 Within R-squared 0.635806
LSDV F(53, 289) 12.79384 P-value(F) 2.77E-50
Random effects test
Breusch-Pagan test -
Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0
Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(1) = 16.5749  with p-value = 4.67666e-05
Hausman test -
Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent
Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(10) = 83.0335 with p-value = 1.27354e-13
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Africa, where the home country was less corrupt than the host country, a negative effect on 
FDI will occur. 
4.4 Summary 
Table 9: Summary of hypothesis tests 
Objective Null hypothesis Effect (FD1) Results 
Objective 1: Does corruption 
negatively affect FDI inflows in 
Africa 
H1:Corruption has no 
relationship to  FDI inflows in 
Africa 
Negative Rejected 
Objective 2: Does corruption 
distance positively affects FDI 
inflows in Africa where the 
home country is more corrupt 
than the host country 
H2a:Corruption has no 
relationship to FDI inflows in 
Africa where the home country 
is more corrupt than the host 
country 
Positive Rejected 
Objective 3: Does corruption 
distance negatively affect FDI 
inflows in Africa where the 
home country is less corrupt 
than the host country 
H2b:Corruption distance has no 
relationship to  FDI inflows in 
Africa where the home country 
is less corrupt than the host 
country 
Negative Rejected 
The summary findings show that all three null hypothesis postulated where rejected. 
Regarding the Hypothesis HI and H2b, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that 
corruption has a negative effect on FDI inflows in Africa. The findings however also find a 
positive effect on FDI where the home country is more corrupt than the host country. A 
further examination of the results given the literature is discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
5 Introduction 
The purpose of the research was to investigate corruption and FDI where the home countries 
are developing economies in Africa in order to obtain a greater insight regarding relationships 
in Intra-African investment. In order to achieve this, the following research questions where 
developed: 
 Does the perception of corruption in Africa affect the capability of African countries
to attract foreign direct investment from investor countries?
 Is the effect of corruption distance on FDI significant in Africa?
xiii.
This chapter further examines the results of the findings summarized in the previous chapter 
(Table 8) regarding these questions in greater detail and relates them to the theory discussed 
as well as offer possible explanations for the results. The results are illustrated below: 
Table10: Research results 
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5.1 Objective 1: Does corruption affect FDI inflows in Africa 
Corruption in this instance was represented by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for the 
periods 2003 to 2013. Cleeve similarly uses the CPI  obtained from Transparency 
International (Cleeve, 2008) and finds a negative correlation with FDI in a study with 16 sub-
Saharan countries. Other authors support this view using different corruption indexes such as 
Mohamed and Sidiropoulos who use the ICRG corruption index and Asiedu, who combines it 
with the Investment Profile (Mohamed & Sidiropoulos, 2010). In other studies, Cleeve 
(2008) and Mhlanga (2010)  find results that are not conclusive. In the case of inconclusive 
results, it is suggested by Assunção et al (2011), that it may be a consequence of the size of 
the samples used. The general hypothesis in most studies has been that there is a negative 
correlation between corruption and FDI inflows. 
In the case of this thesis it was essential to firsly include a large population of countries to 
limit inconclusive results as well as investigate the above discussed general findings in the 
broader African context where within African countries the perception of corruption is 
relatively higher than the rest of the world  but it is still unclear how African countries behave 
towards each other when considering investment and the extent to which corruption plays a 
part in making such decisions. 
5.1.1 Hypothesis H1: Corruption (CPI) and FDI inflows 
 The first hypothesis in the study (hypothesis H1) was aimed at confirming the general view 
and findings regarding corruption and FDI and relate them to the African context using as 
large a population as possible given the constraints of available data. These findings 
suggested that corruption had a negative effect on FDI. The null hypothesis put forward was 
that corruption has no effect on FDI in Africa and its alternate was that corruption plays a 
role in affecting FDI in Africa.  
A total of 46 African countries was used in the study. The first criteria for selection of the 
sample was availability of data for the variables under consideration as per the specification 
of the model in section 3.8. As a consequence, the final data set included 44 African countries 
with the exclusion of Eritrea and the Seychelles for reason related to the criteria of selection 
stated. The hypothesis was tested using the fixed-effects regression model after performing 
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tests to select the most appropriate model for the data set. Time lag effects were taken into 
consideration at it was determined that a lag of  𝑡−2 for CPI produced the more significant p-
value for corruption. Intuitively, this makes sense as the investment decisions and inevitable 
investment flow takes time to materialize. 
Table 6, presented the results of the regression. A p-value of 0.0805 and a significant 
coefficient at a significance level of 10% (-0.0771) suggested a negative correlation. As a 
result, the findings for the relationship between corruption and FDI in Africa are that there is 
sufficient evidence that corruption negatively affects FDI in Africa and we reject the null 
hypothesis. Model 1, relating to CPI and FDI, showed an 𝑅2  of 0.702 suggesting the
variables included in the model can explain 70.2% of the variation in FDI. 
The results for H1 are therefore conclusive as opposed to the findings of Cleeve and 
Mhlanga. In the case of this research, a sufficient sample of countries was obtained for the 
study which in a way discounts the possible reasons for inconclusive results suggested by 
Assunção et al (2011).  
5.2 Objective 2: Does corruption distance affect FDI inflows in Africa where the home 
country is more corrupt than the host country 
After getting a greater insight regarding the effect of corruption on FDI in Africa, our second 
objective addressed the distance factor of corruption that may affect FDI in Africa. The 
theory of corruption distance as described by Blonigien (2005) “specifies the trade flows 
between countries as primarily a function of the GDP of each country and the distance 
between the two countries” (p.393). In the study, research relating to Africa studying the 
effects of corruption distance specifically looking at Africa has not been encountered. In 
Latin America, Assunção et al (2011) suggest a positive association between corruption  and 
FDI when the home country is more corrupt than the host country. The expectation from the 
theory therefore reasons that countries with limited exposure to corruption “are more likely to 
be deterred by high levels of corruption” in host countries Driffield et al (2013). This view is 
supported by Habib and Zurawicki who see these differences in corruption levels between 
host and home countries  as having an influence on FDI (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). 
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5.2.1 Hypothesis H2a: Corruption distance (CorrD_more) and FDI inflows 
The second hypothesis of this research, H2a, seeks to test the view made by Driffield. In this 
regard, it is expected that home countries that are more corrupt than host countries, are more 
likely to be unperturbed by the corruption levels and as a result, there would be a positive 
corruption association with FDI. The study is therefore limited in adequately testing this 
hypothesis as the primary source of FDI in Africa is mostly from outside of the continent and 
because it was essential for the study to include the corruption levels of Africa’s biggest 
trading partners when calculating the average corruption level for home countries more 
corrupt than host countries in Africa, this FDI relationship is skewed to mostly countries 
outside of Africa. 
Table 6, presented the results of the regression. The regression showed a p-value of 0.0673 
had with a significance level of p<0.10 and a coefficient of -0.44549.  Unsurprisingly and 
confirming the findings of Assunção et al (2011), the coefficient was negative with 
significant results (negative variable means a positive relationship with FDI in this case), 
implying that in Africa the level of corruption where the home country is more corrupt than 
the host country, a positive association of corruption and FDI is observed.  
A  reason that can be put forward for the results is that, as Johnson had  suggested, cultural 
opinions and other ethical standards vary across regions (Johnston, 2001). These differences 
cannot be estimated by the fixed effect model used and may suggest the same attitude 
towards corruption from home countries who appear to be more corrupt as home countries 
which are less. In fact the evidence that the effect on corruption on FDI is greater in this case. 
The evidence therefore suggests that the more corrupt home countries with weak institutions 
“are more likely to invest in conflict locations as suggested by Driffield et al (2013). 
These more corrupt countries also represent almost two thirds (64%) of the countries in 
Africa. This suggests that the institutional quality of the more corrupt countries that facilitate 
growth and investment such as capital markets and research are weak and as a consequence, 
the ability to compete in their own markets is diminished. A more plausible explanation is the 
argument propagated by various researches which links corruption to the increased 
operational cost of business, creates uncertainty and deters growth (Acemoglu, Johnson, & 
Robinson, 2005; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, & Thaicharoen, 2003; Andrei Shleifer, 
1993; Hall & Jones, 1999; Mauro, 1995) and as such supports and strengthens the sanding-
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the-wheels hypothesis. Our research results do not provide any evidence supporting the 
alternative view described  by Bardhan (2013) and (Leff, 1964). 
At some level the evidence supports the Heckscher-Ohlin Theory of Factor Endowments 
which relied on the premise that a nation is absolutely better (more efficient) at producing 
certain products than another as a result of production cost differences as there is clear 
evidence firstly that capital tends to move from less corrupt countries and secondly that 
corruption increases the cost of operation in more corrupt countries  (Ohlin, 1933). If one 
considers the significance of the role of technology in modern commerce and the extent of 
globalisation today, some of the theoretical conjectures of Heckscher such as the assumption 
of perfectly mobile production factors are more applicable in today’s economic environment.   
The findings however are surprising in that it was expected that more corrupt countries would 
find it difficult to exploit factor arbitrage opportunities in less corrupt countries because of a 
higher costs of production and yet the opposite is suggested by the comparatively higher 
coefficient (−0.44549) than in objective 3 (−0.117849) of the study. It can be surmised 
therefore that countries from more corrupt countries that invest in relatively less corrupt 
countries in Africa find that the local internal propriety monopolistic advantage over the local 
competitors such as superior technology, economies of scale or other superior knowledge 
supersedes the local disadvantages they may encounter when  investing as found Ardiyanto 
(2007).  
The findings of the research are therefore not surprising from the view point that it may be 
expected that host countries with lower levels should attract FDI.  
5.3 Objective 3: Does corruption distance affect FDI inflows in Africa where the home 
country is less corrupt than the host country 
Objective 3 in the study seeks to answer whether less corrupt home countries are deterred to 
invest in areas where the home country corruption is greater than the host nation corruption. 
Intuitively this may appear so. Some of the theoretical discussions in this case would be the 
same as discussed in objective 1 so they will not be repeated again. The first distinct 
difference in these two objectives however is that objective 1 considered corruption and FDI 
from the African context with no consideration of the level of corruption in countries outside 
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of Africa. Objective 3 on the other hand, compares the home country corruption of countries 
in Africa as well as outside of Africa in order to determine the effect on FDI if these countries 
compared were less corrupt than the host country. 
Secondly, the objective wants to make a distinction between how the level of African FDI is 
influenced by countries who are less corrupt from around the world (including those in 
Africa). Lastly, a distinction is made from objective 2 in relation to excluding the countries 
who are more corrupt in the computation of the corruption distance. The outcome should give 
us greater insight regarding how home countries who are less corrupt than African host 
countries react to the corruption levels of African countries when considering foreign direct 
investment. 
5.3.1 Hypothesis H2b: Corruption distance (CorrD_lesscorr) and FDI inflows 
The results for hypothesis Hb2 were not surprising given the overwhelming support of 
research alluding to the negative effect of corruption on FDI discussed in this study. The null 
hypothesis was rejected. The results showed a significant p-value of 0.0768 with a negative 
correlation of -0.117849 (confidence level p<0.10).. The model showed an 𝑅2 of 70%,
indicating that the variables explained 70% of the variance in FDI inflows.. The evidence of 
the study therefore, if one considers the rejection of H2a and H1, points to the view that it is 
the less corrupt countries that have the most effect on positive FDI flows in Africa. 
Our findings support the view of provided by North that comparative growth in economies 
can be explained by differences in institutions and the Kaufmann et al assessment that 
corruption is the undermining of institutions. As already stated in the study, we equate 
institutional quality to corruption and as such we point to the evidence regarding corruption 
levels and growth provided in Table 8 to support the view that less corrupt countries tend to 
have greater levels of growth. 
Table 8: Mean GDP of countries below (most corrupt) and above (less corrupt) 
Below Above 
Mean 25,420,038,747.67 40,606,240,974.53 
Standard Error 7,979,223,891.07 17,880,741,754.41 
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Median 9,707,694,800.00 10,794,219,098.00 
Standard Deviation 42,222,084,142.16 73,724,186,917.83 
Range 192,346,000,000.00 288,075,429,430.00 
Minimum 763,003,662.70 1,627,882,465.00 
Maximum 193,109,209,393.00 289,703,311,895.00 
Sum 711,761,084,934.70 690,306,096,567.00 
Count 28 17 
The acceptance of the evidence also confirms and enhances the acceptability of the more 
modern theories of FDI based on imperfect markets. As Hymer had argued (cited by 
Ardiyanto), the internal propriety monopolistic advantage over the local competitors such as 
superior technology, economies of scale or other superior knowledge determines if firms will 
invest abroad or not Ardiyanto (2007). This monopolistic advantage must supersede the 
location advantages that host countries may have which may imply higher costs of operation 
in the host country. If one combines this view with another also promulgated by Hymer, and 
already covered in this research, that as FDI implies the control or influence of the factors of 
production, the flow of FDI is also dependent on the protection of this ownership through the 
rule of law which is enforced through the institutions of the country. The research finds 
however that the significance of the rule of law index in our model was weak in relation to 
Africa, and that political stability was more significant at p>0.10 albeit at a lower effect on 
FDI. Other variables such as the Bureaucracy, Unemployment and Infrastructure also showed 
a relatively low effect in FDI than the market seeking variables. 
The takeaway is that if the environment is ripe for a less corrupt country to invest in a more 
corrupt home country, the less corrupt country would do so. This may not necessarily mean 
that corruption does not deter FDI, as our evidence clearly supports that it does, but rather 
that because other variables such as GDP, education and infrastructure also play a role. The 
less corrupt countries seem to prefer imperfect markets in which a monopolistic advantage 
can be exploited. The question that arises as a result of our evidence is therefore whether or 
not more corrupt countries provide the ideal environment to exploit these monopolistic 
advantages. The literature and the evidence seems to suggest that these monopolistic 
advantages exists, but may be constrained by corruption and possibly other variables such as 
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GDP and HDI (market attractiveness. Other reasons could be “psychic distance” as suggested 
by Johanson and Vahlene (1977). 
Lastly, a surprising finding is that HDI seems to improve in its positive effect (from a 
coefficient of 2.86592 to 3.57498) on FDI when more corrupt home countries invest in less 
corrupt African host countries versus when less corrupt countries invest in more corrupt 
African countries. This finding could point to the motive seeking element of FDI directed to 
Africa. That either the FDI crowds out the local competitors with limited human capital, 
technology transfer and other downstream benefits and that may support the need for stronger 
policy on FDI restrictions as suggested by Reiter et al (2010). 
5.4 Recommendations for policy makers 
The research provides some insight that may be useful to policy makers in the African 
continent. The first observation that may be considered is that FDI has been growing 
substantially in developing countries and Africa for the last three decades. This growth has 
seen FDI becoming more important that Aid in the said regions. Secondly, intra-African FDI 
seems to be constrained by the institutional weakness of African countries who are regarded 
as corrupt as well as foreign countries viewed in this light. These countries contribute the 
least in FDI flow to Africa and generally have low GDP. FDI flows in Africa are mostly 
sourced from less corrupt countries and as the evidence suggests, destined to the least corrupt 
countries in Africa. 
With this in view, policy makers in Africa, when outlining African or regional strategies for 
economic cooperation and integration should also consider the enablers of economic activity 
such as the enablers that seem to determine and constrain FDI in Africa. Central to this is the 
institutional quality of countries and the relationship between this and corruption. Secondly 
because the current drivers of FDI in Africa seems to originate from less corrupt countries, 
and specifically , countries in Europe and the USA, positive foreign relations in these 
countries require maintenance. Thirdly, the importance of technological innovation as well as 
its dependence on the investment in R&D not only will enable market imperfections that 
drive FDI, but will unlock the potential of FDI within the African countries. Lastly, 
lawmakers should implement FDI policy restrictions more effectively to ensure that less 
corrupt countries do not exploit them adversely regarding their development. 
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It is interesting to note that FDI from African countries tends to be directed toward less 
corrupt countries outside of Africa. It is these observations that further emphasis on the need 
to improve their institutions in order to drive economic activity in the continent. 
5.5 Recommendations for future research 
One of the limitations of this research was the limited information required to perform a 
reliable investigation of FDI flows between African countries. One of the reasons is that there 
is not much FDI within African countries, the other is that the information is often unreliable 
given the lack of reliable data amongst Africa countries. Future research may consider 
analysis FDI from the point of view of our hypothesis H1, using only African sourced FDI 
flows. Furthermore, Africa is a large and diverse continent. The fixed-effects in our model 
are not explained adequately as a consequence of the model choice. Researchers can 
supplement the findings of this research by investigating how fixed effects such as culture, 
language and other “psychic” proximities influence FDI location in Africa. Lastly, future 
researchers may want to explore the reasons why more corrupt countries are less likely invest 




6.1 Concluding Statement 
The research sought to establish the associations regarding corruption and FDI in Africa and 
also consider the association corruption distance and FDI have in Africa. The research was 
inspired by the work Godinez and Liu (2015) had done for the Latin American countries 
(2015) and contribute the same analysis for Africa which intuitively may have greater fixed 
effects that Latin American countries. In this regard, the study investigated the manner in 
which the perceived level of corruption in the African continent affects the level of FDI 
countries in Africa are able to attract. Key to the research was the recognition of the concept 
of corruption distance as propagated by Habib and Zurawicki (2002): that countries have vary 
in the way they experience and react to corruption and that the level of corruption of a 
country may be a determinant in the way firms from such a country make investment 
decisions. 
Another key element of the research was the understanding of corruption through the lens of 
institutional quality and equating weak institutions with the prevalence of corruption as 
championed by Kaufmann et al (2003). The importance therefore of the appreciation of 
corruption distance and institutional quality, coupled with how these interact with FDI flows 
for the African continent formed the corner stone of the research question and the related 
theoretical underpinnings considered. Amongst the most important was Hymers Theory of 
Monopolistic Advantage which emphasized the rational for why firms invest in foreign 
countries and concludes that it is because they have a monopolistic advantage inherent 
internally that they then use to their advantage to supersede the local advantages of foreign 
competitors. The explanatory power of Hymers (1960) position explain the findings of the 
research sufficiently, and unsurprisingly, also explains the results of hypothesis 2b (H2b) as 
has already been discussed. 
The research findings support the view that corruption distance has a negative effect on FDI 
in Africa. Given the levels of corruption in Africa, even expectations that more corrupt 
countries would be less likely to invest in less corrupt countries were not confirmed. Our 
evidence confirms that the flow of FDI in Africa is mostly influenced by countries who on 
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average are less corrupt that African countries. Given that our finding also supported that 
there is a negative relationship between corruption and FDI where the home country is less 
corrupt than the host African country, we view the potential for FDI towards Africa to be 
great if the institutional quality underpinning the investment climate in African countries 
were to improve. 
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7 Appendix 1: African countries considered in the study 
Country Average of FDI_inflows Average of CPI 
Algeria 1786627476 2.889375222 
Angola -1167761753 1.989448333 
Benin 88492472.38 2.88373125 
Botswana 556762607.3 5.764209111 
Burkina Faso 114900996.6 7.348409222 
Burundi 1696815.183 2.090748 
Cameroon 356445432.6 2.216916333 
Central African Republic 41602400.53 2.118404 
Chad 274179114.4 1.767557875 
Congo 1519533479 2.2 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 349835393.8 1.952633375 
Cote d'Ivoire 350098529 2.081522667 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5235109091 3.073576333 
Equatorial Guinea 979944662.7 1.887453857 
Ethiopia 410800947.9 2.498990222 
Gabon 492872194.3 3.03537525 
Gambia, The 50047686.4 2.701322889 
Ghana 1802190298 3.683417778 
Guinea 274156000 1.885048833 
Kenya 181250875 2.115943333 
Lesotho 48004409.79 3.345157857 
Libya 1768430000 2.40161 
Madagascar 598939233.4 2.982311556 
Malawi 229605140.2 2.922476111 
Mali 292559289.8 2.884300111 
Mauritania 471180345.7 2.621224667 
Mauritius 267809695 4.874127556 
Morocco 2208508721 3.338156444 
Mozambique 1836186598 2.709746889 
Namibia 604533928.5 4.392183333 
Niger 416074781.5 2.542557375 
Nigeria 5818449608 2.149926222 
Rwanda 83985682.66 3.383345571 
Senegal 273447771.5 3.163392111 
Sierra Leone 256306267.3 2.240101 
South Africa 4856121847 4.597808556 
Sudan 1722275934 1.851528667 
Swaziland 58321444.26 3.140253429 
Tanzania 1086033700 2.838947333 
Togo 149261760.7 2.497023 
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Tunisia 1373233972 4.473255444 
Uganda 693088406.5 2.537099667 
Zambia 1028199091 2.766138333 
Zimbabwe 157563636.4 2.258863 
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8 Appendix 2: Foreign Countries considered in the study 























































Trinidad and Tobago 3.685586 
Colombia 3.738519 
El Salvador 3.824988 
Bulgaria 3.825441 
Croatia 3.859361 








Czech Republic 4.607565 
Italy 4.678546 
Lithuania 4.772441 






























United Kingdom 8.18612 












New Zealand 9.46252 
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9 Appendix 3: Data set Corruption, FDI, GDP 




corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Algeria 2003 637881239 2.6 0.453727 -2.5714 0.939943 67,863,829,704.76 24.94077 
Algeria 2004 881851385 2.7 0.510317 -2.45502 1.033521 85,324,998,959.30 25.16973 
Algeria 2005 1156000000 2.8 0.502905 -2.48946 1.120174 103,198,229,168.23 25.35992 
Algeria 2006 1841000000 3.1 0.648611 -2.60875 1.573137 117,027,304,787.84 25.48567 
Algeria 2007 1686736540 3 0.680303 -2.52759 1.249647 134,977,088,396.42 25.62837 
Algeria 2008 2638607034 3.2 0.859127 -2.50482 1.543039 171,000,692,134.75 25.86493 
Algeria 2009 2746930734 2.8 0.601786 -2.4866 2.001975 137,211,039,899.57 25.64479 
Algeria 2010 2300369124 2.9 0.614516 -2.5327 1.426964 161,207,268,840.91 25.80596 
Algeria 2011 2571237025 2.904377 0.565538 -2.41152 1.285535 200,013,050,828.17 26.02165 
Algeria 2012 1500402453 2.889375 0.527254 -2.53737 0.717733 209,047,389,599.67 26.06583 
Algeria 2013 1691886708 2.889375 0.527254 -2.53737 0.806799 209,703,529,364.33 26.06896 
Angola 2003 3576971780 1.8 0.272074 -2.45355 25.20956 14,188,949,190.62 23.37573 
Angola 2004 2197227820 2 0.269722 -2.34808 11.18703 19,640,848,728.89 23.70088 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Angola 2005 -1303836930 2 0.179439 -2.28607 -4.61801 28,233,712,830.90 24.06378 
Angola 2006 -37714860 2.2 0.2 -2.25588 -0.09025 41,789,478,661.31 24.45591 
Angola 2007 -893342152 2.2 0.261538 -2.38915 -1.47785 60,448,921,272.23 24.82506 
Angola 2008 1678971010 1.9 0.27 -2.4628 1.994548 84,178,032,716.10 25.1562 
Angola 2009 2205298180 1.9 0.218182 -2.46224 2.921219 75,492,384,801.37 25.0473 
Angola 2010 -3227211182 1.9 0.29 -2.44983 -3.91315 82,470,913,120.73 25.13571 
Angola 2011 -3023770966 2.005035 0.269178 -2.26738 -2.90423 104,115,923,082.74 25.36877 
Angola 2012 -6897954559 1.989448 0.171999 -2.29215 -5.97751 115,398,371,427.67 25.47166 
Angola 2013 -7120017424 1.989448 0.171999 -2.29215 -5.70002 124,912,063,308.20 25.55088 
Benin 2003 10614240.65 2.883731 0.637875 -2.52648 0.271786 3,905,366,187.87 22.08562 
Benin 2004 -40701529.97 3.2 0.839123 -2.49157 -0.90019 4,521,424,807.23 22.23209 
Benin 2005 -8785364.695 2.9 0.562349 -2.60669 -0.18289 4,803,702,821.08 22.29265 
Benin 2006 -12352499.85 2.5 0.317647 -2.32696 -0.24021 5,142,380,779.44 22.36078 
Benin 2007 139006086.8 2.7 0.509615 -2.4402 2.328591 5,969,535,131.58 22.50993 
Benin 2008 48016408.32 3.1 0.77619 -2.50814 0.673179 7,132,787,396.67 22.68797 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Benin 2009 -18732013.56 2.9 0.653968 -2.50108 -0.26394 7,097,198,711.61 22.68297 
Benin 2010 53454932.99 2.8 0.55 -2.50079 0.766902 6,970,240,895.50 22.66492 
Benin 2011 161091309 2.96985 0.6129 -2.39725 2.061552 7,814,081,155.65 22.77919 
Benin 2012 281564661.1 2.883731 0.537668 -2.4878 3.468784 8,117,100,933.53 22.81724 
Benin 2013 360240965.3 2.883731 0.537668 -2.4878 3.953999 9,110,800,744.88 22.93273 
Botswana 2003 417985826.4 5.7 2.631908 -2.16237 5.564551 7,511,582,173.38 22.73971 
Botswana 2004 391066916.2 6 2.912097 -1.93871 4.36582 8,957,467,706.54 22.91575 
Botswana 2005 278591244.1 5.9 2.821126 -2.02188 2.805231 9,931,134,940.51 23.01894 
Botswana 2006 486640084.8 5.6 2.5625 -2.06944 4.805401 10,126,940,513.31 23.03847 
Botswana 2007 494681695 5.4 2.326446 -2.22571 4.522162 10,939,053,365.48 23.11561 
Botswana 2008 520918029.5 5.8 2.675878 -1.82941 4.759385 10,945,070,441.93 23.11616 
Botswana 2009 208699414 5.6 2.509016 -2.07647 2.032695 10,267,128,733.35 23.05221 
Botswana 2010 218379961.1 5.8 2.692069 -1.96364 1.707873 12,786,662,034.86 23.27167 
Botswana 2011 1371086982 6.077882 2.957606 -1.77688 8.742542 15,682,931,970.40 23.47584 
Botswana 2012 855456446.3 5.764209 2.659035 -1.87703 5.82488 14,686,249,032.04 23.41018 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Botswana 2013 880882080 5.764209 2.681111 -1.88311 5.945959 14,814,801,573.11 23.41889 
Burkina Faso 2003 30831022.58 7.5 4.085223 -1.30588 0.733079 4,205,691,222.11 22.1597 
Burkina Faso 2004 3829373.785 7.5 4.06087 -1.4 0.079143 4,838,551,099.71 22.29988 
Burkina Faso 2005 32254080.61 7.6 4.068409 -1.34375 0.590441 5,462,709,498.45 22.42121 
Burkina Faso 2006 83774772.55 7.3 3.911852 -1.39474 1.433353 5,844,669,845.54 22.4888 
Burkina Faso 2007 21683121.76 7.2 3.759854 -1.39474 0.320222 6,771,277,870.96 22.63596 
Burkina Faso 2008 33056780.41 7.3 3.823045 -1.28824 0.394961 8,369,637,065.40 22.84788 
Burkina Faso 2009 56426881.77 7.5 4.011594 -1.07222 0.674223 8,369,175,126.25 22.84782 
Burkina Faso 2010 38832813.08 7.1 3.732272 -1.34286 0.432438 8,979,966,766.07 22.91826 
Burkina Faso 2011 143657274.8 7.135683 3.771797 -1.26946 1.339579 10,724,061,338.59 23.09576 
Burkina Faso 2012 329300811.2 7.348409 3.877176 -1.30889 2.949122 11,166,061,507.80 23.13614 
Burkina Faso 2013 490264030.5 7.348409 3.877176 -1.30889 4.047031 12,114,166,020.72 23.21764 
Burundi 2003 2.090748 0.335096 -2.29592 .. 784,654,423.62 20.48075 
Burundi 2004 44690.7076 2.090748 0.230092 -2.28981 0.004883 915,257,323.40 20.63472 
Burundi 2005 584701.6926 2.3 0.279023 -2.31265 0.052334 1,117,257,279.46 20.83414 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Burundi 2006 31593.77819 2.4 0.284615 -2.25806 0.002481 1,273,180,597.03 20.96478 
Burundi 2007 500245.0931 2.5 0.442105 -2.39646 0.036889 1,356,078,278.19 21.02786 
Burundi 2008 3833208.348 1.9 0.272727 -2.49748 0.237846 1,611,634,331.65 21.20051 
Burundi 2009 348404.5346 1.8 0.22 -2.46309 0.020026 1,739,781,488.75 21.27703 
Burundi 2010 780582.0036 1.8 0.211111 -2.49983 0.038512 2,026,864,469.36 21.42976 
Burundi 2011 3354999.181 1.935236 0.224302 -2.32196 0.142423 2,355,652,125.85 21.58008 
Burundi 2012 604919.6515 2.090748 0.187079 -2.2852 0.024467 2,472,384,907.00 21.62845 
Burundi 2013 6884806.836 2.090748 0.187079 -2.2852 0.25363 2,714,505,634.53 21.72188 
Cameroon 2003 334137809.9 1.8 0.272074 -2.45355 2.452975 13,621,738,837.20 23.33493 
Cameroon 2004 67863015.12 2.1 0.226561 -2.34763 0.430184 15,775,357,014.63 23.48171 
Cameroon 2005 243504753.3 2.2 0.252738 -2.3091 1.46797 16,587,858,856.68 23.53194 
Cameroon 2006 59069772.85 2.3 0.218182 -2.22121 0.329023 17,953,066,721.09 23.61103 
Cameroon 2007 189330876.4 2.4 0.393939 -2.35667 0.926649 20,431,780,377.86 23.74036 
Cameroon 2008 20910875.62 2.3 0.395536 -2.46803 0.089661 23,322,254,113.56 23.87267 
Cameroon 2009 743285027.3 2.2 0.321739 -2.44173 3.178994 23,381,142,146.65 23.8752 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Cameroon 2010 535742601.5 2.2 0.354167 -2.44784 2.267935 23,622,483,983.71 23.88546 
Cameroon 2011 652411755.8 2.452247 0.343072 -2.27141 2.453846 26,587,311,527.57 24.0037 
Cameroon 2012 527394101.2 2.216916 0.226465 -2.31021 1.992267 26,472,056,037.77 23.99936 
Cameroon 2013 547249169.1 2.216916 0.226465 -2.31021 1.850847 29,567,504,655.49 24.10994 
Central African 
Republic 2003 11300000 2.118404 0.288296 -2.35345 0.991441 1,139,754,799.16 20.85408 
Central African 
Republic 2004 15100000 2.118404 0.203772 -2.34648 1.188901 1,270,080,250.65 20.96235 
Central African 
Republic 2005 10100000 2.118404 0.181838 -2.27606 0.747981 1,350,301,057.07 21.02359 
Central African 
Republic 2006 34670000 2.4 0.284615 -2.25806 2.373744 1,460,562,038.37 21.10209 
Central African 
Republic 2007 56750000 2 0.3 -2.41 3.34192 1,698,125,617.92 21.25279 
Central African 
Republic 2008 117110000 2 0.292857 -2.48279 5.898648 1,985,370,057.92 21.40907 
Central African 
Republic 2009 42280000 2 0.255556 -2.50667 2.133491 1,981,728,140.78 21.40724 
Central African 
Republic 2010 61520000 2.1 0.285213 -2.33011 3.097661 1,986,014,845.63 21.4094 
Central African 
Republic 2011 36908455.89 2.210424 0.274251 -2.23349 1.668028 2,212,699,746.81 21.51748 
Central African 
Republic 2012 70035157.33 2.118404 0.18286 -2.3067 3.206468 2,184,183,758.32 21.50451 
Central African 
Republic 2013 1852792.612 2.118404 0.178748 -2.30759 0.124009 1,494,073,354.38 21.12477 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Chad 2003 712663454.9 1.767558 0.287558 -2.40528 26.0413 
           
2,736,666,515.83  21.73001 
Chad 2004 466793492.1 1.7 0.166667 -2.47647 10.57307 
           
4,414,929,220.00  22.20826 
Chad 2005 -99342519.36 1.7 #DIV/0! -2.46232 -1.49462 
           
6,646,663,021.44  22.61738 
Chad 2006 -278414000 2 0.125 -2.242 -3.75115 
           
7,422,102,519.57  22.72773 
Chad 2007 -321655000 1.8 0.25 -2.40526 -3.72341 
           
8,638,711,756.63  22.87952 
Chad 2008 466131000 1.6 0.266667 -2.61466 4.50284 
         
10,351,933,631.72  23.06044 
Chad 2009 374900000 1.6 0.133333 -2.58117 4.051447 
           
9,253,484,289.67  22.94827 
Chad 2010 313000000 1.7 0.15 -2.56695 2.936842 
         
10,657,705,072.29  23.08955 
Chad 2011 281900000 2.040463 0.235188 -2.27844 2.318947 
         
12,156,380,062.05  23.22112 
Chad 2012 579793037.4 1.767558 0.13477 -2.39067 4.687821 
         
12,368,070,168.97  23.23838 
Chad 2013 520200793.5 1.767558 0.13477 -2.39067 4.01704 
         
12,949,854,262.81  23.28435 
Congo 2003 219545648.8 2.2 0.357879 -2.35991 6.280146 
           
3,495,868,724.68  21.97485 
Congo 2004 88399286.1 2.2 0.276508 -2.40756 1.901621 
           
4,648,628,839.53  22.25984 
Congo 2005 800996241.6 2.2 0.252738 -2.3091 13.15912 
           
6,087,002,681.74  22.52942 
Congo 2006 1487693084 2.2 0.2 -2.25588 19.24257 
           
7,731,261,310.93  22.76854 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Congo 2007 2638405260 2.2 0.261538 -2.38915 31.42946 8,394,688,284.06 22.85086 
Congo 2008 2031879948 2.2 0.336813 -2.48651 17.13363 11,859,014,004.08 23.19635 
Congo 2009 1273828534 2.2 0.352174 -2.46349 13.27799 9,593,536,531.24 22.98436 
Congo 2010 928436006.5 2.2 0.354167 -2.4295 7.731889 12,007,880,590.46 23.20883 
Congo 2011 2179856146 2.2 0.267713 -2.24392 15.11102 14,425,607,224.17 23.39227 
Congo 2012 2151894023 2.2 0.234592 -2.27705 15.7326 13,677,930,123.59 23.33905 
Congo 2013 2913934094 2.2 0.21828 -2.30975 20.68696 14,085,852,120.48 23.36844 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2003 391254723.6 1.952633 0.22823 -2.40124 4.377642 8,937,567,059.88 22.91353 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2004 409032814.5 2 0.269722 -2.34808 3.972163 10,297,483,481.22 23.05517 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2005 166600000 2.1 0.261495 -2.27843 1.392454 11,964,484,667.91 23.20521 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2006 237700000 2 0.125 -2.242 1.662644 14,296,507,096.41 23.38328 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2007 1793700000 1.9 0.266667 -2.36757 10.96124 16,364,029,327.35 23.51835 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2008 1672700000 1.7 0.3 -2.52923 8.70923 19,206,060,270.25 23.67849 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2009 -34800000 1.9 0.218182 -2.46224 -0.19055 18,262,773,820.81 23.62813 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2010 124100000 2 0.307692 -2.41697 0.604679 20,523,285,374.19 23.74483 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2011 -90900000 2.021067 0.235409 -2.28223 -0.38115 
         
23,849,009,737.67  23.89501 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2012 -420534933.8 1.952633 0.150204 -2.31347 -1.53127 
         
27,463,220,380.01  24.03611 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2013 -400663272.5 1.952633 0.150204 -2.31347 -1.33489 
         
30,014,813,755.77  24.12496 
Cote d'Ivoire 2003 165347467.5 2.1 0.326711 -2.35442 1.080236 
         
15,306,602,560.25  23.45155 
Cote d'Ivoire 2004 282979933.1 2 0.269722 -2.34808 1.70939 
         
16,554,441,846.52  23.52992 
Cote d'Ivoire 2005 348920761.5 1.9 0.119159 -2.37072 2.042272 
         
17,084,928,927.46  23.56146 
Cote d'Ivoire 2006 350652855.7 2.1 0.1625 -2.21586 1.969862 
         
17,800,887,796.50  23.60251 
Cote d'Ivoire 2007 443215533.1 2.1 0.2625 -2.43485 2.178645 
         
20,343,635,319.62  23.73603 
Cote d'Ivoire 2008 466489597 2 0.29375 -2.50252 1.925661 
         
24,224,903,099.63  23.91065 
Cote d'Ivoire 2009 396030774 2.1 0.283333 -2.41418 1.631267 
         
24,277,493,862.06  23.91282 
Cote d'Ivoire 2010 358118909 2.2 0.36087 -2.4295 1.439124 
         
24,884,505,034.56  23.93751 
Cote d'Ivoire 2011 301577298.6 2.233704 0.25148 -2.27861 1.188172 
         
25,381,616,734.07  23.95729 
Cote d'Ivoire 2012 330274411.5 2.081523 0.18971 -2.27833 1.221404 
         
27,040,562,587.18  24.0206 
Cote d'Ivoire 2013 407476278.3 2.081523 0.18971 -2.27833 1.302151 
         
31,292,560,974.42  24.16665 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2003 237400000 3.3 0.921906 -2.45428 0.286284 
         
82,924,503,942.64  25.1412 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2004 1253300000 3.2 0.853892 -2.49237 1.589571 
         
78,845,185,293.50  25.09075 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2005 5375600000 3.4 0.887969 -2.69052 5.993819 
         
89,685,725,230.25  25.21958 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2006 10042800000 3.3 0.764634 -2.88209 9.343527 
      
107,484,034,870.97  25.40061 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2007 11578100000 2.9 0.617742 -2.49022 8.873538 
      
130,478,960,092.50  25.59448 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2008 9494600000 2.8 0.657682 -2.39412 5.831413 
      
162,818,181,818.18  25.8159 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2009 6711600000 2.8 0.563333 -2.5957 3.551442 
      
188,982,374,700.81  25.96492 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2010 6385600000 3.1 0.777612 -2.47297 2.917287 
      
218,888,324,504.75  26.11183 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2011 -482700000 2.862187 0.559292 -2.35426 -0.20453 
      
236,001,858,960.02  26.18711 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2012 2797700000 3.073576 0.670159 -2.49629 1.012363 
      
276,353,323,880.22  26.34495 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2013 4192200000 3.073576 0.670159 -2.49629 1.465747 
      
286,011,230,726.27  26.3793 
Equatorial Guinea 2003 689779766 1.887454 0.202607 -2.41566 27.76058 
           
2,484,745,935.09  21.63344 
Equatorial Guinea 2004 340914468.5 1.887454 0.239946 -2.31935 7.729147 
           
4,410,764,338.67  22.20731 
Equatorial Guinea 2005 769146185.2 1.9 0.119159 -2.37072 9.360005 
           
8,217,369,092.65  22.82952 
Equatorial Guinea 2006 469506014.6 2.1 0.1625 -2.21586 5.134191 
           
9,144,693,758.21  22.93644 
Equatorial Guinea 2007 1242731087 1.9 0.2875 -2.41096 11.53162 
         
10,776,721,748.10  23.10065 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Equatorial Guinea 2008 -793872332.8 1.7 0.233333 -2.56295 -4.95498 
         
16,021,701,871.77  23.49721 
Equatorial Guinea 2009 1636219625 1.8 0.266667 -2.45235 16.01081 
         
10,219,467,607.38  23.04756 
Equatorial Guinea 2010 2734000000 1.9 0.3 -2.36561 21.51147 
         
12,709,498,548.49  23.26562 
Equatorial Guinea 2011 1975000000 1.912177 0.165991 -2.34152 11.46273 
         
17,229,758,159.78  23.5699 
Equatorial Guinea 2012 985256411.5 1.887454 0.116262 -2.3477 5.470291 
         
18,011,041,667.13  23.61425 
Equatorial Guinea 2013 730710064 1.887454 0.195861 -2.33611 4.264284 
         
17,135,584,684.64  23.56442 
Ethiopia 2003 465000000 2.5 0.43667 -2.52503 5.392123 
           
8,623,691,300.04  22.87778 
Ethiopia 2004 545100000 2.3 0.305151 -2.44216 5.380416 
         
10,131,187,261.44  23.03888 
Ethiopia 2005 265111675.5 2.2 0.252738 -2.3091 2.137801 
         
12,401,139,453.97  23.24105 
Ethiopia 2006 545257102.2 2.4 0.284615 -2.25806 3.568235 
         
15,280,861,834.60  23.44987 
Ethiopia 2007 222000573 2.4 0.393939 -2.35667 1.126471 
         
19,707,616,772.80  23.70427 
Ethiopia 2008 108537544 2.6 0.545714 -2.48037 0.400997 
         
27,066,912,635.22  24.02158 
Ethiopia 2009 221459581.4 2.7 0.608333 -2.47549 0.682729 
         
32,437,389,116.04  24.20258 
Ethiopia 2010 288271568.3 2.7 0.511765 -2.50076 0.963031 
         
29,933,790,334.34  24.12225 
Ethiopia 2011 626509560.4 2.690912 0.435896 -2.3835 1.960737 
         
31,952,763,089.33  24.18752 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Ethiopia 2012 278562822.2 2.49899 0.348484 -2.34221 0.643173 43,310,721,414.08 24.49167 
Ethiopia 2013 953000000 2.49899 0.348484 -2.34221 2.000075 47,648,211,133.22 24.58711 
Gabon 2003 99666154.02 3.035375 0.738048 -2.51455 1.533961 6,497,305,662.09 22.59465 
Gabon 2004 313970792 3.3 0.884634 -2.48355 4.047949 7,756,293,574.98 22.77177 
Gabon 2005 326161877.9 2.9 0.562349 -2.60669 3.448206 9,458,884,812.18 22.97022 
Gabon 2006 267805315.6 3 0.572464 -2.52674 2.637426 10,154,041,929.65 23.04114 
Gabon 2007 269324270.3 3.3 0.898649 -2.53636 2.165168 12,438,956,756.45 23.2441 
Gabon 2008 773000000 3.1 0.815778 -2.51744 4.984339 15,508,574,820.35 23.46466 
Gabon 2009 573000000 2.9 0.612308 -2.55889 4.74922 12,065,138,272.75 23.21359 
Gabon 2010 499000000 2.8 0.55 -2.50079 3.475273 14,358,584,300.30 23.38761 
Gabon 2011 696000000 2.983002 0.602557 -2.47001 3.827019 18,186,478,119.96 23.62394 
Gabon 2012 832473111.1 3.035375 0.636736 -2.4987 4.848008 17,171,447,372.33 23.56651 
Gabon 2013 771192616 3.035375 0.640858 -2.50547 4.384089 17,590,716,232.49 23.59064 
Gambia, The 2003 18272720.34 2.5 0.43667 -2.52503 3.7518 487,038,821.61 20.00385 
Gambia, The 2004 55526319.44 2.8 0.583458 -2.53039 9.593596 578,785,278.77 20.17644 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Gambia, The 2005 53650280.02 2.7 0.425289 -2.46622 8.595395 624,174,723.71 20.25194 
Gambia, The 2006 82208102.59 2.5 0.317647 -2.32696 12.54954 655,068,695.95 20.30025 
Gambia, The 2007 78099786.49 2.3 0.334483 -2.3624 9.776271 798,870,894.21 20.49871 
Gambia, The 2008 78614989.73 1.9 0.209856 -2.44561 8.140143 965,769,128.17 20.68844 
Gambia, The 2009 39447343.71 2.9 0.652459 -2.5163 4.379925 900,639,747.94 20.61862 
Gambia, The 2010 37366207.68 3.2 0.791071 -2.46269 3.923254 952,429,030.42 20.67453 
Gambia, The 2011 36178721.37 3.511906 0.934611 -2.65639 4.000935 904,256,643.42 20.62262 
Gambia, The 2012 33524808.59 2.701323 0.442977 -2.41411 3.673671 912,569,686.79 20.63178 
Gambia, The 2013 37635270.43 2.701323 0.491127 -2.37972 4.164209 903,779,657.12 20.6221 
Ghana 2003 136751000 3.3 0.958855 -2.48658 1.791715 7,632,406,552.84 22.75567 
Ghana 2004 139270000 3.6 1.042625 -2.64671 1.568114 8,881,368,538.08 22.90722 
Ghana 2005 144970000 3.5 0.927426 -2.78979 1.350866 10,731,634,116.74 23.09646 
Ghana 2006 636010000 3.3 0.764634 -2.88209 3.116282 20,409,257,610.47 23.73925 
Ghana 2007 1383177930 3.7 1.101087 -2.58906 5.586607 24,758,819,717.71 23.93245 
Ghana 2008 2714916344 3.9 1.292012 -2.51452 9.517043 28,526,891,010.49 24.07411 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Ghana 2009 2372540000 3.9 1.266316 -2.48387 9.132935 
         
25,977,847,813.74  23.98051 
Ghana 2010 2527350000 4.1 1.427801 -2.45517 7.855067 
         
32,174,772,955.97  24.19445 
Ghana 2011 3247588000 3.85076 1.201871 -2.51134 8.207966 
         
39,566,292,432.86  24.40124 
Ghana 2012 3294520000 3.683418 1.084086 -2.51864 7.855368 
         
41,939,728,978.73  24.4595 
Ghana 2013 3227000000 3.683418 1.084086 -2.51864 6.75033 
         
47,805,069,494.91  24.5904 
Guinea 2003 78966000 1.885049 0.223894 -2.35929 2.291232 
           
3,446,442,218.90  21.96061 
Guinea 2004 0 1.885049 0.318382 -2.2684 0 
           
3,666,349,049.43  22.02246 
Guinea 2005 105000000 1.885049 0.151604 -2.37945 3.574989 
           
2,937,071,767.26  21.80068 
Guinea 2006 125000000 1.9 0.153137 -2.33772 4.263847 
           
2,931,625,104.50  21.79882 
Guinea 2007 385900000 1.9 0.266667 -2.36757 9.334393 
           
4,134,173,275.12  22.14255 
Guinea 2008 381880000 1.6 0.225 -2.62923 8.456484 
           
4,515,824,647.44  22.23085 
Guinea 2009 140850000 1.8 0.22 -2.47838 3.055365 
           
4,609,923,756.18  22.25148 
Guinea 2010 101350000 2 0.3 -2.41697 2.140011 
           
4,735,956,493.06  22.27845 
Guinea 2011 956040000 2.110293 0.268571 -2.23971 18.86663 
           
5,067,360,009.39  22.34609 
Guinea 2012 605400000 1.885049 0.132833 -2.33455 10.68247 
           
5,667,229,758.99  22.45797 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Guinea 2013 135330000 1.885049 0.132833 -2.33455 2.17163 6,231,725,484.56 22.55292 
Kenya 2003 81738242.64 1.9 0.200682 -2.43696 0.548413 14,904,517,649.85 23.42493 
Kenya 2004 46063931.45 2.1 0.226561 -2.34763 0.286194 16,095,337,093.84 23.5018 
Kenya 2005 21211685.4 2.1 0.261495 -2.27843 0.113202 18,737,895,401.13 23.65381 
Kenya 2006 50674725.18 2.2 0.2 -2.25588 0.19622 25,825,524,820.81 23.97463 
Kenya 2007 729044146 2.1 0.2625 -2.43485 2.281243 31,958,195,182.24 24.18769 
Kenya 2008 95585680.23 2.1 0.311688 -2.49389 0.266291 35,895,153,327.85 24.30387 
Kenya 2009 116257609 2.2 0.331818 -2.44173 0.314027 37,021,512,048.82 24.33476 
Kenya 2010 178064606.8 2.1 0.338889 -2.42071 0.445165 39,999,659,233.76 24.41214 
Kenya 2011 139862091.1 2.24349 0.251206 -2.28601 0.333375 41,953,433,591.41 24.45983 
Kenya 2012 163410210.3 2.115943 0.190421 -2.29257 0.324161 50,410,164,013.55 24.64346 
Kenya 2013 371846696.4 2.115943 0.190421 -2.29257 0.674848 55,100,780,396.39 24.73243 
Lesotho 2003 43948139.98 3.345158 0.944085 -2.47313 4.534629 969,167,237.30 20.69195 
Lesotho 2004 55671430.94 3.345158 0.896618 -2.47006 4.510674 1,234,215,384.85 20.9337 
Lesotho 2005 27440317.19 3.4 0.887969 -2.69052 2.005354 1,368,352,570.25 21.03687 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Lesotho 2006 24322286.69 3.2 0.698718 -2.64079 1.702225 1,428,852,972.02 21.08014 
Lesotho 2007 75610320.58 3.3 0.888 -2.48974 4.733109 1,597,476,793.37 21.19169 
Lesotho 2008 11011198.57 3.2 0.846627 -2.49398 0.675255 1,630,672,202.59 21.21226 
Lesotho 2009 91351945.08 3.3 0.921622 -2.43086 5.337808 1,711,412,960.10 21.26059 
Lesotho 2010 30441963.01 3.5 1.032806 -2.57143 1.391643 2,187,482,926.30 21.50602 
Lesotho 2011 61173319.21 3.516105 0.930049 -2.67291 2.424329 2,523,309,140.49 21.64884 
Lesotho 2012 56648555.1 3.345158 0.872893 -2.43567 2.376154 2,384,043,848.96 21.59206 
Lesotho 2013 50429031.34 3.345158 0.880833 -2.39339 2.273521 2,218,102,350.05 21.51992 
Libya 2003 143000000 2.1 0.326711 -2.35442 0.544438 26,265,625,000.00 23.99153 
Libya 2004 357000000 2.5 0.395862 -2.3891 1.077823 33,122,307,692.31 24.22347 
Libya 2005 1038000000 2.5 0.321279 -2.45171 2.19292 47,334,148,578.42 24.5805 
Libya 2006 2064000000 2.7 0.417647 -2.45446 3.755326 54,961,936,662.61 24.72991 
Libya 2007 4689000000 2.5 0.536111 -2.36121 6.944996 67,516,236,337.72 24.93563 
Libya 2008 4111300000 2.6 0.523897 -2.4205 4.718018 87,140,405,361.23 25.19079 
Libya 2009 1371000000 2.5 0.486842 -2.44107 2.175213 63,028,320,702.03 24.86685 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Libya 2010 1784000000 2.2 0.300665 -2.33147 2.385874 74,773,444,900.54 25.03773 
Libya 2011 2.01449 0.22341 -2.29813 .. 34,699,395,523.61 24.26999 
Libya 2012 1425000000 2.40161 0.334743 -2.26734 1.739813 81,905,365,776.33 25.12883 
Libya 2013 702000000 2.40161 0.315881 -2.31675 1.071683 65,504,442,871.75 24.90538 
Madagascar 2003 12874087 2.6 0.444845 -2.53703 0.235185 5,474,030,080.24 22.42328 
Madagascar 2004 52910748 3.1 0.779272 -2.47556 1.212455 4,363,934,494.37 22.19664 
Madagascar 2005 85428623.9 2.8 0.534317 -2.50476 1.69525 5,039,293,030.82 22.34053 
Madagascar 2006 294681941.5 3.1 0.648611 -2.60875 5.342424 5,515,884,348.55 22.4309 
Madagascar 2007 789389724.1 3.2 0.832394 -2.43976 10.75035 7,342,923,489.10 22.717 
Madagascar 2008 1134497642 3.4 1.024762 -2.48442 12.05245 9,413,002,920.97 22.96536 
Madagascar 2009 1293330142 3 0.70303 -2.55517 15.12602 8,550,363,974.79 22.86924 
Madagascar 2010 809707320.3 2.6 0.446809 -2.43715 9.275066 8,729,936,135.74 22.89002 
Madagascar 2011 738462649 3.040804 0.621634 -2.52066 7.464721 9,892,702,357.57 23.01506 
Madagascar 2012 810503138.6 2.982312 0.596192 -2.52973 8.170576 9,919,780,071.29 23.0178 
Madagascar 2013 566545549.9 2.982312 0.596192 -2.52973 5.337984 10,613,473,832.74 23.08539 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Malawi 2003 65885630.02 2.8 0.590856 -2.55562 2.053044 3,209,167,240.45 21.88928 
Malawi 2004 107811374 2.8 0.583458 -2.53039 3.101295 3,476,333,638.66 21.96924 
Malawi 2005 139696707.4 2.8 0.502905 -2.48946 3.821138 3,655,892,941.67 22.01961 
Malawi 2006 35561531.63 2.7 0.384906 -2.456 0.889479 3,998,020,176.93 22.10907 
Malawi 2007 124388838.7 2.7 0.509615 -2.4402 2.806014 4,432,937,045.80 22.21233 
Malawi 2008 195424461.1 2.8 0.657682 -2.41287 3.672693 5,321,012,192.34 22.39493 
Malawi 2009 49130854.84 3.3 0.938356 -2.40732 0.793569 6,191,127,665.20 22.54638 
Malawi 2010 97010028.45 3.4 0.906206 -2.44703 1.393891 6,959,655,570.89 22.6634 
Malawi 2011 1128341392 3.002285 0.620773 -2.45117 14.09722 8,004,000,737.31 22.80321 
Malawi 2012 -52302532.29 2.922476 0.558421 -2.49865 -0.86759 6,028,487,928.83 22.51976 
Malawi 2013 634708256.1 2.922476 0.55703 -2.58007 11.50067 5,518,880,768.58 22.43144 
Mali 2003 72355432.36 3 0.744624 -2.52102 1.53833 4,703,504,466.48 22.27157 
Mali 2004 84840599.64 3.2 0.839123 -2.49157 1.558288 5,444,474,268.42 22.41787 
Mali 2005 160218206.8 2.9 0.562349 -2.60669 2.565531 6,245,031,690.07 22.55505 
Mali 2006 148195574.1 2.8 0.451724 -2.50638 2.147824 6,899,799,785.84 22.65476 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Mali 2007 206064771.4 2.7 0.509615 -2.4402 2.529738 
           
8,145,694,631.88  22.82076 
Mali 2008 266432781.9 3.1 0.774741 -2.50814 2.732413 
           
9,750,822,511.48  23.00062 
Mali 2009 646609200.6 2.8 0.571186 -2.57128 6.351123 
         
10,181,021,770.43  23.04379 
Mali 2010 371569832.6 2.7 0.563265 -2.43374 3.479526 
         
10,678,749,467.47  23.09152 
Mali 2011 556147161.6 2.758701 0.472649 -2.40974 4.285272 
         
12,978,107,560.60  23.28653 
Mali 2012 397865237.2 2.8843 0.534619 -2.4836 3.197567 
         
12,442,747,897.22  23.2444 
Mali 2013 307853389.3 2.8843 0.530091 -2.51456 2.324162 
         
13,245,777,669.82  23.30694 
Mauritania 2003 101957951.6 2.621225 0.44366 -2.57594 6.522909 
           
1,563,074,859.52  21.16992 
Mauritania 2004 404102025.7 2.621225 0.439684 -2.46298 22.04059 
           
1,833,444,740.38  21.32946 
Mauritania 2005 811869181.4 2.621225 0.353052 -2.47386 37.16593 
           
2,184,444,848.98  21.50463 
Mauritania 2006 154601638.1 3.1 0.648611 -2.60875 5.084382 
           
3,040,716,679.08  21.83536 
Mauritania 2007 139372822.3 2.6 0.473333 -2.44811 4.152007 
           
3,356,757,497.12  21.93424 
Mauritania 2008 342770662 2.8 0.615306 -2.47172 8.503265 
           
4,031,047,704.40  22.11729 
Mauritania 2009 -3072044.396 2.5 0.486842 -2.44107 -0.08388 
           
3,662,281,667.95  22.02135 
Mauritania 2010 130528391.3 2.3 0.383333 -2.3814 3.009098 
           
4,337,791,530.88  22.19063 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Mauritania 2011 588749564.2 2.427348 0.359505 -2.22343 11.39587 
           
5,166,340,390.53  22.36543 
Mauritania 2012 1386098851 2.621225 0.42128 -2.3452 26.49649 
           
5,231,255,478.39  22.37792 
Mauritania 2013 1126004760 2.621225 0.42128 -2.3452 19.94433 
           
5,645,739,651.54  22.45417 
Mauritius 2003 62630665.28 4.4 1.694788 -2.39418 1.116444 
           
5,609,836,354.53  22.44779 
Mauritius 2004 13894736.4 4.1 1.426832 -2.51315 0.217592 
           
6,385,691,316.68  22.57733 
Mauritius 2005 41776995.78 4.2 1.472936 -2.62332 0.664837 
           
6,283,796,154.76  22.56124 
Mauritius 2006 106758059.1 5.1 2.157391 -2.29512 1.585941 
           
6,731,529,167.63  22.63007 
Mauritius 2007 340763853.7 4.7 1.89717 -2.19388 4.373223 
           
7,792,052,679.82  22.77637 
Mauritius 2008 377724738.1 5.5 2.458111 -1.92895 3.917863 
           
9,641,089,804.87  22.9893 
Mauritius 2009 256680711.8 5.4 2.366387 -2.06053 2.905383 
           
8,834,661,042.94  22.90195 
Mauritius 2010 429958030.7 5.4 2.374155 -2.14324 4.42424 
           
9,718,233,910.68  22.99727 
Mauritius 2011 433358879.7 5.067148 2.105725 -2.28292 3.851262 
         
11,252,386,260.71  23.14385 
Mauritius 2012 589018302.8 4.874128 1.940689 -2.34151 5.146217 
         
11,445,657,237.94  23.16088 
Mauritius 2013 293341671.7 4.874128 1.940689 -2.34151 2.458473 
         
11,931,866,299.26  23.20248 
Morocco 2003 2312682907 3.3 0.958855 -2.48658 4.441995 
         
52,064,058,833.97  24.67574 
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Morocco 2004 787053819 3.2 0.839123 -2.49157 1.319984 
         
59,626,020,162.38  24.81136 
Morocco 2005 1619752454 3.2 0.755541 -2.61267 2.598129 
         
62,343,022,650.87  24.85592 
Morocco 2006 2366000096 3.2 0.698718 -2.64079 3.446928 
         
68,640,825,480.92  24.95215 
Morocco 2007 2806642141 3.5 0.988095 -2.67164 3.550845 
         
79,041,539,006.14  25.09324 
Morocco 2008 2466288357 3.5 1.038977 -2.50822 2.666048 
         
92,507,257,783.57  25.25055 
Morocco 2009 1970323920 3.3 0.921622 -2.4321 2.12097 
         
92,897,320,375.82  25.25476 
Morocco 2010 1240625859 3.4 0.960256 -2.43734 1.330904 
         
93,216,746,661.60  25.25819 
Morocco 2011 2521362081 3.443408 0.866836 -2.70467 2.487275 
      
101,370,474,295.11  25.34205 
Morocco 2012 2841954371 3.338156 0.873831 -2.4013 2.892094 
         
98,266,306,615.36  25.31095 
Morocco 2013 3360909924 3.338156 0.876993 -2.41184 3.134146 
      
107,235,262,625.66  25.39829 
Mozambique 2003 336698815 2.7 0.507218 -2.57575 6.015306 
           
5,597,367,853.40  22.44556 
Mozambique 2004 244703873.4 2.8 0.583458 -2.53039 3.581831 
           
6,831,808,930.40  22.64486 
Mozambique 2005 122413755.6 2.8 0.502905 -2.48946 1.584881 
           
7,723,846,194.87  22.76758 
Mozambique 2006 251141650.3 2.8 0.451724 -2.50638 3.021406 
           
8,312,078,525.09  22.84098 
Mozambique 2007 416689348.4 2.8 0.573214 -2.48646 4.448605 
           
9,366,742,309.49  22.96043 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Mozambique 2008 641399415.8 2.6 0.630662 -2.44679 5.579891 11,494,837,053.41 23.16516 
Mozambique 2009 930100407.8 2.5 0.430952 -2.46126 8.523883 10,911,698,208.10 23.1131 
Mozambique 2010 1258453097 2.7 0.534694 -2.40361 12.39338 10,154,238,250.18 23.04116 
Mozambique 2011 3663937118 2.687722 0.441027 -2.36399 27.9026 13,131,168,011.81 23.29825 
Mozambique 2012 5635092659 2.709747 0.46006 -2.39089 38.77105 14,534,278,446.31 23.39978 
Mozambique 2013 6697422432 2.709747 0.46006 -2.39089 41.80964 16,018,848,990.67 23.49703 
Namibia 2003 65110887.11 4.7 1.881016 -2.43627 1.320356 4,931,312,147.21 22.31887 
Namibia 2004 223561311.2 4.1 1.432689 -2.5185 3.383776 6,606,858,786.01 22.61137 
Namibia 2005 392758629.4 4.3 1.52489 -2.72319 5.408905 7,261,333,794.60 22.70583 
Namibia 2006 609774001.2 4.1 1.370588 -2.66296 7.64249 7,978,734,401.54 22.80005 
Namibia 2007 669795195.4 4.5 1.750485 -2.20556 7.662802 8,740,865,600.25 22.89128 
Namibia 2008 749771643.8 4.5 1.775813 -2.16909 8.834644 8,486,721,916.91 22.86177 
Namibia 2009 496968181.1 4.5 1.722115 -2.41837 5.59889 8,876,191,120.76 22.90664 
Namibia 2010 766951872.4 4.4 1.669848 -2.40577 6.797897 11,282,192,605.04 23.14649 
Namibia 2011 744490546.9 4.42965 1.614244 -2.45569 5.999297 12,409,629,835.70 23.24174 
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Namibia 2012 1077257911 4.392183 1.620919 -2.34281 8.276316 
         
13,016,152,023.59  23.28946 
Namibia 2013 853433033.1 4.392183 1.620919 -2.34281 6.709151 
         
12,720,433,346.03  23.26648 
Niger 2003 18487601.85 2.542557 0.412048 -2.50611 0.67685 
           
2,731,416,346.48  21.72809 
Niger 2004 24367537.69 2.2 0.276508 -2.40756 0.798177 
           
3,052,898,739.47  21.83936 
Niger 2005 49733809.25 2.4 0.323218 -2.28403 1.460553 
           
3,405,134,831.85  21.94855 
Niger 2006 40274236.62 2.3 0.218182 -2.22121 1.104394 
           
3,646,728,060.06  22.0171 
Niger 2007 98942805.39 2.6 0.473333 -2.44811 2.305626 
           
4,291,363,390.91  22.17987 
Niger 2008 281935056.4 2.8 0.657682 -2.41683 5.217769 
           
5,403,363,917.31  22.41029 
Niger 2009 631278387 2.9 0.633333 -2.525 11.69657 
           
5,397,121,856.35  22.40913 
Niger 2010 795859656 2.6 0.527907 -2.42385 13.91706 
           
5,718,589,799.24  22.46699 
Niger 2011 1065789606 2.540459 0.3709 -2.32019 16.62914 
           
6,409,169,889.51  22.581 
Niger 2012 851019876.2 2.542557 0.375344 -2.33938 12.25863 
           
6,942,209,594.55  22.66089 
Niger 2013 719134023.7 2.542557 0.375344 -2.33938 9.378437 
           
7,667,951,987.69  22.76032 
Nigeria 2003 2005390033 1.4 0.1 -2.7073 2.964105 
         
67,655,840,108.15  24.9377 
Nigeria 2004 1874033035 1.6 0.1 -2.54452 2.133331 
         
87,845,403,978.27  25.19884 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Nigeria 2005 4982533943 1.9 0.119159 -2.37072 4.438849 
      
112,248,324,605.53  25.44398 
Nigeria 2006 4854416867 2.2 0.2 -2.25588 3.33798 
      
145,429,764,861.25  25.70296 
Nigeria 2007 6034971231 2.2 0.261538 -2.38915 3.62567 
      
166,451,213,395.64  25.83797 
Nigeria 2008 8196606673 2.7 0.579143 -2.52277 3.93945 
      
208,064,753,766.47  26.06112 
Nigeria 2009 8554840769 2.5 0.486842 -2.44107 5.04766 
      
169,481,317,540.36  25.85601 
Nigeria 2010 6026232041 2.4 0.459375 -2.3773 1.632849 
      
369,062,464,570.39  26.63423 
Nigeria 2011 8841113287 2.449336 0.349879 -2.2557 2.147237 
      
411,743,801,711.64  26.74367 
Nigeria 2012 7069934205 2.149926 0.205239 -2.29179 1.533762 
      
460,953,836,444.36  26.85656 
Nigeria 2013 5562873606 2.149926 0.205239 -2.29179 1.08024 
      
514,966,287,206.51  26.96737 
Rwanda 2003 4700000 3.383346 0.959161 -2.50029 0.254607 
           
1,845,979,351.35  21.33628 
Rwanda 2004 7700000 3.383346 0.912852 -2.49714 0.368564 
           
2,089,188,920.77  21.46004 
Rwanda 2005 10500000 3.1 0.673502 -2.55528 0.406746 
           
2,581,465,675.21  21.67162 
Rwanda 2006 30643966.47 2.5 0.317647 -2.32696 0.985233 
           
3,110,328,010.91  21.85799 
Rwanda 2007 82283165.86 2.8 0.573214 -2.48646 2.179428 
           
3,775,447,705.94  22.05178 
Rwanda 2008 103346051.9 3 0.742177 -2.57701 2.154581 
           
4,796,573,531.22  22.29117 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Rwanda 2009 118670000 3.3 0.921622 -2.42469 2.235265 
           
5,308,990,459.48  22.39267 
Rwanda 2010 42332000 4 1.318617 -2.51356 0.742856 
           
5,698,548,987.89  22.46348 
Rwanda 2011 106210000 4.983419 2.039578 -2.3123 1.657789 
           
6,406,727,230.17  22.58061 
Rwanda 2012 159814904.8 3.383346 0.868072 -2.52756 2.213608 
           
7,219,657,132.22  22.70007 
Rwanda 2013 257642420.2 3.383346 0.868072 -2.52756 3.425182 
           
7,522,006,198.23  22.7411 
Senegal 2003 86305872.18 3.2 0.870462 -2.43679 1.258295 
           
6,858,952,880.10  22.64882 
Senegal 2004 137336903.7 3 0.691897 -2.46469 1.710011 
           
8,031,344,381.10  22.80662 
Senegal 2005 167877437.2 3.2 0.755541 -2.61267 1.928071 
           
8,707,015,771.00  22.88739 
Senegal 2006 289582834.4 3.3 0.764634 -2.88209 3.09426 
           
9,358,710,935.43  22.95957 
Senegal 2007 350994490.1 3.6 1.012088 -2.61061 3.110384 
         
11,284,603,070.57  23.14671 
Senegal 2008 453902667.5 3.4 1.024762 -2.48442 3.390789 
         
13,386,345,214.54  23.3175 
Senegal 2009 330145120.8 3 0.70303 -2.55517 2.576643 
         
12,812,994,418.94  23.27373 
Senegal 2010 266107641.3 2.9 0.614516 -2.5327 2.057677 
         
12,932,428,287.60  23.283 
Senegal 2011 338218819.4 2.870529 0.550791 -2.39435 2.342126 
         
14,440,676,929.32  23.39331 
Senegal 2012 276175403.1 3.163392 0.734943 -2.4581 1.966266 
         
14,045,681,414.37  23.36558 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Senegal 2013 311278297.3 3.163392 0.731433 -2.49512 2.081897 
         
14,951,667,193.55  23.42809 
Sierra Leone 2003 8615049.668 2.2 0.357879 -2.35991 0.628174 
           
1,371,442,565.70  21.03913 
Sierra Leone 2004 61153314.19 2.3 0.305151 -2.44216 4.272844 
           
1,431,208,677.30  21.08179 
Sierra Leone 2005 90731669.74 2.4 0.323218 -2.28403 5.573697 
           
1,627,854,494.80  21.21053 
Sierra Leone 2006 58869143.91 2.2 0.2 -2.25588 3.122846 
           
1,885,112,201.85  21.35725 
Sierra Leone 2007 95470171.32 2.1 0.2625 -2.43485 4.422993 
           
2,158,496,872.86  21.49268 
Sierra Leone 2008 53095074.15 1.9 0.258333 -2.51307 2.119176 
           
2,505,458,705.03  21.64174 
Sierra Leone 2009 110430202.5 2.2 0.321739 -2.45952 4.434973 
           
2,489,985,963.18  21.63554 
Sierra Leone 2010 238404157.8 2.4 0.458065 -2.36013 9.111181 
           
2,616,610,911.08  21.68515 
Sierra Leone 2011 950477689 2.460909 0.342461 -2.28161 31.83586 
           
2,985,556,819.41  21.81705 
Sierra Leone 2012 722447242.9 2.240101 0.24094 -2.30448 18.74815 
           
3,853,432,409.29  22.07223 
Sierra Leone 2013 429675225.2 2.240101 0.24094 -2.30448 8.664983 
           
4,958,754,472.42  22.32442 
South Africa 2003 783136092.3 4.4 1.694788 -2.39418 0.44685 
      
175,256,866,088.54  25.88952 
South Africa 2004 701422007.6 4.6 1.788406 -2.50296 0.306842 
      
228,593,703,990.96  26.15521 
South Africa 2005 6522098178 4.5 1.668931 -2.57575 2.530173 
      
257,772,766,357.93  26.27534 
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South Africa 2006 623291744.3 4.6 1.812264 -2.342 0.229456 
      
271,638,630,111.50  26.32774 
South Africa 2007 6586792253 5.1 2.152632 -2.19024 2.199885 
      
299,415,359,539.56  26.4251 
South Africa 2008 9885001293 4.9 2.036304 -2.05208 3.447016 
      
286,769,850,239.68  26.38195 
South Africa 2009 7624489974 4.7 1.859259 -2.21837 2.576394 
      
295,936,471,258.13  26.41341 
South Africa 2010 3693271715 4.5 1.722138 -2.39 0.983956 
      
375,349,442,837.24  26.65112 
South Africa 2011 4139289123 4.080277 1.400536 -2.42419 0.993596 
      
416,596,716,626.96  26.75538 
South Africa 2012 4626029122 4.597809 1.763349 -2.31727 1.164114 
      
397,386,418,270.40  26.70817 
South Africa 2013 8232518816 4.597809 1.7739 -2.24411 2.248966 
      
366,057,913,372.21  26.62606 
Sudan 2003 1349190000 2.3 0.396176 -2.35103 7.645651 
         
17,646,503,525.17  23.5938 
Sudan 2004 1511070000 2.2 0.276508 -2.40756 7.042163 
         
21,457,470,202.78  23.78934 
Sudan 2005 1561689997 2.1 0.261495 -2.27843 5.887718 
         
26,524,538,565.74  24.00134 
Sudan 2006 1841833814 2 0.125 -2.242 5.141569 
         
35,822,408,611.56  24.30184 
Sudan 2007 1504379838 1.8 0.25 -2.40526 3.277591 
         
45,898,948,564.06  24.54971 
Sudan 2008 1653120315 1.6 0.266667 -2.59833 3.03177 
         
54,526,580,231.56  24.72195 
Sudan 2009 1726298403 1.5 0.1 -2.66452 3.247962 
         
53,150,209,167.93  24.69639 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Sudan 2010 2063730998 1.6 0.15 -2.61192 3.144296 
         
65,634,109,236.77  24.90736 
Sudan 2011 1734376994 1.563758 0.073462 -2.56322 2.576039 
         
67,327,289,319.73  24.93283 
Sudan 2012 2311460740 1.851529 0.152172 -2.42851 3.687194 
         
62,688,889,672.54  24.86145 
Sudan 2013 1687884179 1.851529 0.119175 -2.35272 2.53893 
         
66,480,141,187.35  24.92017 
Swaziland 2003 -60190680.48 3.140253 0.821821 -2.46752 -3.24647 
           
1,854,032,545.90  21.34063 
Swaziland 2004 69582011.84 3.140253 0.790353 -2.40645 2.874523 
           
2,420,645,241.19  21.6073 
Swaziland 2005 -45850344.68 2.7 0.425289 -2.46622 -1.77433 
           
2,584,089,443.81  21.67264 
Swaziland 2006 121031132.7 2.5 0.317647 -2.32696 4.105612 
           
2,947,943,587.09  21.80437 
Swaziland 2007 37493846.24 3.3 0.888 -2.48974 1.227773 
           
3,053,808,158.51  21.83966 
Swaziland 2008 105729374.7 3.6 1.092437 -2.66364 3.501229 
           
3,019,779,208.83  21.82845 
Swaziland 2009 65705859.52 3.6 1.097619 -2.45211 2.089435 
           
3,144,671,159.00  21.86898 
Swaziland 2010 135660413.7 3.2 0.827778 -2.48385 3.845493 
           
3,527,776,867.18  21.98393 
Swaziland 2011 93211828.7 3.081774 0.648906 -2.54683 1.878113 
           
4,963,056,465.27  22.32529 
Swaziland 2012 89720140.54 3.140253 0.717866 -2.4882 1.826246 
           
4,912,817,417.78  22.31511 
Swaziland 2013 29442304.11 3.140253 0.714698 -2.48124 0.64532 
           
4,562,432,041.10  22.24112 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Tanzania 2003 318401298.7 2.5 0.43667 -2.52503 2.730918 
         
11,659,129,888.80  23.17936 
Tanzania 2004 442539548.4 2.8 0.583458 -2.53039 3.450385 
         
12,825,801,580.93  23.27472 
Tanzania 2005 935520591.7 2.9 0.562349 -2.60669 5.525823 
         
16,929,976,600.14  23.55235 
Tanzania 2006 403038991.4 2.9 0.509375 -2.54157 2.165658 
         
18,610,460,326.54  23.64699 
Tanzania 2007 581511807 3.2 0.832394 -2.43976 2.704487 
         
21,501,741,757.48  23.7914 
Tanzania 2008 1383260000 3 0.747696 -2.55114 5.054226 
         
27,368,386,358.13  24.03265 
Tanzania 2009 952630000 2.6 0.493478 -2.47264 3.333931 
         
28,573,777,052.45  24.07576 
Tanzania 2010 1813200000 2.7 0.563265 -2.43471 5.773068 
         
31,407,908,612.09  24.17033 
Tanzania 2011 1229361018 2.950526 0.60285 -2.3908 3.628721 
         
33,878,631,649.42  24.24605 
Tanzania 2012 1799646137 2.838947 0.544951 -2.37915 4.604118 
         
39,087,748,240.44  24.38907 
Tanzania 2013 2087261310 2.838947 0.544951 -2.37915 4.708095 
         
44,333,456,244.74  24.51501 
Togo 2003 45671000.8 2.497023 0.443779 -2.35081 2.72876 
           
1,673,690,429.62  21.2383 
Togo 2004 79824366.06 2.497023 0.414761 -2.34687 4.120872 
           
1,937,074,572.09  21.38444 
Togo 2005 95965416.47 2.497023 0.373705 -2.22355 4.537041 
           
2,115,154,262.03  21.47239 
Togo 2006 91315553.92 2.4 0.284615 -2.25806 4.145414 
           
2,202,809,251.31  21.513 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Togo 2007 62324369.4 2.3 0.334483 -2.3624 2.469796 
           
2,523,462,557.39  21.6489 
Togo 2008 50687212.17 2.7 0.591143 -2.44808 1.602293 
           
3,163,416,242.06  21.87492 
Togo 2009 46118873.9 2.8 0.566102 -2.57128 1.458074 
           
3,163,000,528.82  21.87479 
Togo 2010 124942198.6 2.4 0.459375 -2.3773 3.937735 
           
3,172,945,644.56  21.87793 
Togo 2011 727757280.6 2.382138 0.336454 -2.23355 19.37574 
           
3,756,023,159.96  22.04663 
Togo 2012 121518516.1 2.497023 0.354968 -2.32399 3.14276 
           
3,866,617,462.62  22.07565 
Togo 2013 195754579.9 2.497023 0.354968 -2.32399 4.796598 
           
4,081,112,865.36  22.12964 
Tunisia 2003 539481939 4.9 2.030639 -2.3426 1.965105 
         
27,453,084,982.54  24.03574 
Tunisia 2004 592147521.7 5 2.089011 -2.37161 1.898935 
         
31,183,139,301.49  24.16314 
Tunisia 2005 712714847.3 4.9 2.019763 -2.32747 2.208393 
         
32,273,007,553.57  24.1975 
Tunisia 2006 3239909093 4.6 1.812264 -2.342 9.424248 
         
34,378,437,265.21  24.2607 
Tunisia 2007 1515345044 4.2 1.507071 -2.40357 3.894681 
         
38,908,069,299.20  24.38447 
Tunisia 2008 2600674976 4.4 1.716739 -2.21754 5.797755 
         
44,856,586,316.05  24.52674 
Tunisia 2009 1525244858 4.2 1.509091 -2.33966 3.509946 
         
43,454,935,940.16  24.49499 
Tunisia 2010 1334497695 4.3 1.587245 -2.36182 3.029443 
         
44,050,929,160.26  24.50861 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Tunisia 2011 432666011.6 3.759299 1.131852 -2.58054 0.944466 
         
45,810,626,509.45  24.54778 
Tunisia 2012 1554269129 4.473255 1.66301 -2.32516 3.450544 
         
45,044,176,963.95  24.53091 
Tunisia 2013 1058622582 4.473255 1.670719 -2.35059 2.288639 
         
46,255,554,871.67  24.55745 
Uganda 2003 202192593.6 2.2 0.357879 -2.35991 3.19082 
           
6,336,696,288.98  22.56962 
Uganda 2004 295416479.8 2.6 0.471879 -2.46075 3.720441 
           
7,940,362,799.18  22.79522 
Uganda 2005 379808340.7 2.5 0.366301 -2.3764 4.213616 
           
9,013,834,373.41  22.92203 
Uganda 2006 644262499.9 2.7 0.384906 -2.456 6.479821 
           
9,942,597,779.99  23.02009 
Uganda 2007 792305780.9 2.8 0.573214 -2.48646 6.445276 
         
12,292,813,603.23  23.23228 
Uganda 2008 728860900.7 2.6 0.555844 -2.45833 5.118755 
         
14,239,026,629.64  23.37925 
Uganda 2009 841570802.7 2.5 0.430952 -2.44107 4.707251 
         
17,878,178,830.72  23.60685 
Uganda 2010 543872727.3 2.5 0.497297 -2.39803 2.694868 
         
20,181,796,802.86  23.72805 
Uganda 2011 894293858 2.433897 0.35516 -2.23476 4.413457 
         
20,262,889,523.96  23.73206 
Uganda 2012 1205388488 2.5371 0.378489 -2.32431 5.18739 
         
23,236,898,742.13  23.86901 
Uganda 2013 1096000000 2.5371 0.378489 -2.32431 4.443911 
         
24,662,957,836.49  23.92857 
Zambia 2003 347000000 2.5 0.43667 -2.52503 7.078975 
           
4,901,839,731.27  22.31288 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Zambia 2004 364040000 2.6 0.471879 -2.46075 5.851719 6,221,077,674.78 22.55121 
Zambia 2005 356940000 2.6 0.399701 -2.47152 4.284032 8,331,870,169.15 22.84335 
Zambia 2006 615790000 2.6 0.351163 -2.43905 4.827129 12,756,858,899.28 23.26933 
Zambia 2007 1323900000 2.6 0.473333 -2.44811 9.418112 14,056,957,976.26 23.36638 
Zambia 2008 938620000 2.8 0.613283 -2.4949 5.240508 17,910,858,637.90 23.60867 
Zambia 2009 694800000 3 0.70303 -2.55517 4.53278 15,328,342,303.96 23.45297 
Zambia 2010 1729300000 3 0.709375 -2.46306 8.5332 20,265,552,104.40 23.73219 
Zambia 2011 1108500000 3.195245 0.732581 -2.51882 4.725162 23,459,515,284.21 23.87854 
Zambia 2012 1731500000 2.766138 0.508087 -2.35739 6.789381 25,503,060,411.46 23.96206 
Zambia 2013 2099800000 2.766138 0.508087 -2.35739 7.487114 28,045,517,946.11 24.05709 
Zimbabwe 2003 3800000 2.3 0.376575 -2.32593 0.066346 5,727,591,800.00 22.46856 
Zimbabwe 2004 8700000 2.3 0.334712 -2.39815 0.149855 5,805,598,400.00 22.48209 
Zimbabwe 2005 102800000 2.6 0.356246 -2.48835 1.786206 5,755,215,200.00 22.47337 
Zimbabwe 2006 40000000 2.4 0.329502 -2.24815 0.734768 5,443,896,500.00 22.41776 
Zimbabwe 2007 68900000 2.1 0.252042 -2.45119 1.301978 5,291,950,100.00 22.38945 
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corr FDI_of_GDP GDP LN_GDP 
Zimbabwe 2008 51600000 1.8 0.366488 -2.49889 1.168557 
           
4,415,702,800.00  22.20843 
Zimbabwe 2009 105000000 2.2 0.321739 -2.45952 1.287226 
           
8,157,077,400.00  22.82215 
Zimbabwe 2010 165900000 2.4 0.454839 -2.36013 1.760743 
           
9,422,161,300.00  22.96633 
Zimbabwe 2011 387000000 2.229767 0.258305 -2.26554 3.532238 
         
10,956,226,600.00  23.11717 
Zimbabwe 2012 399500000 2.258863 0.250778 -2.3033 3.223668 
         
12,392,715,500.00  23.24037 
Zimbabwe 2013 400000000 2.258863 0.250778 -2.3033 2.965109 
         






10 Appendix 4: Data set Education Index, HDI, Inflation, Infrastructure, Political Stability, Rule of Law, Unemployment, Bureuacracy 
Country Time 
Education 
index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Algeria 2003 0.534936 0.6682 4.27 3.933845 5.288462 -0.54438 23.70000076 25 
Algeria 2004 0.548751 0.6776 3.96 5.081225 10.57692 -0.55413 20.10000038 24 
Algeria 2005 0.562567 0.687 1.38 6.228605 20.67308 -0.70365 15.30000019 24 
Algeria 2006 0.570238 0.6946 2.31 7.375985 15.86539 -0.64449 12.30000019 24 
Algeria 2007 0.580687 0.7022 3.67 9.451191 14.42308 -0.71178 13.80000019 24 
Algeria 2008 0.59808 0.7098 4.86 10.18 14.83254 -0.70641 11.30000019 24 
Algeria 2009 0.615473 0.7174 5.73 11.23 13.27014 -0.75809 10.19999981 24 
Algeria 2010 0.631478 0.725 3.91 12.5 11.32076 -0.74908 10 24 
Algeria 2011 0.642589 0.73 4.52 14 10.37736 -0.77497 10 24 
Algeria 2012 0.642589 0.732 8.89 15.22803 9.952606 -0.75369 11 24 
Algeria 2013 0.642589 0.734 3.25 16.5 12.32228 -0.66325 9.800000191 24 
Angola 2003 0.338296 0.4254 98.22 1.006347 19.23077 -1.5298 6.900000095 83 
Angola 2004 0.35149 0.4372 43.54 1.30678 17.78846 -1.45906 6.900000095 83 
Angola 2005 0.364685 0.449 22.96 1.607214 21.15385 -1.44271 6.800000191 83 
Angola 2006 0.379923 0.461 13.3 1.907648 28.84615 -1.29697 6.800000191 83 
Angola 2007 0.395162 0.473 12.25 3.2 23.55769 -1.39593 6.699999809 83 
Angola 2008 0.410401 0.485 12.47 4.6 31.57895 -1.39687 6.800000191 68 
Angola 2009 0.42564 0.497 13.73 6 31.75356 -1.24047 6.900000095 68 
Angola 2010 0.440879 0.509 14.47 10 37.26415 -1.25579 6.900000095 66 
Angola 2011 0.474212 0.521 13.47 14.776 35.37736 -1.24787 6.900000095 66 
Angola 2012 0.474212 0.524 10.29 16.93721 35.54502 -1.27635 6.900000095 66 
Angola 2013 0.474212 0.53 8.78 19.1 34.12322 -1.27962 6.900000095 66 
Benin 2003 0.31068 0.4166 1.49 0.881551 67.78846 -0.51882 0.899999976 35 




index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Benin 2005 0.338667 0.433 5.36 1.319087 60.57692 -0.59101 1.299999952 34 
Benin 2006 0.351515 0.44 3.78 1.537854 62.5 -0.56603 1.100000024 34 
Benin 2007 0.364363 0.447 1.3 1.79 55.76923 -0.5511 1.100000024 34 
Benin 2008 0.377211 0.454 7.95 1.85 55.98086 -0.5678 1.100000024 34 
Benin 2009 0.390059 0.461 2.16 2.24 57.34597 -0.67335 1.200000048 34 
Benin 2010 0.402907 0.468 2.31 3.13 52.83019 -0.7007 1 34 
Benin 2011 0.413556 0.473 2.71 4.148323 56.60378 -0.7072 1 32 
Benin 2012 0.413556 0.475 6.75 4.5 57.8199 -0.63556 1 29 
Benin 2013 0.413556 0.477 0.97 4.9 57.8199 -0.6261 1 18 
Botswana 2003 0.59484 0.5916 9.19 3.5963 86.05769 0.66833 23.79999924 125 
Botswana 2004 0.601087 0.6018 6.95 3.827511 76.92308 0.635057 22.89999962 125 
Botswana 2005 0.607333 0.612 8.61 4.058722 84.13461 0.603888 22 125 
Botswana 2006 0.603 0.6258 11.56 4.289933 80.28846 0.580817 17.60000038 105 
Botswana 2007 0.607 0.6396 7.08 5.28 82.21154 0.612609 18.5 105 
Botswana 2008 0.611 0.6534 12.7 6.25 81.33971 0.659515 21.89999962 74 
Botswana 2009 0.615 0.6672 8.03 6.15 82.93839 0.654873 18.39999962 59 
Botswana 2010 0.619 0.681 6.95 6 82.07547 0.666208 17.89999962 59 
Botswana 2011 0.619 0.688 8.46 8 83.49056 0.657604 17.79999924 40 
Botswana 2012 0.619 0.691 7.54 11.5 88.15166 0.653666 17.70000076 40 
Botswana 2013 0.619 0.696 5.88 15 85.78199 0.585473 17.60000038 41 
Burkina Faso 2003 0.1944 2.03 0.354894 43.26923 -0.56387 2.799999952 40 
Burkina Faso 2004 0.2592 -0.4 0.447498 41.82692 -0.56235 2.799999952 40 
Burkina Faso 2005 0.172256 0.324 6.42 0.540103 43.26923 -0.51244 2.700000048 40 
Burkina Faso 2006 0.177811 0.3348 2.33 0.632708 51.92308 -0.41702 2.299999952 34 
Burkina Faso 2007 0.1917 0.3456 -0.23 0.75 53.84615 -0.39898 3.299999952 18 
Burkina Faso 2008 0.205589 0.3564 10.66 0.92 48.32536 -0.3398 3.299999952 16 
Burkina Faso 2009 0.2167 0.3672 2.61 1.13 45.0237 -0.1953 3.299999952 14 





index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Burkina Faso 2011 0.2417 0.385 2.76 3 28.30189 -0.3662 3.299999952 13 
Burkina Faso 2012 0.250033 0.393 3.82 3.725035 26.54029 -0.43095 3.299999952 13 
Burkina Faso 2013 0.250033 0.396 0.53 9.1 20.37915 -0.52248 3.299999952 13 
Burundi 2003 0.220071 0.3172 10.76 0.367421 1.442308 -1.53715 7.300000191 13 
Burundi 2004 0.231219 0.3226 7.85 0.464145 0.961538 -1.59778 7.300000191 13 
Burundi 2005 0.242367 0.328 13.52 0.560869 6.730769 -1.18458 7.300000191 13 
Burundi 2006 0.281244 0.3404 2.81 0.657593 10.09615 -0.97469 7.199999809 13 
Burundi 2007 0.303456 0.3528 8.34 0.7 10.57692 -1.08928 7.199999809 13 
Burundi 2008 0.327056 0.3652 24.11 0.81 9.090909 -1.04637 7.199999809 13 
Burundi 2009 0.350656 0.3776 10.98 0.9 12.79621 -1.16434 7.099999905 13 
Burundi 2010 0.370089 0.39 6.4 1 7.54717 -1.19035 7.099999905 13 
Burundi 2011 0.370089 0.392 9.74 1.11 5.188679 -1.11691 7.099999905 13 
Burundi 2012 0.370089 0.395 18.01 1.22 5.687204 -1.07855 7 7 
Burundi 2013 0.370089 0.397 7.95 1.3 9.952606 -1.04627 7 5 
Cameroon 2003 0.387596 0.4484 0.62 1.140432 29.80769 -1.09294 6 45 
Cameroon 2004 0.397953 0.4522 0.23 1.436537 31.25 -1.19536 5.099999905 45 
Cameroon 2005 0.408311 0.456 2.01 1.732641 40.38462 -1.1807 4.400000095 45 
Cameroon 2006 0.406029 0.462 5.12 2.028745 37.01923 -1.13079 4.099999905 45 
Cameroon 2007 0.428747 0.468 0.92 2.93 33.17308 -1.16747 4.099999905 38 
Cameroon 2008 0.445909 0.474 5.34 3.4 27.27273 -1.0944 4.199999809 38 
Cameroon 2009 0.463071 0.48 3.04 3.84 29.38389 -1.11528 4.5 35 
Cameroon 2010 0.480233 0.486 1.28 4.3 23.58491 -1.05231 4.099999905 19 
Cameroon 2011 0.485789 0.496 2.94 5 26.41509 -1.06163 4.099999905 15 
Cameroon 2012 0.485789 0.501 2.94 5.698987 27.48815 -1.039 4.099999905 15 
Cameroon 2013 0.485789 0.507 1.95 6.4 28.43602 -1.05104 4.099999905 15 
Central African 




index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Central African 
Republic 2004 0.273685 0.322 -2.07 0.225238 8.653846 -1.63292 7 22 
Central African 
Republic 2005 0.280022 0.325 2.88 0.268198 8.653846 -1.48143 7 22 
Central African 
Republic 2006 0.285508 0.3324 6.7 0.311159 5.769231 -1.48996 6.900000095 22 
Central African 
Republic 2007 0.290993 0.3398 0.93 0.375816 6.25 -1.52653 6.900000095 22 
Central African 
Republic 2008 0.296479 0.3472 9.27 1 6.698565 -1.43938 7 23 
Central African 
Republic 2009 0.301964 0.3546 3.52 1.8 4.739336 -1.32068 6.900000095 24 
Central African 
Republic 2010 0.310922 0.362 1.49 2 3.773585 -1.29393 6.900000095 24 
Central African 
Republic 2011 0.317867 0.368 1.3 2.2 4.716981 -1.27212 6.900000095 22 
Central African 
Republic 2012 0.317867 0.373 5.77 3 5.21327 -1.44556 6.900000095 22 
Central African 
Republic 2013 0.317867 0.348 1.5 3.5 3.317536 -1.83426 7.400000095 22 
Chad 2003 0.196407 0.3356 -1.75 0.308376 10.09615 -1.3085 6.900000095 62 
Chad 2004 0.199741 0.3368 -5.36 0.399266 7.211538 -1.33965 6.699999809 62 
Chad 2005 0.203074 0.338 7.89 0.490156 9.615385 -1.45287 7 62 
Chad 2006 0.210482 0.3446 8.04 0.581046 6.25 -1.5088 7.099999905 62 
Chad 2007 0.217889 0.3512 -8.97 0.847225 5.769231 -1.50602 7.099999905 62 
Chad 2008 0.225296 0.3578 10.3 1.19 3.827751 -1.59649 7.099999905 62 
Chad 2009 0.236407 0.3644 9.95 1.5 6.161138 -1.4932 7 62 
Chad 2010 0.236407 0.371 -2.08 1.7 8.962264 -1.48023 6.900000095 62 
Chad 2011 0.255852 0.382 -3.7 1.9 10.84906 -1.4497 7.099999905 53 





index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Chad 2013 0.255852 0.388 0.15 2.3 15.16588 -1.37249 7.099999905 60 
Congo 2003 0.439387 0.4974 -0.63 1.017172 15.38461 -1.18608 6.699999809 37 
Congo 2004 0.449205 0.5002 2.43 1.347445 14.90385 -1.15101 6.599999905 37 
Congo 2005 0.459023 0.503 3.09 1.677718 15.86539 -1.46088 6.599999905 37 
Congo 2006 0.467016 0.5132 6.54 2.00799 17.78846 -1.24007 6.599999905 37 
Congo 2007 0.475009 0.5234 2.66 2.759704 21.63461 -1.21237 6.599999905 38 
Congo 2008 0.483002 0.5336 7.33 4.28751 21.5311 -1.17107 6.599999905 161 
Congo 2009 0.490995 0.5438 5.3 4.5 36.01896 -1.18856 6.5 161 
Congo 2010 0.498988 0.554 5 5 33.96227 -1.18336 6.5 161 
Congo 2011 0.50516 0.56 1.33 5.6 34.90566 -1.1616 6.599999905 161 
Congo 2012 0.511333 0.575 3.89 6.106695 30.80569 -1.11653 6.599999905 161 
Congo 2013 0.511333 0.582 5.97 6.6 30.33175 -1.09241 6.599999905 101 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2003 0.308526 0.35 12.87 0.150978 3.37 -1.73 8.199999809 166.00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2004 0.3123 0.35 3.99 0.199336 1.44 -1.70 8.199999809 133.00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2005 0.316074 0.36 21.32 0.247695 1.44 -1.57 8.199999809 133.00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2006 0.319715 0.37 13.05 0.296054 0.96 -1.61 8.199999809 133.00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2007 0.323356 0.38 16.95 0.370000 2.88 -1.59 8.199999809 132.00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2008 0.345978 0.39 17.30 0.440000 2.87 -1.56 8.199999809 132.00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2009 0.349156 0.40 2.80 0.560000 3.79 -1.63 8.199999809 126.00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2010 0.355111 0.41 7.10 0.720000 2.83 -1.61 8.199999809 84.00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2011 0.360667 0.42 15.32 1.200000 2.36 -1.61 8.199999809 65.00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2012 0.371778 0.42 9.72 1.679961 2.84 -1.65 8.199999809 58.00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2013 0.371778 0.43 1.63 2.200000 2.37 -1.55 8.199999809 31.00 
Cote d'Ivoire 2003 0.3263 0.4082 3.3 0.878181 4.807693 -1.45532 4.099999905 62 
Cote d'Ivoire 2004 0.334428 0.4116 1.46 1.093754 2.884615 -1.41953 4.099999905 58 
Cote d'Ivoire 2005 0.342556 0.415 3.89 1.309328 0.961538 -1.50427 4.099999905 45 
Cote d'Ivoire 2006 0.350917 0.4208 2.47 1.524901 3.846154 -1.45988 4.099999905 45 





index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Cote d'Ivoire 2008 0.367639 0.4324 6.31 1.9 7.177033 -1.4485 4.099999905 40 
Cote d'Ivoire 2009 0.376 0.4382 1.02 2 11.37441 -1.26287 4.099999905 40 
Cote d'Ivoire 2010 0.384361 0.444 1.23 2.7 8.018867 -1.23635 4.099999905 40 
Cote d'Ivoire 2011 0.389222 0.445 4.91 2.9 8.490566 -1.28902 4.099999905 32 
Cote d'Ivoire 2012 0.389222 0.452 1.3 5 11.37441 -1.11664 4.099999905 32 
Cote d'Ivoire 2013 0.389222 0.458 2.58 8.4 17.06161 -0.93439 4.099999905 8 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2003 0.509529 0.6364 4.51 7.150633 26.44231 0.061045 10.39999962 38 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2004 0.517376 0.6412 11.27 9.320422 22.11539 0.087638 10.69999981 38 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2005 0.525222 0.646 4.87 11.49021 26.44231 0.026409 11.19999981 22 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2006 0.534422 0.653 7.64 13.66 21.15385 -0.19946 10.60000038 19 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2007 0.543622 0.66 9.32 16.03 26.44231 -0.18468 8.899999619 10 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2008 0.552822 0.667 18.32 18.01 28.22967 -0.08566 8.699999809 8 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2009 0.562022 0.674 11.76 20 25.59242 -0.05984 9.399999619 8 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2010 0.573444 0.681 11.27 21.6 19.33962 -0.11533 9 8 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2011 0.573444 0.682 10.05 25.6 6.603774 -0.40351 12 8 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2012 0.573444 0.688 7.12 26.4 7.582938 -0.45967 12.69999981 8 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2013 0.573444 0.689 9.42 29.4 7.109005 -0.60372 13.19999981 8 
Equatorial Guinea 2003 0.414911 0.5482 7.32 0.705774 45.67308 -1.43 6.699999809 
 Equatorial Guinea 2004 0.414911 0.5556 4.22 0.896914 41.34615 -1.34832 6.5 
 Equatorial Guinea 2005 0.414911 0.563 5.63 1.088054 32.21154 -1.44515 6.800000191 177 
Equatorial Guinea 2006 0.414911 0.5686 4.42 1.279194 50.96154 -1.43176 6.900000095 154 
Equatorial Guinea 2007 0.414911 0.5742 2.8 1.557123 51.92308 -1.35512 6.800000191 155 
Equatorial Guinea 2008 0.414911 0.5798 6.55 1.82 52.15311 -1.27634 6.800000191 155 
Equatorial Guinea 2009 0.414911 0.5854 4.69 2.13 58.76777 -1.24515 7 155 
Equatorial Guinea 2010 0.414911 0.591 7.79 6 53.30189 -1.24625 7 155 
Equatorial Guinea 2011 0.414911 0.59 2.48 11.5 50.4717 -1.26807 6.900000095 133 
Equatorial Guinea 2012 0.414911 0.584 0.99 13.94318 53.08057 -1.20106 6.900000095 154 





index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Ethiopia 2003 0.206983 0.3218 17.76 0.162928 9.615385 -0.79876 5.800000191 47 
Ethiopia 2004 0.219761 0.3344 3.26 0.21215 12.5 -0.80933 5.400000095 35 
Ethiopia 2005 0.232539 0.347 12.94 0.261371 5.769231 -0.86502 5.400000095 35 
Ethiopia 2006 0.25202 0.36 12.31 0.310593 7.211538 -0.61949 5.300000191 19 
Ethiopia 2007 0.281043 0.373 17.24 0.37 7.211538 -0.59898 5.300000191 19 
Ethiopia 2008 0.300524 0.386 44.39 0.45 8.61244 -0.66158 5.199999809 19 
Ethiopia 2009 0.305191 0.399 8.47 0.54 7.582938 -0.78435 5.099999905 20 
Ethiopia 2010 0.300318 0.412 8.14 0.75 6.603774 -0.75376 5.199999809 20 
Ethiopia 2011 0.313744 0.423 33.22 1.1 6.132075 -0.69818 5.199999809 20 
Ethiopia 2012 0.316522 0.429 22.77 1.48281 7.109005 -0.65589 5.599999905 20 
Ethiopia 2013 0.316522 0.436 8.08 1.9 8.056872 -0.62173 5 19 
Gabon 2003 0.560567 0.6392 2.24 3.352671 53.36538 -0.38737 20.79999924 
 Gabon 2004 0.5657 0.6416 0.41 4.064847 60.09615 -0.51054 20.89999962 
 Gabon 2005 0.570833 0.644 3.71 4.777024 56.25 -0.46244 20.89999962 57 
Gabon 2006 0.574533 0.6478 -1.41 5.489201 52.40385 -0.73108 21 57 
Gabon 2007 0.578233 0.6516 5.03 5.767005 53.36538 -0.69427 21.10000038 57 
Gabon 2008 0.581933 0.6554 5.26 6.21 53.58852 -0.62794 21.20000076 57 
Gabon 2009 0.585633 0.6592 1.89 6.7 48.81517 -0.54929 21.29999924 57 
Gabon 2010 0.589333 0.663 1.46 7.23 55.66038 -0.51441 20.39999962 57 
Gabon 2011 0.589333 0.668 1.27 8 60.37736 -0.44897 20.39999962 57 
Gabon 2012 0.589333 0.673 2.66 8.616714 56.87204 -0.45109 20.29999924 57 
Gabon 2013 0.589333 0.679 0.48 9.2 58.76777 -0.51649 20.29999924 50 
Gambia, The 2003 0.286615 0.4042 17.03 3.079743 56.73077 0.163488 7.099999905 28 
Gambia, The 2004 0.296921 0.4106 14.21 3.799059 54.32692 -0.29766 7.099999905 28 
Gambia, The 2005 0.307226 0.417 4.84 4.518375 55.76923 -0.28051 7.199999809 28 
Gambia, The 2006 0.318066 0.4218 2.06 5.237691 44.71154 -0.30326 7.099999905 27 
Gambia, The 2007 0.328905 0.4266 5.37 6.205037 45.67308 -0.24025 7.099999905 32 




index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Gambia, The 2009 0.342678 0.4362 4.56 7.63 49.76303 -0.44333 7 27 
Gambia, The 2010 0.345611 0.441 5.05 9.2 50 -0.5106 7 27 
Gambia, The 2011 0.345611 0.437 4.8 10.8703 48.11321 -0.50602 7.199999809 27 
Gambia, The 2012 0.345611 0.44 4.25 12.44923 44.54976 -0.54363 7 27 
Gambia, The 2013 0.345611 0.442 5.7 14 44.54976 -0.58686 7 27 
Ghana 2003 0.448749 0.5006 26.67 1.438396 40.38462 -0.00488 8.100000381 21 
Ghana 2004 0.454158 0.5058 12.62 1.866656 46.15385 -0.14508 6.900000095 21 
Ghana 2005 0.459567 0.511 15.12 2.294916 52.88462 -0.14102 3.799999952 17 
Ghana 2006 0.476536 0.5196 10.92 2.723176 46.15385 0.0012 3.599999905 17 
Ghana 2007 0.496282 0.5282 10.73 3.85 40.38462 -0.01373 2.799999952 13 
Ghana 2008 0.516029 0.5368 16.52 4.27 44.49761 -0.1068 4.300000191 11 
Ghana 2009 0.521887 0.5454 19.25 5.44 45.97157 -0.07681 2.200000048 11 
Ghana 2010 0.534689 0.554 10.71 7.8 47.64151 -0.063 5.300000191 11 
Ghana 2011 0.544411 0.566 8.73 9 52.83019 -0.04237 4.599999905 11 
Ghana 2012 0.552744 0.572 9.16 10.6 50.23697 -0.036 3.599999905 11 
Ghana 2013 0.552744 0.577 11.61 12.3 46.91943 0.102853 1.799999952 14 
Guinea 2003 0.344 0.366459 22.59615 -1.10651 2 48 
Guinea 2004 0.351 0.456803 17.30769 -1.24059 2 40 
Guinea 2005 0.252778 0.358 31.37 0.547148 15.38461 -1.35513 2 40 
Guinea 2006 0.266667 0.364 34.7 0.637492 4.326923 -1.41786 2 40 
Guinea 2007 0.277778 0.37 22.84 0.780025 1.923077 -1.46641 2 40 
Guinea 2008 0.280556 0.376 18.38 0.92 2.392344 -1.54132 2 40 
Guinea 2009 0.280556 0.382 4.68 0.94 2.843602 -1.54015 1.600000024 40 
Guinea 2010 0.286111 0.388 15.46 1 4.716981 -1.49858 1.600000024 40 
Guinea 2011 0.291667 0.399 21.35 1.3 9.433962 -1.47342 1.700000048 40 
Guinea 2012 0.294445 0.409 15.22 1.490144 10.90047 -1.4327 1.700000048 35 
Guinea 2013 0.294445 0.411 11.89 1.6 11.37441 -1.41618 1.700000048 16 





index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Kenya 2004 0.459656 0.475 11.62 5.128546 16.34615 -0.85764 9.600000381 47 
Kenya 2005 0.466778 0.482 10.31 6.331168 12.01923 -0.89747 9.5 54 
Kenya 2006 0.471889 0.4914 14.45 7.53379 15.38461 -0.88724 9.5 54 
Kenya 2007 0.490889 0.5008 9.76 7.95 11.05769 -0.96997 9.399999619 44 
Kenya 2008 0.501556 0.5102 26.24 8.67 10.52632 -1.01742 9.399999619 31 
Kenya 2009 0.512222 0.5196 9.23 10.04 9.478673 -1.05064 9.399999619 31 
Kenya 2010 0.514556 0.529 3.96 14 13.20755 -0.99341 9.300000191 31 
Kenya 2011 0.514556 0.535 14.02 28 12.73585 -0.95359 9.199999809 33 
Kenya 2012 0.514556 0.539 9.38 32.1 10.42654 -0.86569 9.199999809 32 
Kenya 2013 0.514556 0.544 5.72 39 13.74408 -0.74733 9.100000381 32 
Lesotho 2003 0.463894 0.4394 6.63 1.595757 46.15385 -0.01373 38.59999847 138 
Lesotho 2004 0.4687 0.4382 5.02 2.057074 60.57692 -0.15311 36 138 
Lesotho 2005 0.473506 0.437 3.44 2.518391 47.11538 -0.16559 36.40000153 103 
Lesotho 2006 0.477414 0.444 6.07 2.979708 41.82692 -0.25775 32.5 73 
Lesotho 2007 0.483174 0.451 8.01 3.445431 31.25 -0.3419 26.39999962 73 
Lesotho 2008 0.488934 0.458 10.72 3.58 36.36364 -0.26176 25.29999924 39 
Lesotho 2009 0.494695 0.465 7.38 3.72 54.9763 -0.23056 28.5 39 
Lesotho 2010 0.500455 0.472 3.6 3.86 63.67924 -0.30046 28.29999924 39 
Lesotho 2011 0.502307 0.48 5.02 4.2248 59.90566 -0.27289 30.20000076 39 
Lesotho 2012 0.504158 0.484 6.1 4.589618 55.92417 -0.28664 27.20000076 29 
Lesotho 2013 0.504158 0.494 4.93 5 58.29384 -0.2612 24.60000038 29 
Libya 2003 0.64564 0.743 -2.19 2.244047 47.11538 -0.79424 19.70000076 
 Libya 2004 0.652598 0.747 -2.2 2.929715 58.17308 -0.81265 19.60000038 
 Libya 2005 0.659556 0.751 2.65 3.615384 60.09615 -0.8721 19.5 
 Libya 2006 0.667222 0.752 1.46 4.301052 55.76923 -0.99019 19.29999924 
 Libya 2007 0.674889 0.753 6.25 4.721999 71.15385 -0.81171 19.10000038 
 Libya 2008 0.682556 0.754 10.36 9 73.68421 -0.70401 18.79999924 






index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Libya 2010 0.697889 0.756 2.8 14 45.28302 -0.93926 18.5 
 Libya 2011 0.697889 0.711 15.52 14 11.79245 -1.17596 17.70000076 
 Libya 2012 0.697889 0.745 6.06 
 
6.635071 -1.14804 19.20000076 35 
Libya 2013 0.697889 0.738 2.61 16.5 4.739336 -1.36317 19.20000076 35 
Madagascar 2003 0.412685 0.4692 -1.22 0.401973 64.90385 -0.20312 5 67 
Madagascar 2004 0.4175 0.4736 13.81 0.4705 53.36538 -0.20141 3.799999952 47 
Madagascar 2005 0.422315 0.478 18.51 0.539026 44.23077 -0.32514 2.599999905 42 
Madagascar 2006 0.430648 0.4832 10.77 0.607552 50.48077 -0.42893 3.900000095 20 
Madagascar 2007 0.433426 0.4884 10.3 0.65 43.75 -0.37408 4.099999905 12 
Madagascar 2008 0.441759 0.4936 9.22 1.65 29.1866 -0.45412 4.300000191 12 
Madagascar 2009 0.455648 0.4988 8.96 1.63 21.32701 -0.7267 4.800000191 12 
Madagascar 2010 0.456574 0.504 9.25 1.7 15.09434 -0.85351 3.599999905 12 
Madagascar 2011 0.4575 0.505 9.48 1.9 22.64151 -0.861 3.599999905 12 
Madagascar 2012 0.458426 0.507 6.36 2.3 27.01422 -0.90144 3.599999905 12 
Madagascar 2013 0.458426 0.508 5.83 3 23.22275 -0.89981 3.599999905 12 
Malawi 2003 0.382784 0.349 9.58 0.275959 40.86538 -0.24974 7.699999809 43 
Malawi 2004 0.381176 0.352 11.43 0.325685 49.51923 -0.12259 7.800000191 37 
Malawi 2005 0.379567 0.355 15.41 0.375411 50 -0.12251 7.900000095 37 
Malawi 2006 0.387698 0.368 13.97 0.425137 49.03846 -0.24855 7.800000191 37 
Malawi 2007 0.387496 0.381 7.95 0.965865 44.71154 -0.18622 7.5 37 
Malawi 2008 0.403034 0.394 8.71 0.7 42.10526 -0.13772 7.5 37 
Malawi 2009 0.418573 0.407 8.42 1.07 46.91943 -0.12338 7.5 36 
Malawi 2010 0.434111 0.42 7.41 2.26 48.58491 -0.1424 7.5 36 
Malawi 2011 0.439667 0.429 7.62 3.33 44.81132 -0.17588 7.599999905 36 
Malawi 2012 0.439667 0.433 21.27 4.3506 45.0237 -0.24179 7.599999905 37 
Malawi 2013 0.439667 0.439 27.28 5.05 38.38863 -0.18744 7.599999905 40 
Mali 2003 0.21424 0.3448 -1.35 0.436087 51.92308 -0.02643 8.600000381 33 





index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Mali 2005 0.239312 0.366 6.4 0.63178 53.84615 -0.13955 8.5 27 
Mali 2006 0.250978 0.3746 1.54 0.729627 57.69231 -0.27672 8.300000191 42 
Mali 2007 0.262644 0.3832 1.41 0.81 51.44231 -0.17542 8.5 25 
Mali 2008 0.275897 0.3918 9.17 1.57 50.7177 -0.32066 8.399999619 25 
Mali 2009 0.286372 0.4004 2.46 1.8 41.70616 -0.35033 8.5 8 
Mali 2010 0.29407 0.409 1.11 2 37.73585 -0.44168 8.100000381 8 
Mali 2011 0.3015 0.415 2.86 2.2 25.4717 -0.49702 8.100000381 8 
Mali 2012 0.305181 0.414 5.43 2.8 3.791469 -0.69256 8.100000381 8 
Mali 2013 0.305181 0.416 -0.61 3.5 6.161138 -0.75009 8.100000381 11 
Mauritania 2003 0.298484 0.4564 5.15 0.585846 42.78846 -0.50591 32.5 82 
Mauritania 2004 0.304609 0.4612 10.37 0.717118 42.30769 -0.68415 32.5 82 
Mauritania 2005 0.310733 0.466 12.13 0.84839 37.98077 -0.64557 32.09999847 82 
Mauritania 2006 0.32182 0.4704 6.24 0.979661 53.36538 -0.71632 31.79999924 82 
Mauritania 2007 0.324573 0.4748 7.25 1.433613 35.57692 -0.63985 31.39999962 50 
Mauritania 2008 0.318993 0.4792 7.35 1.87 24.40191 -1.11826 31.20000076 19 
Mauritania 2009 0.335636 0.4836 2.22 2.28 19.43128 -0.78604 31.10000038 19 
Mauritania 2010 0.338389 0.488 6.28 4 14.62264 -0.86792 31.10000038 19 
Mauritania 2011 0.341167 0.489 5.64 4.5 13.67924 -0.88107 31.10000038 19 
Mauritania 2012 0.352278 0.498 4.94 5 15.63981 -0.90417 31.10000038 19 
Mauritania 2013 0.352278 0.504 4.13 6.2 18.00948 -0.97201 31.10000038 19 
Mauritius 2003 0.612594 0.7028 3.92 11.99077 82.69231 1.056726 7.699999809 
 Mauritius 2004 0.625424 0.7124 4.71 13.56051 79.80769 1.007987 8.5 46 
Mauritius 2005 0.638253 0.722 4.94 15.13026 81.25 1.006921 9.600000381 46 
Mauritius 2006 0.64832 0.7288 8.93 16.7 67.78846 0.862413 9.100000381 46 
Mauritius 2007 0.655609 0.7356 8.8 20.22 75.96154 0.891133 8.5 7 
Mauritius 2008 0.665675 0.7424 9.73 21.81 76.55502 0.991221 7.199999809 6 
Mauritius 2009 0.678519 0.7492 2.55 22.51 69.66824 0.952071 7.300000191 6 





index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Mauritius 2011 0.695875 0.762 6.53 34.95 75.9434 0.910734 7.900000095 6 
Mauritius 2012 0.718097 0.772 3.85 35.42 79.14692 0.949529 8.699999809 6 
Mauritius 2013 0.718097 0.775 3.54 39 77.25118 0.91561 8 6 
Morocco 2003 0.38294 0.5556 1.17 10.23249 31.25 -0.05296 11.89999962 35 
Morocco 2004 0.395409 0.5648 1.49 13.41206 35.57692 0.016679 10.80000019 12 
Morocco 2005 0.407878 0.574 0.98 16.59163 28.84615 -0.1215 11 12 
Morocco 2006 0.410984 0.5814 3.28 19.77119 30.76923 -0.25337 9.699999809 12 
Morocco 2007 0.422424 0.5888 2.04 21.5 27.40385 -0.26181 9.800000191 12 
Morocco 2008 0.431087 0.5962 3.71 33.1 25.83732 -0.28804 9.600000381 12 
Morocco 2009 0.439749 0.6036 0.99 41.3 31.27962 -0.19243 9.100000381 12 
Morocco 2010 0.453967 0.611 0.99 52 33.01887 -0.1568 9.100000381 12 
Morocco 2011 0.467856 0.621 0.92 46.10748 33.96227 -0.22302 8.899999619 12 
Morocco 2012 0.467856 0.623 1.28 55.41605 32.22749 -0.21413 9 12 
Morocco 2013 0.467856 0.626 1.89 56 29.85782 -0.25594 9.199999809 11 
Mozambique 2003 0.283283 0.3348 13.43 0.476274 51.44231 -0.67824 22.70000076 168 
Mozambique 2004 0.303555 0.3464 12.66 0.598501 44.71154 -0.65238 22.70000076 174 
Mozambique 2005 0.323826 0.358 7.17 0.720727 51.44231 -0.61226 22.60000038 174 
Mozambique 2006 0.334179 0.3666 13.24 0.842954 61.05769 -0.60527 22.60000038 116 
Mozambique 2007 0.352866 0.3752 8.16 0.91 54.80769 -0.60476 22.60000038 31 
Mozambique 2008 0.365996 0.3838 10.33 1.56 56.45933 -0.60764 22.60000038 33 
Mozambique 2009 0.373572 0.3924 3.25 2.68 66.82465 -0.59211 22.60000038 33 
Mozambique 2010 0.372814 0.401 12.7 4.17 57.07547 -0.4712 22.60000038 19 
Mozambique 2011 0.372056 0.405 10.35 4.3 57.54717 -0.5704 22.60000038 19 
Mozambique 2012 0.372056 0.408 2.68 4.8491 58.29384 -0.59814 22.60000038 19 
Mozambique 2013 0.372056 0.413 4.26 5.4 37.44076 -0.84095 22.5 19 
Namibia 2003 0.512049 0.5638 7.14 3.021805 59.61538 0.248138 18.79999924 85 
Namibia 2004 0.513558 0.5664 4.14 3.480827 68.26923 -0.00431 21.89999962 85 




index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Namibia 2006 0.513869 0.5772 4.96 4.398871 70.67308 0.136006 21.70000076 95 
Namibia 2007 0.515449 0.5854 6.55 4.835611 84.13461 0.11674 19.39999962 99 
Namibia 2008 0.517029 0.5936 9.09 5.329004 92.82297 0.366438 37.59999847 66 
Namibia 2009 0.518609 0.6018 9.45 6.5 79.62085 0.217036 29.70000076 66 
Namibia 2010 0.520189 0.61 4.87 11.6 74.0566 0.194186 22.10000038 66 
Namibia 2011 0.520189 0.616 5.01 12 73.1132 0.172939 19.79999924 66 
Namibia 2012 0.520189 0.62 6.72 12.9414 78.19905 0.238183 16.70000076 66 
Namibia 2013 0.520189 0.625 5.6 13.9 76.30331 0.255479 19 66 
Niger 2003 0.136145 0.2762 -1.61 0.165148 41.82692 -0.66114 5 35 
Niger 2004 0.142334 0.2826 0.26 0.20811 28.36539 -0.73057 5 35 
Niger 2005 0.148522 0.289 7.8 0.251072 30.76923 -0.80002 5.099999905 35 
Niger 2006 0.152293 0.2964 0.04 0.294034 39.42308 -0.63761 5.099999905 31 
Niger 2007 0.158842 0.3038 0.05 0.390391 28.84615 -0.65946 5.099999905 23 
Niger 2008 0.165391 0.3112 11.31 0.7 23.92344 -0.73131 5.099999905 19 
Niger 2009 0.17194 0.3186 0.58 0.76 14.69194 -0.52307 5.099999905 17 
Niger 2010 0.184044 0.326 0.8 0.83 12.73585 -0.52058 5.099999905 17 
Niger 2011 0.192378 0.333 2.94 1.3 19.81132 -0.39289 5.099999905 17 
Niger 2012 0.197933 0.342 0.46 1.4077 14.69194 -0.694 5.099999905 17 
Niger 2013 0.197933 0.345 2.3 1.7 9.00474 -0.72599 5.099999905 17 
Nigeria 2003 0.2802 14.03 2.804558 5.769231 -1.52285 7.599999905 
Nigeria 2004 0.3736 15 3.718051 4.807693 -1.43203 7.699999809 
Nigeria 2005 0.415333 0.467 17.86 4.631544 6.25 -1.3613 7.599999905 
Nigeria 2006 0.417239 0.4722 8.24 5.545036 2.884615 -1.08112 7.599999905 
Nigeria 2007 0.419144 0.4774 5.38 6.77 3.846154 -1.06521 7.599999905 
Nigeria 2008 0.421049 0.4826 11.58 15.86 5.263158 -1.05953 7.599999905 
Nigeria 2009 0.422955 0.4878 11.54 20 4.265403 -1.16418 7.599999905 
Nigeria 2010 0.42486 0.493 13.72 24 3.301887 -1.17335 7.599999905 





index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Nigeria 2012 0.42486 0.505 12.22 32.8 3.317536 -1.18171 7.5 
 Nigeria 2013 0.42486 0.511 8.48 38 3.791469 -1.16149 7.5 30.8 
Rwanda 2003 0.305398 0.3678 7.45 
 
15.86539 -0.8766 0.600000024 18 
Rwanda 2004 0.314527 0.3794 12.25 
 
14.42308 -0.80809 0.600000024 18 
Rwanda 2005 0.323656 0.391 9.01 
 
19.23077 -0.91557 0.600000024 18 
Rwanda 2006 0.355113 0.4034 8.88 
 
25.48077 -0.66297 0.600000024 16 
Rwanda 2007 0.356016 0.4158 9.08 2.115387 34.13462 -0.5737 0.600000024 16 
Rwanda 2008 0.35414 0.4282 15.44 4.5 33.49282 -0.47906 0.600000024 14 
Rwanda 2009 0.366153 0.4406 10.39 7.7 29.85782 -0.49376 0.600000024 7 
Rwanda 2010 0.375389 0.453 2.31 8 38.67924 -0.30219 0.600000024 7 
Rwanda 2011 0.3865 0.464 5.67 7 41.50943 -0.30822 0.600000024 7 
Rwanda 2012 0.478167 0.476 6.27 8.023854 39.33649 -0.26326 0.600000024 8 
Rwanda 2013 0.478167 0.479 4.23 9 43.60189 -0.1477 0.600000024 7 
Senegal 2003 0.293998 0.4052 -0.03 3.007853 36.05769 -0.07973 8.699999809 57 
Senegal 2004 0.303238 0.4136 0.51 3.875815 45.67308 -0.01739 9.100000381 57 
Senegal 2005 0.312478 0.422 1.7 4.743777 39.42308 -0.01459 9.199999809 57 
Senegal 2006 0.323544 0.4288 2.11 5.611739 35.09615 -0.24688 10 57 
Senegal 2007 0.329056 0.4356 5.85 6.89 36.05769 -0.25158 8.800000191 58 
Senegal 2008 0.3429 0.4424 5.77 7.12 39.23445 -0.28903 9.399999619 9 
Senegal 2009 0.356744 0.4492 -2.25 7.5 38.38863 -0.37055 9.899999619 9 
Senegal 2010 0.363644 0.456 1.23 8 31.60377 -0.40281 9.100000381 9 
Senegal 2011 0.367811 0.458 3.4 9.8 37.73585 -0.48351 10.39999962 6 
Senegal 2012 0.367811 0.461 1.42 10.8 41.23223 -0.31995 10.30000019 6 
Senegal 2013 0.367811 0.463 0.7 13.1 44.07583 -0.26995 10.30000019 6 
Sierra Leone 2003 0.280889 0.326 7.6 0.172962 18.26923 -1.21135 3.400000095 26 
Sierra Leone 2004 0.283278 0.335 14.19 0.191198 29.80769 -1.17412 3.400000095 26 
Sierra Leone 2005 0.285667 0.344 12.05 0.209434 34.13462 -1.18272 3.400000095 26 





index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Sierra Leone 2007 0.2898 0.3616 11.66 0.239835 42.78846 -1.0269 3.400000095 26 
Sierra Leone 2008 0.291867 0.3704 -35.84 0.25 37.32058 -0.96241 3.400000095 17 
Sierra Leone 2009 0.293933 0.3792 9.25 0.26 34.59716 -0.91886 3.400000095 12 
Sierra Leone 2010 0.296 0.388 16.64 0.58 36.32076 -0.95582 3.400000095 12 
Sierra Leone 2011 0.3045 0.394 16.19 0.9 40.56604 -0.87674 3.400000095 12 
Sierra Leone 2012 0.3045 0.397 12.87 1.3 37.44076 -0.87294 3.400000095 12 
Sierra Leone 2013 0.3045 0.408 10.27 1.7 40.75829 -0.88214 3.400000095 12 
South Africa 2003 0.65769 0.6206 5.86 6.47785 34.13462 0.043203 27.10000038 36 
South Africa 2004 0.658506 0.6168 1.39 6.85428 39.90385 0.089017 24.70000076 36 
South Africa 2005 0.659323 0.613 3.4 7.23071 41.34615 0.077486 23.79999924 33 
South Africa 2006 0.661081 0.619 4.64 7.60714 47.11538 0.237213 22.60000038 33 
South Africa 2007 0.666429 0.625 7.1 8.065375 50.96154 0.073489 22.29999924 31 
South Africa 2008 0.66909 0.631 11.54 8.43 45.93301 0.03404 22.70000076 22 
South Africa 2009 0.682194 0.637 7.13 10 41.23223 0.092992 23.70000076 22 
South Africa 2010 0.684515 0.643 4.26 24 46.69811 0.10755 24.70000076 22 
South Africa 2011 0.687192 0.651 5 33.97 48.58491 0.120726 24.70000076 19 
South Africa 2012 0.695447 0.659 5.65 41 43.12796 0.075322 25 19 
South Africa 2013 0.695447 0.663 5.45 46.5 45.0237 0.120242 24.60000038 19 
Sudan 2003 0.239223 0.4192 7.71 
 
3.846154 -1.57621 14.80000019 
 Sudan 2004 0.250297 0.4256 8.42 
 
5.769231 -1.48403 14.80000019 37 
Sudan 2005 0.261372 0.432 8.52 
 
3.365385 -1.59836 14.69999981 37 
Sudan 2006 0.271986 0.4386 7.2 
 
1.923077 -1.30903 14.80000019 37 
Sudan 2007 0.2826 0.4452 7.98 8.66 2.403846 -1.38515 14.69999981 37 
Sudan 2008 0.293215 0.4518 14.31 
 
1.913876 -1.41498 14.80000019 37 
Sudan 2009 0.303829 0.4584 11.25 
 
0.947867 -1.23448 14.60000038 35 
Sudan 2010 0.305956 0.465 13.25 16.7 0.943396 -1.29618 14.60000038 35 
Sudan 2011 0.305956 0.466 22.11 17.30391 0.943396 -1.2215 14.60000038 35 





index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Sudan 2013 0.305956 0.477 29.96 22.7 2.843602 -1.25251 14.60000038 36 
Swaziland 2003 0.480073 0.496 7.29 2.311365 43.75 -0.75095 22.79999924 60 
Swaziland 2004 0.487087 0.496 3.45 2.77309 46.63462 -0.8315 22.89999962 60 
Swaziland 2005 0.4941 0.496 4.77 3.234814 35.57692 -0.87 22.89999962 60 
Swaziland 2006 0.514427 0.5018 5.3 3.696539 34.13462 -0.68507 22.89999962 60 
Swaziland 2007 0.522531 0.5076 8.08 4.1 44.23077 -0.77793 23 60 
Swaziland 2008 0.530636 0.5134 12.66 6.85 41.14833 -0.63808 23 60 
Swaziland 2009 0.53874 0.5192 7.45 8.94 44.54976 -0.61391 22.89999962 60 
Swaziland 2010 0.546844 0.525 4.51 11.04 43.86792 -0.49143 22.79999924 56 
Swaziland 2011 0.551289 0.528 6.11 18.13 30.18868 -0.4543 22.70000076 56 
Swaziland 2012 0.551289 0.529 8.94 20.78178 33.64929 -0.4603 22.5 56 
Swaziland 2013 0.551289 0.53 5.62 24.7 31.75356 -0.42147 22.29999924 38 
Tanzania 2003 0.351398 0.4256 5.3 0.708597 21.15385 -0.28643 3.5 34 
Tanzania 2004 0.360224 0.4368 4.74 0.905731 24.51923 -0.36116 3 34 
Tanzania 2005 0.369051 0.448 5.03 1.102866 28.36539 -0.26014 2.5 34 
Tanzania 2006 0.37891 0.4584 7.25 1.3 33.17308 -0.441 4.300000191 31 
Tanzania 2007 0.38877 0.4688 7.03 1.6 32.69231 -0.3564 2 30 
Tanzania 2008 0.39863 0.4792 10.28 1.9 37.79904 -0.34491 2.5 29 
Tanzania 2009 0.40095 0.4896 12.14 2.4 47.8673 -0.47625 2.5 29 
Tanzania 2010 0.40327 0.5 6.2 2.9 46.22641 -0.48976 3 29 
Tanzania 2011 0.425889 0.506 12.69 3.2 46.22641 -0.53693 3.5 29 
Tanzania 2012 0.425889 0.51 16 3.95 46.4455 -0.55898 3.200000048 26 
Tanzania 2013 0.425889 0.516 7.87 4.4 41.23223 -0.50443 2.900000095 26 
Togo 2003 0.430291 0.4332 -0.96 1.4 36.53846 -0.98252 7.099999905 74 
Togo 2004 0.438084 0.4356 0.39 1.6 34.13462 -1.13224 7.099999905 63 
Togo 2005 0.445878 0.438 6.8 1.8 7.692307 -1.0945 7.099999905 63 
Togo 2006 0.460142 0.4422 2.23 2 27.88461 -0.97606 7.099999905 62 




index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Togo 2008 0.466449 0.4506 8.68 2.4 38.27751 -0.78115 7.099999905 60 
Togo 2009 0.483491 0.4548 3.31 2.6 38.86256 -0.88097 7 84 
Togo 2010 0.500533 0.459 1.83 3 38.20755 -0.91348 7 84 
Togo 2011 0.514422 0.468 3.57 3.5 39.62264 -0.86332 7 84 
Togo 2012 0.514422 0.47 2.63 4 34.12322 -0.94046 7 38 
Togo 2013 0.514422 0.473 1.77 4.5 35.07109 -1.01451 6.900000095 19 
Tunisia 2003 0.558089 0.6744 2.71 7.868574 56.25 -0.0862 14.5 11 
Tunisia 2004 0.569044 0.6812 3.63 9.574519 50.48077 0.145145 13.89999962 11 
Tunisia 2005 0.58 0.688 2.02 11.28046 47.59615 0.097936 14.19999981 11 
Tunisia 2006 0.588291 0.6932 4.49 12.98641 53.84615 0.201595 12.5 11 
Tunisia 2007 0.596582 0.6984 3.42 17.1 50.48077 0.172598 12.39999962 11 
Tunisia 2008 0.604873 0.7036 4.92 27.53 49.2823 0.139754 12.39999962 11 
Tunisia 2009 0.610387 0.7088 3.52 34.07 47.39336 0.199438 13.30000019 11 
Tunisia 2010 0.618678 0.714 4.42 36.8 44.33962 0.121903 13 11 
Tunisia 2011 0.621456 0.715 3.54 39.1 34.43396 -0.1353 18.29999924 11 
Tunisia 2012 0.621456 0.719 5.14 41.4416 22.27488 -0.1554 14 11 
Tunisia 2013 0.621456 0.72 5.8 43.8 18.48341 -0.20932 13.30000019 11 
Uganda 2003 0.439994 0.4152 8.68 1.346539 6.25 -0.54036 3.200000048 34 
Uganda 2004 0.444684 0.4226 3.72 1.740813 11.53846 -0.63475 2.5 34 
Uganda 2005 0.449375 0.43 8.45 2.135088 8.173077 -0.56264 2 34 
Uganda 2006 0.445784 0.4386 7.31 2.529363 13.94231 -0.33599 3.599999905 28 
Uganda 2007 0.451916 0.4472 6.14 3.671965 18.26923 -0.37946 3 28 
Uganda 2008 0.46638 0.4558 12.05 7.9 17.22488 -0.37791 3.599999905 25 
Uganda 2009 0.47529 0.4644 13.02 9.78 17.06161 -0.41831 4.199999809 25 
Uganda 2010 0.478644 0.473 3.98 12.5 16.03773 -0.39135 4.199999809 24 
Uganda 2011 0.478644 0.473 18.69 13.01354 17.92453 -0.34771 4.199999809 33 
Uganda 2012 0.478644 0.476 14.02 14.6896 19.43128 -0.35859 4.199999809 36 




index HDI Inflation Infrastructure Political_stability Rule_of_Law Unemployment Bureuacracy 
Zambia 2003 0.51769 0.4672 21.4 2.175493 49.03846 -0.47007 15.19999981 35 
Zambia 2004 0.527748 0.4786 17.97 2.836966 51.92308 -0.52199 15.30000019 35 
Zambia 2005 0.537805 0.49 18.32 3.49844 48.55769 -0.57597 15.89999962 35 
Zambia 2006 0.545682 0.503 9.02 4.159913 56.25 -0.59015 15.60000038 35 
Zambia 2007 0.55356 0.516 10.66 4.87 56.73077 -0.57407 15.19999981 33 
Zambia 2008 0.561437 0.529 12.45 5.55 60.28708 -0.43979 15.60000038 18 
Zambia 2009 0.569314 0.542 13.4 6.31 65.40285 -0.48505 14.80000019 18 
Zambia 2010 0.577192 0.555 8.5 10 62.26415 -0.49781 13.19999981 18 
Zambia 2011 0.584262 0.565 6.43 11.5 62.73585 -0.46788 13.19999981 18 
Zambia 2012 0.591333 0.576 6.58 13.4682 65.40285 -0.40269 13.10000038 17.5 
Zambia 2013 0.591333 0.58 6.98 15.4 60.66351 -0.30706 13.10000038 7.5 
Zimbabwe 2003 0.478493 0.4178 431.7 5.096638 17.78846 -1.68099 4.5 131 
Zimbabwe 2004 0.48088 0.4144 282.38 6.661706 12.98077 -1.75804 4.199999809 93 
Zimbabwe 2005 0.483267 0.411 302.12 8.226774 12.98077 -1.76687 4.599999905 93 
Zimbabwe 2006 0.4866 0.421 1096.68 9.791842 18.75 -1.72556 5.099999905 93 
Zimbabwe 2007 0.489933 0.431 24411.03 10.85 15.38461 -1.78467 5.099999905 93 
Zimbabwe 2008 0.493267 0.441 11.4 13.39713 -1.76562 5.699999809 93 
Zimbabwe 2009 0.4966 0.451 11.36 14.21801 -1.84183 6.400000095 93 
Zimbabwe 2010 0.499933 0.461 3.03 11.5 14.15094 -1.81321 5.5 86 
Zimbabwe 2011 0.499933 0.474 3.28 15.7 19.33962 -1.77779 5.400000095 86 
Zimbabwe 2012 0.499933 0.491 3.92 17.09 21.80095 -1.61177 5.300000191 86 
Zimbabwe 2013 0.499933 0.501 1.63 18.5 24.64455 -1.56021 5.300000191 90 
